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The Chinese Maritime Customs Service was an institution that for over 
80 years held an integral role in facilitating foreign trade along the China
coast and waterways. Established as the Imperial Maritime Customs
Service in the wake of China’s defeat in the Opium Wars (1842–3), it
became a central feature of the Treaty Port system. This British-dominated
service also encompassed other responsibilities such as harbour mainten-
ance, lighthouse service, quarantine, anti-piracy patrols and postal ser-
vices. The Maritime Customs Service sat at a crucial juncture between
Chinese and foreign interests, and was intimately linked to British inter-
ests and fortunes in the Far East (most particularly through the aspirations
of the British Inspectors General at its helm). It was these inherent
conflicting interests that led the Service to face serious challenges to its
integrity in the 1920s and 1930s; and these challenges are examined in
detail in this work.
This book provides an overview of the development of the Chinese
Maritime Customs Service as an essentially imperial institution focusing
especially on the fate of the foreign inspectorate in its last decades when
it faced challenges from nationalist elements, civil unrest and war,
compounded with tensions between the inspectorate and British interests
in China.
Donna Brunero is a Research Fellow in the Department of Historical
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Preface
It is common knowledge that during the past eight or nine decades the quasi-
British controlled Inspectorate of Customs has hitherto been a corner-stone
of British position in China and has been co-equal with the name of England
in the Far East. And it should be considered furthermore, that the influ-
ence and prestige of the Inspectorate General throughout this period was
attained and sustained solely by individual exertions
Sir Frederick Maze, 21 December 19431
So wrote the recently retired Inspector General (IG) of the Chinese Maritime
Customs Service (CMCS), Sir Frederick Maze, the determined and some-
times unpopular leader of this service from 1929 to 1943. After an embattled 
and embittering term as IG, marked by the resistance of Chinese nation-
alist forces and British Foreign Office indifference, Maze’s resignation in 
late May 1943 brought to a close over 80 years of British predominance
in the CMCS. This institution, greatly diminished as a result of the Sino-
Japanese War, continued to function under an American IG and relocated
to Taiwan in 1949. This work examines the twilight period of this Service,
particularly the growing turbulence it encountered in the 1920s and 1930s,
and early 1940s through Chinese nationalism, British Foreign Office
indifference and Japanese aggression. In doing so I explore the anomalies
presented by this imperial institution, and examine how perceptions of the
Service and its role changed over these years.
This work draws on Customs documents, personal papers, newspaper
reports and British Foreign Office correspondence among other sources to
build a picture of this institution. The Imperial Maritime Customs Service
(IMCS), known as the Chinese Maritime Customs Service from 1912, was
indeed Chinese in name but its British leadership and close links to British
and foreign interests in China reflect its intimate ties to the treaty port
system and to foreign ambitions in the Far East. Based on English language
sources, this study provides British perceptions of this institution, and in
this way contributes to imperial studies. There is certainly a place for
understanding the Maritime Customs Service as an imperial institution or,














































At present a project is under way (the Chinese Maritime Customs Project)
to open and make accessible voluminous Customs records contained in the
Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing. This project, involving
collaboration between historians at Bristol and Cambridge Universities and
archivists and researchers at the Second Historical Archives, Nanjing, will
see the production of detailed catalogues, datasets and bound volumes of
documents. In light of this project, this work, based on my doctoral disser-
tation, seeks to lay a basic groundwork on the Maritime Customs Service
with the belief that in years to come more detailed studies will flesh out
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From its inception in the 1850s the Imperial Maritime Customs Service
(IMCS) was a uniquely cosmopolitan institution dominated by British
nationals. Stretching along the China coast and penetrating inland along
waterways, the Service represented a vast network of over 40 Customs
stations and sub-branches monitoring and regulating foreign trade with
China. Its influence, however, reached far beyond tariffs and trade, ensuring
its survival in the uncertain years of the early Republic (1911) and beyond;
it was arguably the most important institution in China during the Republic.
With a history of strong leadership from its successive Inspectors General
(IG) – Horatio Nelson Lay (1859–63), Robert Hart (1863–1911), Francis
Aglen (1911–27), Frederick Maze (1929–43) and Lester Knox Little
(1943–50) – the key to the existence of the Service was undeniably through
the treaty port system. Without foreign presence and privilege in China,
reinforced though the Unequal Treaties and preserved by gunboat diplo-
macy, this Service would never have come into being nor would it have
endured into the Republic.
The Service was born out of China’s tumultuous encounters with the
West in the nineteenth century. It was a central element of the treaty port
system that had forced the opening of China to Western trade and resi-
dence. And it encompassed far more than the collection of import and
export duties; it was also responsible for lighthouses, harbour maintenance,
postal service, quarantine and anti-piracy measures among other duties. By
the dawning of the Chinese Republic, however, it had become an anomaly.
It was a potent reminder of China’s humiliation at the hands of the West,
but at the same time remained a major source of revenue for the Chinese
Government. Despite being drawn inexorably closer to Chinese political
affairs from 1911 onwards under the leadership of Aglen and Maze, the
Service (from 1912 known as the Chinese Maritime Customs Service or
CMCS) perceived itself as representing and advancing not just foreign
trade interests in China but more specifically British interests.
This work explores the CMCS during the Republic, paying particular
attention to the development of this institution. The Service was not static;














































climate. These changes, however, led to perceptible alterations in the sig-
nificance of the Service to both Western and Chinese interests. In partic-
ular British attitudes towards the Customs underwent a dramatic shift from
the time when Britain was dominant in encouraging a multinational gunboat
demonstration to defend the Guangzhou Customs in 1923 to its hesitant
and unofficial protests to the Manzhouguo authorities over the seizure of
north-eastern Customs houses in 1932. While the British Foreign Office
generally believed their interests in the CMCS had been eroded with the
rise of Chinese nationalism, the perception within the Service was that it
continued to provide a valuable service to British interests in China. This
imperial institution rapidly found itself associated with a ‘bygone era’ and
by the 1940s had largely faded from Britain’s view.
This work explores how and why the foreign administration of the
Customs survived the transition from Imperial times to the Republic and
the effect of its encounters with nationalist China. In doing so, the themes
of resistance and change emerge; the Service encountered growing Chinese
resistance to the foreign inspectorate, changing political landscapes both
in China and the West, and the resisting of change by some elements of
Customs leadership as well as the British Foreign Office and the diplo-
matic body. The burgeoning of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s presented
resistance to the basis of the foreign inspectorate that took the forms 
of anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism. Aglen and Maze took different
approaches to navigating such oppositions and stresses but both with the
intention of keeping the foreign inspectorate intact. As a result, the CMCS
therefore had a shifting significance to both Western and Chinese interests
throughout the Republic and this work explores the junctures when the
foreign basis of the Service was called into question.
The 1920s through to the 1940s provide the overarching timeframe 
for this research and were particularly turbulent from the viewpoint of 
China’s internal politics. The 1920s are largely marked by the peak and
then decline of warlordism and the subsequent rise of the Nationalist move-
ment culminating in the dominance of the Guomindang (GMD) and the
Nanjing Decade. The 1930s brought increasing tensions from Japanese
ambitions in the north-east, culminating in the Sino-Japanese War. The
Service was both directly and indirectly affected by these developments.
Staff found themselves the focus of anti-foreign attacks and Customs
houses needed foreign protection to ensure they could maintain their regular
duties. As Nationalist forces harnessed anti-foreign feeling with powerful
results, the foreign powers were faced with the realization of the need to
recast their relationship with China. Academics such as Clifford and Fung
in particular have presented this reshaping of policy as part of a particu-
larly British decline and retreat from China.1 The chronicling of this
diplomatic retreat leads to the question: what was the fate of the foreign-
dominated CMCS in such a climate of gradual withdrawal? By examining
the Service through case studies the decisive shift in British foreign policy
2 Introduction
in China (enunciated in the December Memorandum of 1926) can be
clearly detected. During the Republic the Service can be broadly presented
as reflecting some of the main forces in Sino-Western relations but on
closer examination the CMCS often diverges from the expected pattern.
The most prominent example of this divergence was its ability to survive
until the 1940s (albeit with diminished influence) when the Chinese
Government had absorbed other foreign-dominated Chinese institutions
such as the salt administration.
Imperialism, but more specifically, British imperialism and its manifes-
tations in China is a predominant theme in this work. China was never a
British colony and was never formally adopted into the realm of the British
Empire, but it did form an undeniably important part of British ambitions
for the Far East. While there was an absence of a formal colonialism, the
Service stood as a manifestation of British imperialism in Republican
China; not unlike the Indian Civil Service, its staff were inculcated with
the imperial mindset and there was an ever-present division between
foreign and ‘native’ staff. Bickers’ work Britain in China strongly argues
that the imperial mentality was evident in the ‘settler communities’ in the
treaty ports.2 And at each treaty port, the CMCS was a key institution, its
senior staff prominent in the foreign community. Through the CMCS
Britain was able to interfere with or at the least exert pressure over political
events in China for this institution straddled Chinese and foreign realms
of interest.
The CMCS, with its foreign inspectorate, was a key part of the treaty port
system and possessed the potential to serve as a prime mechanism for 
exercising foreign influence in China’s affairs. It represented not only a large
source of revenue for the Chinese Government but was also the main secur-
ity for foreign loans to China. The CMCS, however, has received relatively
low coverage in discussions of imperialism and its manifestations in the
Republic.3 One notable exception is that of Jürgen Osterhammel.4 In his
attempts to find a framework for analysing imperialism in the Chinese con-
text, the CMCS, with its foreign de facto leadership and yet Chinese status,
is cited as an anomaly for researchers. However, it was commonly grouped
under the banner of imperialism without due attention to its unusual basis.
During the Republic the Service was indeed representative of British influ-
ence in China and, despite waning British commitment to the CMCS, the
Service remained an avenue for potential interference.
Researching the CMCS is in essence an exploration of Sino-Western
relations and their changing face through the Republic. In this way two
broad theories of Sino-Western relations can be placed on the Customs,
that of the ‘oppression’ school and ‘beneficial’ school.5 There has been a
move (Rawski for example) for a ‘marginalization’ approach to explain
Western contact with China.6 Essentially did the CMCS act as an agent
for oppressing the Chinese economy and society? Did it fulfil a benevo-















































a regular income for the Chinese Government? Was the Customs merely
an adjunct to the treaty port system? Did its existence and regulatory
methods fail to affect anything outside the safe haven of the ports? The
anomaly presented by the Customs Service is apparent as an argument can
be made for and against each of these questions.
The CMCS is of interest as an imperial and maritime institution. Studies
of imperial institutions have undergone a resurgence of late, providing
fresh examinations of these important mechanisms of empire and their
administrators. This includes work by scholars such as Kirke-Greene on
the Indian Civil Service, Sudan Political Service and Colonial Service;7
McKay on the Tibet Cadre;8 and Strauss9 on China’s Sino-Foreign Salt
Inspectorate among others. This work makes a contribution to this growing
field. So too, the development of research in China’s maritime history was
the subject of a detailed historiographical review by Chi-Kong Lai in
1995.10 This review confirmed the fact that there are at present few English
language works on the CMCS. This work attempts to further augment
China’s maritime history through a signposting of materials available in
English language. Consequently this research draws on, among other mater-
ials, the well-documented collections at London University’s School of
Oriental and African Studies and also on the lesser-known Maze Collection
at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, the Clementi Papers at
Rhodes House Library, Oxford, and British Foreign Office and Colonial
Office papers.
Significant events embroiling the Customs exemplify the dynamic nature
of the Service in responding to forces of resistance that were produced by
changing British and Chinese interests. Unsurprisingly these interests were
often at odds with each other; the Chinese pursuing of nationalistic aims
and the British attempting to protect their political and commercial inter-
ests. In some cases these tokens of resistance were not split neatly between
the Chinese and British, and each party had its own stories of internal
dissension and embittered rivalry. The year 1923 is a significant starting
point for this work as it was in this year that ‘Father of the Republic’, 
the revolutionary Dr Sun Yatsen made a threat against the revenue of the
Guangzhou Customs. This was an unprecedented challenge to the CMCS
and a foreign naval demonstration assembled in its defence; the Service
was able to carry on unmolested. From this time on, however, the 
Service encountered a growing number of threats and found it could no
longer rely on the foreign powers to help defend its interests. This study
concludes with the 1940s and the end of British leadership of the Service.
This research allows for an examination of the CMCS in light of the decline
of warlordism, the Nanjing decade and also internal tensions within the
Service. Examining selected incidents has twofold significance: previously
obscure areas of CMCS history are given greater clarity and these incidents
individually and cumulatively allow the development of a historical narra-
tive on the CMCS as representative of foreign interests and presence in
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China. Customs circulars (both official and semi-official), annual reports,
and official and private correspondence all contribute to Customs perspec-
tive of these incidents.
The golden era of Western imperial presence in China as typified through
gunboat diplomacy and the Unequal Treaties can be seen as a more glam-
orous prospect than the waning star of Western privilege in China, which
was feared and then realized in the Republic. By focusing on the Customs
in this much later period, however, this work seeks to redress some of the
imbalance of academic attention.11 The emphasis in this work is not solely
on the CMCS as an institution but on the historical and political context
within which it operated. In keeping with the foreign focus in this research,
this work draws on English language sources. While taking an Anglocentric
approach may attract criticism, one must reflect that the CMCS was indeed
a Western-styled, British-dominated institution and, in most instances,
actively protected Western interests in China. This is also in keeping with
the fact that the Inspectorate of Customs was undisputedly British domin-
ated. For this reason I believe that an Anglocentric approach provides a
valuable insight into the functioning and mindset of the Inspectorate.
The structure of this work is broadly chronological. Chapter 2 sets the
scene with an institutional review of the CMCS. This review examines the
Service in light of its bureaucracy, fiscal responsibilities and the role of 
its London office. It also explores the nature of life in the Service for foreign
staff. Chapters 3 to 7 each trace incidents that affected the Service. Chapter
3 examines reaction to Sun Yatsen’s threat against the Guangzhou Customs
and also observes CMCS reaction to the Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott.
Chapter 4 looks inside the Service and explores the ramifications of the
succession crisis which arose following Aglen’s dismissal. Chapter 5 inves-
tigates the revival of negotiations for a Hong Kong–China Trade and
Customs Agreement (1930) as evidence of a new direction for the CMCS.
Chapter 6 details the decline of the CMCS as evidenced through attacks on
the integrity of the Service with a takeover at Tianjin Customs house.
Chapter 7 provides an overview of the Service in the face of the Sino-
Japanese and Pacific Wars. This marked the end of British leadership of
the Service.
Explaining the CMCS
The organization of the CMCS has been described in various terms by
both its contemporaries and by academics. The following pages explore
how the Customs saw itself and also how academics assessed the Service.
This evaluation is pertinent because the Customs occupied such an unusual
position in China; it was a Chinese department but at the same time was
dominated by foreigners and had close links to foreign interests in China.
Within the Service a number of records and documents were produced that















































memoranda and Customs publications. The focus of this discussion is there-
fore with the official views and those expressed by leaders Hart, Aglen
and Maze. The more informal impressions of the Service can be found in
a number of memoirs and even poetry; these are introduced at various
stages throughout this work.
As the development of the Customs Service was shaped to a large extent
by the vision of the IG, it is necessary to review how each respective leader
perceived the organization they were heading. Their attitudes can be
surmised through their correspondence on the Service. In his development
and guidance of the IMCS through its early years, Hart consistently
described the Service in terms of its being a Chinese institution, estab-
lished to serve the Chinese court and people above all else. He did,
however, also see that the Customs also represented Western values and
had a role to play in promoting these values in China.12 The focus was,
however, on the Customs’ responsibility to the Chinese court.
By the Republic this view of the CMCS had undergone a shift. Aglen
attempted to describe what he saw as the stages through which the Custom
Service had progressed. In a letter to the London Office (LO) Non-Resident
Secretary (NRS) in 1922 Aglen mused that the Customs had passed through
two stages and was entering a third. The stages were as follows: first, as
a purely Chinese institution supported by the Chinese because they
performed a useful service; second, the proliferation of foreign loans and
coming of the revolution gave the Customs more control over revenue,
making the service a foreign caisse de la dette; and the third stage, as
warlords vied for political dominance, the customs became an imperium
in imperio asking foreign powers for advice and not the Chinese.13
Certainly, the focus on being servants of the Chinese powers had shifted
and in its place was a more self-righteous idea that the Customs knew
what was best for the young Republic.
Under the leadership of Maze, moreover, perceptions of the Service shift
again. Maze describes the Customs as an ‘unofficial outpost of British
Empire’ and throughout his correspondence speaks of the difficulties in
preserving British interests in the Service. Moreover, empire became a
reference point for Maze and he often mentioned the parallels between his
organization and that of the Indian Civil Service.14 In this way the CMCS
is represented as part of a larger scheme of British (and foreign in a more
general sense) presence in Asia.
As can be seen from the above discussion, attitudes towards what the
CMCS represented changed markedly over time, in response not only to
personalities but to larger forces at play. Aglen in particular encountered
a turbulent number of years during his leadership, culminating in his
dismissal; hence his descriptions of the Customs as representing a vehicle
for order in China are not unexpected. Maze’s attitude too reflected the
tensions he encountered with the British Foreign Office and the belief that
he had been abandoned to defend the Customs alone.
6 Introduction
A predominant contributor to work on the CMCS is Stanley Fowler
Wright, who was not only a distinguished Customs officer but has written
what remain some of the most detailed accounts of the revenue and 
tariff aspects of the Customs service.15 Further to this, his work provides
an insight into how the Service perceived itself to stand in relation to 
China and the treaty powers. Had Wright’s work not followed a standard
line accepted among the top echelons of the Customs there is little chance
that it would have been published. An example of this being his first 
work, The Collection and Disposal of the Maritime and Native Customs
Since the Revolution of 1911, With An Account of the Loan Services
Administered by the Inspector General of Customs, as this study was
published by the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of
Customs in Shanghai. In a letter to Bowra, NRS of the LO, Aglen’s cautious
tone is evident:
Tell Stanley Wright to be very careful when discussing finance either
with the Hongkong Bank or with the Foreign Office. His book is really
a very wonderful piece of work and reflects the greatest credit on him,
but it was a description of my doings and whatever he says he must
be careful not to speak beyond the book.16
Although the title of the book is not mentioned specifically in this letter,
it must have been Wright’s first publication on the collection and disposal
of Customs revenue that had been released at this time. Clearly any work
endorsed and prefaced by the IG was expected to fulfil certain expecta-
tions of maintaining a standard discourse on the nature of the Service.
Wright’s work on the CMCS remains significant for researchers, not 
merely for its exhaustive attention to detail but also for the insights it
provides as to what constituted accepted representations of the Service 
in the 1920s.
In a publication of 1950, Hart and the Chinese Customs, Wright presents
the reader with a plethora of descriptions of the nature of the Service during
its Imperial and Republican guises. While these comments range from the
empirical and insightful to those that are grandiose and overstated,
however, not surprisingly Wright’s work always casts the CMCS in a 
positive light. Initially Wright presents the Service as:
an organisation controlled by the Imperial – and not the provincial –
authorities collecting revenue at all the open ports for the disposal of
the Central Government, controlling foreign trade in accordance with
treaties ratified by that Government, and in all other matters carrying
out the orders of that Government.17
Within this description of the IMCS there is no mention of the essential















































alludes to the injection of foreign supervision into the Service as causing
aggravation to the Chinese, but even so this reflection still casts a positive
glow on the CMCS:
the essential feature of the plan was the injection of the element of
foreign supervision into a Chinese Government body, an injection
which undoubtedly has wrought great and lasting benefit, but which
has also acted as an irritant both internally and externally.18
Such comments display an awareness of the ambiguity of the foreign
inspectorate in terms of the benefits and drawbacks it offered.
The international nature of the Service is given prominence in Wright’s
work. The Service is represented as larger than only Chinese concerns or
only foreign interests but rather as an example of how ‘international diver-
sities can be fused to serve the interests of all’.19 The broader significance
of the Service is developed further by Wright and he outlines the cosmo-
politan nature of the Service, its international duties, range of interests and
ideals of public service as the reasons why the Service had been termed
a precursor of the League of Nations. Although this was certainly a grand
comparison and Wright was quick to emphasize that the Service was only
a China Service, he did stress that it still was cosmopolitan and indeed
had benefited every nation on earth having dealings with China. He
extolled:
For over eighty years the Service stood as a signpost on the road to
international understanding and co-operation. . . . In a world to be
purged from the evil aggressiveness of perverted nationalism the
example and experience of China’s Customs Service indicate inspiring
possibilities for the future.20
League of Nations allusions aside, clearly the Service had international
significance in Wright’s view; he invests it with a leadership role that
extended far beyond the boundaries of China. Regardless of his pro-CMCS
sympathies, Wright’s reflections as an employee and chronicler of the
Service are significant in that they provide officially sanctioned views of
the Service.
Contemporary views
In his studies of treaty port China, Fairbank presented the IMCS as lying
at the heart of the treaty port system and, therefore, of Sino-Western 
relations. Fairbank coined the term synarchy, denoting a symbiotic cooper-
ation between China and foreigners (this was different from the dyarchy 
recognized to exist in British India). Synarchy was synonymous with a
joint administration and as a distinctly Chinese phenomenon.21 In Chinese
8 Introduction
Thoughts and Institutions (1957) Fairbank explored the existence of 
synarchical relationships throughout China’s history that took place before
initial Western contacts with China. Western presence in China is situated
as following these precedents of synarchy. Following this line of reasoning
then, the treaty port arrangement was not simply enforced by the West,
but was a compromise of sorts by both the Qing court and the West. This
placed the Westerners within an accepted, traditional framework of power
relations where their actions could, to some extent, be limited and moni-
tored. In this understanding, the IMCS was cited as the most striking
example of synarchy in modern China. The dawning of the Republic
signalled the disintegration of synarchy. This leads to a necessary ques-
tioning of whether the customs (considered such a prominent example of
synarchy) was recast in the Republic and, if so, how this was achieved
and with what result. The Customs Service of the Republic poses diffi-
culties to the historian when attempting to situate it within the synarchy
thesis. Some researchers, however, presuppose the universality of this
theory in describing the Customs throughout its existence without suffi-
cient analysis to determine its suitability. In Atkin’s Informal Empire 
in Crisis a chapter is titled ‘Synarchy and Revenue’ but there is little
exploration of the implications of the Customs as a synarchy.22
The CMCS can be located within the context of British informal empire
in China. Certainly the Service was a mechanism for foreign influence 
and interference in China’s affairs. The informal empire theory and its
application to China nevertheless rest uneasily with some academics. 
Dean and Osterhammel, for example, both express reservations when
applying such paradigms to China.23 Informal empire has been put forward
in a recent work by Bickers, Britain in China.24 The CMCS is cited in
Bickers’ work as representative of British informal empire. It is undeni-
able that the CMCS played a significant part in representing British and
other foreign interests in China and that its fortunes were tied in a large
way to the British presence in China. In support of this, it must not be
forgotten that Maze described the Service as ‘an outpost of British
empire’.25 And perceptions from within the Service are significant to 
understanding this institution.
The CMCS can also be understood in institutional or structural terms.
In her dissertation, Aitchison focuses on the Service as a Western fiscal
organization and explores its development and adaptation from the Qing
to the Republic. Subsequently the Customs is posited within Max Weber’s
critique of rational bureaucracy.26 Aitchison argues convincingly that this
critique can be applied to the CMCS with a measure of success but stresses
that Hart, at the time, had no such model on which to have planned the
Service. The Service was indeed a highly centralized and well-disciplined
service with a strict hierarchy for the efficient undertaking of predeter-
mined goals and duties. In Max Weber’s ‘Authority and Legitimacy’ the















































stressed as being above that of the personalities.27 In addition, the CMCS
has been compared to another hybrid organization at national level in
China, the Salt Inspectorate, as it also had foreign leadership and staff
composition and displayed similar structures and organizational aims.28
The origins of the IMCS
[T]he service was called into being for the express purpose of enforcing the
impartial administration of China’s treaty tariff at a moment when civil strife,
lawlessness on land and sea, mercantile defiance of authority, and corrupt
practices of both traders and officials had made that tariff, and the customs
procedure enjoined by the treaties, ‘more honoured in the breach than the
observance’.29
The IMCS was created as a result of the Opium Wars and the Taiping
Rebellion and it was intended to replace the pre-existing Chinese Customs
system. This system was unregulated and the bane of foreign merchants
in China. Arguably the irregularity of Customs in China, which left foreign
traders at the mercy of often unscrupulous and arbitrary dealings by the
Chinese, was one of the catalysts for the Opium Wars.
The intrusion of the Western powers along the coast of China provided
a further external irritant (adding to the internal problems of rigid social
strata and ethnic discrimination) for the massive upheaval of the Taiping
Rebellion. Pirates and bandits were pushed inland and to the river systems
largely as a result of the new foreign presence, and this further exacer-
bated social distress. This rebellion in turn gave opportunity for further
Western (but particularly British) interference in Chinese affairs. The
Taiping, led by Hong Xiuquan, a member of the Hakka (ke jia) ethnic
minority who became embittered by his experiences of unsuccessful civil
service exams, adopted the doctrine of Christianity as a spiritual and 
revolutionary force. In this way, the presence of foreign missionaries in
China had also had some effect. Hong had reinterpreted Christian texts
and was convinced of his destiny as the younger brother of Jesus to
campaign for the salvation of China.30 The Taiping campaign against the
Qing court threatened the dynasty’s control for almost 15 years (1850–64)
and, in their bid to establish their own kingdom (the so-called Kingdom
of Heavenly Peace), the Taiping ravaged huge areas of the nation and crip-
pled trade.31 A Taiping capital was established in Nanjing on 8 March
1853. The Taiping did not just oppose the Qing court but also many of
the precepts of Confucianism. Customs chronicler, Wright, reflected on the
final bloody overthrow of the Taiping Tianguo (heavenly kingdom), which
saw the:
final extinction of those semi-Christian ideas, their early profession of
which had at first misled so many missionaries and well wishers.
Whatever the Taiping Rebellion may have been, or aspired to be, as
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a regenerating force in religion and politics, there can be little doubt
that economically it was a devastating blight.32
The overthrow of the Taiping did not, however, mark the end of diffi-
culties for the beleaguered Qing court. Other rebellious groups sprang 
up from the wake of the Taiping. One such secret organization called the
Small Sword Society attacked and captured the Chinese walled city of
Shanghai in 1853–4.33 The disruption to trade led the foreign powers to
look at alternatives to Chinese administration of trade in the treaty ports.
They sought some way of enforcing control over the existing Chinese
customs system that was intrinsically corrupt and had been severely
disrupted by the Taiping. The foreign powers wanted a say, preferably the
biggest, in the taxes and duties imposed upon them.
A conference held at Shanghai on 29 June 1854, attended by the taotai
of Shanghai and the British, American and French consuls, drew up the
plans for a Western-style customs system.34 They envisaged a system in
which there would be three Inspectors of Customs, one nominated by each
of the British, American and French consuls respectively. From the outset
it appeared the consuls had little real influence in the creation of the
customs, as it was the taotai who appointed the Inspectors. This is decep-
tive as on further examination of the document it becomes clear that the
consuls selected the appointees:
In the appointment of the head inspectors, and the organisation of the
whole auxiliary department, it has been agreed as the best mode of
guarding against any future difficulties and sources of complaint, and
at the same time ensuring, by the better knowledge of persons, a proper
selection, that the consular representative of each treaty power shall
select and nominate, for appointment by the taoutae, one inspector.35
In this way, the consuls controlled the most significant process in estab-
lishing the new Customs administration; the taotai’s role was a token one.
This new institution was regarded with a certain amount of consternation
among foreign traders; they believed it was unfair that only Shanghai had
such strict customs procedures. It was envisaged, however, that if this
system in Shanghai were successful, it could then be extended to the other
ports in due course.
In early 1859 the Imperial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Shanghai
appointed Horatio Nelson Lay, former British Vice Consul and inter-
preter, as IG of Customs. Lay travelled to each of the treaty ports with 
the objective of establishing a standardized Customs system throughout
China, based on the Customs system in Shanghai operating in each of 
these ports. The customs system was extended to Guangzhou in October
of the same year.36 It was at this time that Robert Hart resigned his consular















































Customs Service. Hart took up the position of Assistant Commissioner at
Guangzhou.37 The suitability of this Customs service having been proven
in Shanghai, the push for the expansion of this system rapidly followed the
Treaty of Tianjin (1858) and the opening of more ports to foreign traders;
these were followed by further extension of customs control. Table 1.1 illus-
trates the manner in which Customs houses were established after the ports
had been opened to foreign trade for a few years.
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Table 1.1 The opening of treaty ports and Customs houses






















































































Opened in 1907 by treaty Hailar/Hailaer
but styled ‘self-opened’ Qiqihar






















Source: Adapted from ‘List of Treaty Ports, Etc., in Chronological Order’ in Robert E. Bredon,
circular no. 1501 (second series), Documents, vol. 2 646–8.
a The first IG was appointed in 1859.
b While officially opened in 1858, Niuzhuang wasn’t opened to trade until 1864.
c Nanjing was not opened until 1899.
d Not opened until 1889.
e Not opened until 1889.
f Not opened until 1891.
g Opened in 1897.
h Opened in 1900.
i Jiangmen was not opened until 1904. At this time another 10 outposts were established
1904 as West River passenger stations.
j Opened in 1904.
k Moukden was opened in 1907 but was styled ‘self-opened’ in American and Japanese
treaties.
l Andong was opened in 1907 but was styled ‘self-opened’ in American treaty.
m Dadonggou was opened in 1907 but styled ‘self-opened’ in American and Japanese
treaties.
n Wusong’s status was modified from a port of call.
There was a flurry of Customs houses opening in the years following
Lay’s appointment as IG, with 11 outposts established between 1854 and
1863. From 1864 until 1876, however (when Hart was the newly appointed
IG following Lay’s fall from grace), few Customs houses were opened.
This 12-year period was marked as one of consolidation for the new insti-
tution rather than further expansion. From 1877 this pattern of expansion
and consolidation was repeated. Further development of Customs outposts
was consistent from 1889 through to 1907.
Lay’s leadership of the IMCS was short-lived. When on leave in London,
the Chinese requested Lay’s assistance to raise a flotilla to fight against
the Taiping. This flotilla would then be used by the IMCS to combat piracy
and smuggling. In doing so he overreached his authority. In an agreement
signed in London in January 1863, Captain Sherard Osborn was appointed
commander of the European–Chinese fleet for four years. As commander
he was directly answerable to Lay, who nominated himself as acting on
behalf of the Emperor.38 This agreement, moreover, emphasized that Lay
held ultimate control for all orders given and that it was understood that
Osborn would not accept instructions from any other channel. This included
directives from the Emperor unless Lay conveyed them to his commander.39
Lay’s manoeuvring for greater influence in Chinese affairs was unmistak-
able in the text of the agreement.
Lay’s intention to wield power through this flotilla disquieted the Chinese
leadership. In response to the contentious articles, negotiations were held
between both Lay and Hart and the Chinese authorities. Prince Gong
Qinwang communicated with Bruce:
As China would thus have spent several millions of revenue without
obtaining an atom of power, his [Lay’s] arguments (in support of the
agreement) were rebutted, and in the place of it five other articles were
drawn up.40
After a series of discussions in which Lay would not yield, he was
dismissed from the service on 15 November 1863.41 Hart was immediately
appointed IG. Lay was given a four-month period to settle the affairs of
the Customs but was already removed from his post.42 It is noteworthy
that the foreign powers did not get involved in this decision to remove
Lay but respected the Qing court’s right to dismiss him.43 Prince Gong
welcomed Hart’s appointment, warmly commenting that his prudence, tact
and experience were well known to both Chinese and foreigners interested
in the Customs. Nevertheless he issued a warning to him saying: ‘it would
behove you to be still more careful and diligent, so as to justify your
present appointment.’44 Clearly Hart would need to call all his skills for
diplomacy into play as he proceeded to begin the creation of the IMCS
that was to endure for the next 80 years.
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Hart’s vision for the IMCS
True friend of the Chinese people
Modest, patient, sagacious and resolute
He overcame formidable obstacles and
Accomplished a work of great
Beneficence
For China and the world.
(So read the inscription on the plinth of the statue of Hart erected by a
grateful foreign community on the Bund in Shanghai in 1914.45) Hart,
considered the founder of the IMCS, was a giant figure, straddling both
worlds of China and abroad. His papers have been painstakingly compiled,
making it possible to assess not only his vision for the Customs Service
but the role that he fulfilled as IG.46 Hart was personally responsible to
the Zongli Yamen and the Chinese court for the efficient running of the
service and hence often roved from port to port to ensure procedure was
strictly adhered to.47 Under Hart’s watchful guidance a regulated Customs
service was fully established in China.
Hart’s work as IG earned him the trust and admiration of Chinese
Government, but in his career he amassed more personal power than the
Chinese had ever envisaged when the IMCS was created.48 This can been
seen most clearly in Hart’s quasi-diplomatic role as intermediary between
the foreign powers and the Chinese court. The Chinese often entrusted
Hart with confidential tasks. Hart, in turn, would rely on a trusted colleague,
James Duncan Campbell, and his London connections to assist with these
duties. An example of this was in October 1874 when Hart was instructed
to acquire a gunboat for the Chinese.49 By enlisting Hart’s assistance with
such delicate matters, the Chinese court showed that they trusted Hart’s
judgement, discretion and loyalty.
In an 1864 circular to all Commissioners, Hart outlined what he saw as
the guiding principles by which the IMCS should be operating.50 This
document is critical for understanding the aims and ambitions of the IMCS
in its relationship with not only the Chinese but also the foreign powers.
It inculcated the value of service, the importance of diplomacy and the
necessity of integrity. In the circular’s 24 points Hart detailed the various
aspects of running the IMCS and what it should strive for in its status in
Chinese affairs. This was written in response to failings and unsettling
occurrences that Hart had noted during the first three years of the Service.
Hart stressed the importance of Sino-Western relations for ensuring the
smooth running of Customs establishments. He advised employees to
remember that:
The Inspectorate of Customs is a Chinese and not a Foreign Service,















































himself towards Chinese, people as well as officials, in such a way to
avoid all cause of offense and ill-feeling.51
Such comments were designed to encourage an acceptance of the foreign
Inspectorate by the Chinese; this was vital to the longevity of the Service.
Furthermore, if such advice had been followed, it would have ensured that
the IMCS was on a more intimate footing with the Chinese than merchants
and the foreign consuls.
Hart turned a considerable amount of attention to the Commissioners at
the ports, seeing them as the vital element in ensuring the ports were
running smoothly. In 1864 there were only 12 Commissioners but by 1912
this had increased to 40.52 They were reminded that they were not only
responsible to the IG but also to the Chinese Superintendent of their port.
They filled an advisory role with the Superintendent and were discouraged
from trying to push themselves forward at the expense of the Chinese.
Hart wrote: ‘[t]he more the Commissioners keep in the back-ground, the
better will it be for the duties they have to perform, and the less will be
the chances of their becoming objects of ill-feeling.’53 Hart reasoned that
it was not unusual for a Commissioner to have more knowledge of foreign
trading practices than a Superintendent but imparting this knowledge
needed discretion. Commissioners were also encouraged to keep good rela-
tions with consular staff and with the mercantile community. Hart urged
staff to ‘aim at the perfect’ in fulfilling their duties.54 Clearly this document
contains many of the key elements he wanted to see in the IMCS: loyalty
to duty; a rapport with Chinese and foreigners alike; and willingness to
improve their work.
Despite Hart’s principles for the foreigners and Chinese to work together
for the common good of the IMCS, the Chinese staff of the Service were
not treated in an egalitarian manner (the Customs can be compared to the
Indian Civil Service in this regard).55 Chinese employees did not fill any
responsible positions within the elite indoor staff until after 1928 (owing
to pressure from the Nationalist government). The 1895 and 1907 Service
Lists of the Customs reveal that there was an increase in the overall number
of staff, both foreign and Chinese. In 1895 there were 735 foreigners and
3,471 Chinese in the Service; by 1907 this had expanded to 1,387 foreigners
and 12,389 Chinese.56 By 1912 there was roughly a ratio of seven Chinese
staff to one foreigner. There is little discernible difference, however, in
the level of positions held by Chinese. In both Service Lists Chinese staff
were treated as a separate entity to foreign staff and rarely ranked higher
than a clerk in the indoor staff.57 According to Wright, the role of these
Chinese clerks initially was to act as go-betweens and translators for the
foreign staff who were unable to speak Chinese. More important perhaps,
Chinese clerks helped the Service cut its running expenses ‘by entrusting
the less important kind of routine office work to natives on moderate
salaries’58 (such a hierarchy was not unusual in any British colony at this
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time). Apart from their superior ranking in the IMCS, foreign staff had a
privileged position in the Service because, although they worked for the
Chinese Government, they still enjoyed the right of extraterritoriality. This
meant they were not answerable to Chinese law but would be tried by their
own national court.
As with any imperial institution of the time, Hart discouraged his staff
from the temptation of ‘going native’. He reminded them that they were
representatives ‘of a civilization of a progressive kind’ and accordingly
should not hesitate to raise Chinese interests in this civilization.59 He did
stress though, that any such action must be placed after the commitment
to work for the Chinese Government and that ideally they should lead
through example. Such comments are not without a certain amount of
irony. During his early years in China Hart had a Chinese common law
wife and three children from this relationship.60 Hart’s own indiscretions
during his early career may have added impetus to his warnings for
Customs employees.
In both his work and pastimes, Hart reflected high aspirations for his
Service. Appearance was important for the IMCS and in Hart’s volumin-
ous letters to Campbell the idea of a uniform for the indoor staff was raised
on several occasions.61 The main incentive for the creation of such uniforms
was Hart’s desire that staff could appear before Chinese officials in 
similar official dress and that, in doing so, they would also be recogniz-
able by rank.62 In Hart’s discussion of the uniform, one is given the
impression that, while Western in basic style, it was intended to have a
certain ‘Chinese flavour’. He envisaged his staff sporting a French-style
cap with a knob and tassels on top.63 The colour of the knob would deter-
mine rank: red for the IG, blue for Commissioners and Deputy Commis-
sioners, and white for the clerks. In one description Hart enthused that the
uniform should be ‘diplomat style’, providing an interesting reflection on
the extent of powers that the Service possessed in directing Chinese actions
and, importantly, the Customs’ perception of itself.64 The role of foreign
Customs staff as promoters of Western values and culture in China was
evident through Hart’s passion for music. The IMCS brass band, which
Hart trained and nurtured during his spare time, is an example of these
two principles in action. Through this band, which consisted almost solely
of Chinese employees, Hart was advancing the ideals of Western culture.
This places the IMCS within a grander, imperialist, civilizing mission of
foreigners in Asia.65
Consular jealousies had been evident since the inception of the IMCS
and did not abate with Hart’s appointment as IG. The British were per-
ceived to dominate the Service with their recruits. American representative
Anson Burlingame complained in strong terms to Sir Frederick Bruce,
British Minister to China, about this in 1900. Furthermore Burlingame
reported to the US Secretary for State that he distrusted British intentions















































of the Treaty Ports’.66 The profile of senior staff in 1864 exemplified the
grounds for suspicions of the British. The nationalities of the Commis-
sioners were as follows: five British, three American, three French and one
German; fuelling complaints of British predominance.67 In the early days
of the IMCS, however, there appears an element of inevitability with regard
to British prominence. Not only were the British leaders in Sino-Western
relations, but they also possessed a larger number of men who had the
essential Chinese language skills. The other treaty powers had little 
mechanism for usurping British position in the IMCS or its China rela-
tions. In spite of all this, the Service had quite a cosmopolitan staff and
encouraged the learning of the Chinese language for all its young foreign
recruits.
While there was a considerable amount of banter about Service integ-
rity, the IMCS attracted its share of adventurers and opportunists. A.H.
Rasmussen, who joined the outdoor staff in 1905, described the IMCS as
the ‘Foreign Legion of the Far East’.68 He commented:
There were men from every imaginable stratum of society: remittance
men, drunks and sober men, gentlemen and rascals, ignorant and highly
educated men. Love of adventure had attracted some of them to the
Service; others were probably fugitives from justice, hiding under
assumed names, and some like me, had joined from necessity.69
Rasmussen’s romanticized reflections give the impression that many men
in the Service had pasts they may have wanted to avoid. Such reflection
of the motley nature of the Customs employees may further explain Hart’s
issuing of circulars outlining the ideal spirit of the Service.
In a bid to prevent the Customs employees from developing close ties
with, and therefore vested interests in any one port, Hart regularly rotated
staff around to minimize these temptations.70 He was also known to utilize
the threat of transfer as a method of disciplining his employees.71 This
system, however, was not always foolproof and staff indiscretion often
caused Hart concern as any such breaches gave impetus to growing Chinese
demands for the removal of foreigners from the Service. In a letter of 1869
he described one of his Commissioners as a ‘quarrelsome, pigheaded
fellow’ who was a great clerk but a ‘frightfully bad Commissioner’.72 In
another instance, a Deputy Commissioner had been expropriating Customs
funds for his own benefit.73 Despite the good service the Customs was
fulfilling for the Chinese Government, not all of Hart’s employees adhered
to such ideals.
Duties of the IMCS included application of customs tariff and collection
of revenue, cargo appraisal, navigational aids (coastwise lights and charts)
and the publication of trade statistics.74 With the absorption of the postal
service into the IMCS in 1896, Hart became the IG of Customs and Posts.75
The number of staff required to administer these dual services rapidly
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increased. Part of the revenue collected covered the expenses of the Service.
In fact, in the earliest years of the Customs existence, there was little revenue
left over after covering the cost of maintaining the daily expenses of the
Service. As revenue increased then foreign loans were serviced by the CMCS
with surplus at the Chinese Government’s discretion.
The coming of the Republic: The end of a golden age
The IMCS viewed the instability of the Qing court, besieged by internal
corruption, Western imperialist pressures and social turmoil, with trepida-
tion. A rise of Chinese nationalistic fervour fuelled these concerns. Hart
pessimistically prophesied that:
The Customs will go on forever and the foreign element will be
retained as long as it is useful, subordinate, and wanted, but Chinese
supremacy will be felt and will grow in form and fact, and the foreigner
will die out.76
While the foreigner did not ‘die out’ of the Service, the coming of the
Republic, the decentralization of power and the rise the GMD with their
anti-imperialist sentiment posed considerable threats to the fabric of the
service.
The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was a popular response to the frustration
and resentment of foreign intrusion into China. The siege of Beijing and
the loss of foreign lives and property left the Western powers shaken by the
enormity of Chinese popular resistance. In the ensuing Peace Protocol of
1901, the treaty powers claimed reparations for their losses. These 
indemnities were secured against the customs revenue after paying for the
upkeep of the Service itself. Tariffs were set at 5 per cent ad valorem. This
setting of tariffs guaranteed the Service revenue but at the same time 
benefited traders and disadvantaged the Chinese Government, as they were
unable to adjust these tariffs over time.77 The return of tariff autonomy
became a major platform for the GMD and its nationalist movement.
The revolution of 1911 had far-reaching significance on the Customs
Service. The Chinese Imperial Post Office, which had been created under
the Customs auspices in 1896, became an independent service this 
year.78 The largest change, however, was to the leadership of the Service.
Physically and mentally exhausted after many years of unstinting service, 
Hart travelled to London on leave in 1908 and Francis Aglen, his deputy,
was placed in charge. Hart never returned to China but he retained the
official title of IG of Customs until his death on 20 September 1911.79
Hart’s legendary efforts were memorialized through the erection of a statue
on Shanghai’s prestigious waterfront location, the Bund, in 1914.80 At the
official unveiling ceremony, Customs officials and consular staff were















































The succession of Hart’s leadership by Officiating IG Francis Aglen81
had not been without its share of dilemmas. For many years Hart’s brother-
in-law, Robert Bredon, had waited anxiously in the wings for his
appointment, only to be thwarted by Hart’s reluctance to relinquish his post
and by dislike on the part of British authorities (and if the truth be known,
by Hart as well).82 The post of IG was clearly considered one of great
significance and changes to leadership caused considerable angst during
their transitional phases. Succession-related turmoil commonly occurred
throughout the history of the Service and the top post of IG was inevitably
the focus of much jockeying for position.
The First World War had a lasting impact on the Customs Service. 
The Service was seriously depleted of staff who left to enlist to fight the
war in Europe. Aglen instructed the CMCS that neutrality rules were to 
be enforced, owing to the fact that China had declared itself neutral in the
conflict. Staff who wished to return to take up arms were instructed to
tender their resignation with the Service. There was a possibility of re-
employment, however, in the event they later returned to China.83 Reflecting
upon this King (the NRS, London) commented:
I could not help but see that the wholesale exodus of young men from
their jobs in China was a tactical mistake. . . . ‘They also serve who
only stand and wait,’ and the negligible quantity – from the numer-
ical point of view – of British youths, who left their jobs in China and
Japan, did more than ‘their bit’ – though they could not see it in that
light – towards weakening British grip on Far Eastern trade.84
Clearly, the perception held here was that it was vital for the British to
maintain its dominance in trade with China. In reality, the Japanese, whose
trade with China continued to grow, were rapidly outstripping that of the
British. As Shanghai was the most economically vibrant of the treaty ports
it is valuable to examine reports of trade according to nationality from the
1912–21 series of Decennial reports.85 British trade represented 54.8 per
cent of annual revenue in 1912, (America 0.8 per cent. France 2.8 per cent,
Germany 8.1 per cent, Japan 19.4 per cent, Chinese 9.1 per cent and
Miscellaneous 5 per cent). In the war years the most striking difference is
the British and Japanese results. In 1918 Britain represented 31 per cent
and the Japanese increased to 45.5 per cent. After the war British percent-
ages rose again to 47 per cent in 1921 and the Japanese declined to 29
per cent. This indicates the opportunities the Japanese were able to make
during the war years, no doubt increasing King’s conviction that as a matter
of strategy Western staff needed to remain in the CMCS.
In the years following the 1911 revolution, the political situation in China
was significantly disturbed and there were concerns over the fate of the
Customs revenue. As a result revenues were placed in the respective
Commissioners’ hands as the imperial officials had fled from their posts.
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The IG then assumed responsibility for these revenues. A loans and indem-
nity service was then administered from Shanghai.86 Hence, until well 
into the 1920s revenue surplus was directed into foreign banks. This was
justified in the CMCS as protecting revenue but was importantly a 
guarantee that foreign indemnities and loans would be serviced. The three
banks designated for this appropriation were the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation. Due to faltering international relations in the case of the
German bank and national crisis in the case of the Russian bank, all revenue
was placed in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, a British-owned finan-
cial institution.87 This further accentuated the extensive dominance the
British played in the foreign inspectorate of the CMCS.
During Yuan Shikai’s tenure as the first President of the Chinese
Republic, he kept rivalries and ambitions in check and subservient to his
regime. His death in 1916 was a catalyst for the visible decentralization
of political and military power, and many of these rivalries broke to the
surface of the new government. Factionalism occurred as in many instances
Yuan’s former protégés sought to strengthen their control and power base.
This led to a rapid decentralization of power in China, with rival forces
gathering provincial power bases in a bid to assert their dominance and to
claim national sovereignty. The phenomenon of warlordism had emerged
in China and would bring chaos for over a decade. For the warlords, the
potential revenue offered by the Service would have been a tantalizing
prospect, should they be successful in establishing the dominance of their
own regime. And, for the CMCS, the integrity of the institution was vital
for its continued survival.
The chaos of the early Republic foretold the beginning of what would
become an ongoing process of change for the Service. For the Chinese the
CMCS became the focus of resentment as it allowed a foreign mechanism
for exerting influence. The desire for tariff autonomy and control over
surplus revenue were platforms adopted by Chinese nationalists in their
campaigns to free China from foreign imperialist interests. The Nanjing
Government’s plans for a strong, united China did not have room for 
such a Western-dominated service. Hence the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s
provide a fascinating study of the Service and its attempts to negotiate its















































2 An institutional review
Throughout its history the CMCS was described in various institutional
terms. It was regarded as the basis of the Chinese economy, and was
presented by its contemporaries as the closest model to a civil service in
modern China. This chapter examines the Customs in these terms, namely
as a bureaucracy and fiscal organization. This chapter is divided into four
sections, each providing a perspective on this institution. These include 
an examination of the structures of the CMCS; an economic review of 
the Service and its significance to both the Chinese and foreign interests;
an exploration of the London Office (LO) of the Customs and its unique
role in perpetuating and protecting foreign interests in the Service; and 
an exploration of the privileged life led by foreigners in the Service. 
Consequently, this chapter provides the backdrop for understanding the
rationale and motivations of the Service and its responses to events in 
the 1920s and 1930s.
The structures of the Customs Service
During the early Republic, the CMCS possessed three major divisions: 
a Revenue Department, a Marine Department and a Works Department. 
A later addition was the Preventive Department, established in 1931 in
response to widespread smuggling on the China coast. Despite the expan-
sive scope of the CMCS, it remained extremely centralized as an organ-
ization. Control for the direction of the Service rested solely in the hands
of the Inspector General (IG). In theory the IG was answerable to the
Chinese Government, but for the early part of the Republic (1912–26) this
was not evident in the leadership of Aglen and only became a more 
conscious action by Maze (IG from 1929 to 1943).
The structure of the CMCS was complex, as would be expected from
an institution that combined a national service with a wide-ranging scope
of duties.1 Moreover, the CMCS, while appearing unified, had two major
structural schisms. These were the division between foreign and Chinese
staff and also the divide between indoor and outdoor staff. A schematic
representation of the various departments in the Service gives some idea
of the scale of this organization. The IG was at the top of the Service with
his Commissioners forming the important basis for the dissemination of
orders and the daily running of the ports (see Figure 2.1).
Commissioners filled a centripetal role in the functioning of the Service.
They were immediately under the IG in terms of seniority in the 
Service as well as in the flow of command. The Secretaries appointed to
various departments under the IG were of, and shared, Commissioner
ranking. The Commissioners employed at Customs houses did not merely
act as overseers of Inspectorate instructions, but were the vehicles through
which information and directives were disseminated to staff. Essentially
the Commissioners acted as the IG’s representatives and the local chiefs.
They were the vital link that maintained the unity of the Service through
the management of the Customs ports and their loyalty to the Service 
and, most importantly, to the IG. In matters concerning revenue, the
Superintendent of Customs (a Chinese) was consulted. In matters pertaining
to the recruitment, training, promotion of and/or disciplining of staff, the
Commissioner was obliged to defer to the IG’s authority.
Appointment to the position of Commissioner was generally the culmin-
ation of around 20 years’ service (see Table 2.1). This table provides 
an indication of the length of service generally undertaken by customs 
staff before they can reach the level of Commissioner. The one notable
exception in this table is that of Maze (Hart’s nephew), who became IG 
in 1929. Maze had only been in the Service for nine years before his
appointment as Commissioner. Prospective Commissioners were appointed
from the indoor staff. Ports, however, varied in size and therefore had
differing significance to the Customs. Newer Commissioners were gener-
ally appointed to the smaller establishments to gain some experience before
being entrusted with the running of the larger ports. Smaller ports included
postings to Longzhou, Mengzi, Wenzhou and Yadong, for example.2 And,
in a reflection on the importance of certain ports, senior Commissioners
administered Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangzhou.3
Responsibilities were clearly demarcated within each Customs house.
The collection of tariffs and duties flowed from the Commissioner in 
each Customs house to the Inspectorate. To facilitate trade, Marine staff
manned Customs Cruisers and assisted with navigational and conservancy
work. The outdoor staff examined cargoes and prevented smuggling by
searching vessels. The indoor staff examined traders’ paperwork and
assessed and collected the tariffs due. They administered and kept record
of the import and export trade of the ports.4 The Commissioner oversaw
the collection of tariffs within his Customs establishment. After settling
pre-agreed accounts for the running of the Service and sundry expenses,
the net revenue was forwarded to the IG’s account in Shanghai. Funds
were remitted on a weekly basis at the larger ports and generally twice
monthly for smaller ports.5 This tight reign over accounts reinforces the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































occurring in the accounts could be detected rapidly and redressed. Further-
more the regular removal of funds to the Inspectorate reduced the possi-
bility of demands being made against the funds accumulating at any one
Customs house.
The indoor staff formed the elite of the CMCS. The essential difference
between indoor and outdoor staff being that the former underwent a 
thorough examination and vetting process before taking up a China appoint-
ment, while the latter were more likely to be drawn from the pool of
foreigners living in or travelling through the treaty ports.6 They enjoyed a
much more exclusive existence and better benefits than the outdoor staff,
which will be elaborated later in this chapter. A sense of superiority
emerged from the fact that they were removed from the physically arduous
tasks of examining cargo. Yvonne King, whose father and husband both
had CMCS careers (indoor staff) reflected:
The outdoor staff were the people who actually met the ships and went
through your luggage and when the big ships brought in cargo the
outdoor staff went on board and did the actual sorting of the cargo.
The indoor staff were purely in the office . . . unless there was some
special occasion or something and then they may have gone and
boarded a ship.7
In her recollections King spoke freely of there being a sense of snobbery
on the part of the indoor staff towards their outdoor counterparts. The two
groups of staff had their own distinct social circles and generally did not
intermix.8 Attention to redressing this disparity is discussed even during
the IMCS period in the letters of G.E. Morrison ‘Morrison of Peking’.9 In
1917 Morrison wrote that if any Chinese institution needed reform it was
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Table 2.1 Selected Customs Commissioners of 1911
Name Nationality Date of first Date of 
appointment appointment to 
Commissioner
H.M. Hillier British August 1872 April 1896
P.H. King British January 1874 April 1900
C.A.V. Bowra British October 1886 March 1903
F.W. Maze British January 1897 November 1906
A.H. Harris British July 1883 September 1908
J.H. Macoun British May 1888 March 1910
J. Acheson British July 1874 April 1911
Source: Chinese Maritime Customs Service, Service List, 1911–1913 (Shanghai: Statistical
Department of the Inspector General of Customs, 1914).
the wholly inadequate pay of the outdoor staff’.10 Through readings of the
Customs documents in the 1920s and 1930s, it is apparent that even the
lowest position in the indoor staff was a more esteemed appointment than
that of those relegated to the arduous outdoor examination and assessment
of goods on the docks and in the godowns.
Rasmussen’s China Trader provides an interesting insight into the
experiences of a member of the outdoor staff of the Customs. Foreign
outdoor staff were generally drawn from sailors and adventurers who had
been lured to the East. Rasmussen, himself a sailor, had arrived in Shanghai
in 1905 with only $5 (10s.) and was reassured by acquaintances that 
he would have no difficulty gaining employment in the IMCS.11 While
relieved at his appointment as a probationary tidewaiter, Rasmussen was
conscious of the low status of outdoor staff. He wrote:
My elation was not in the slightest dampened by the fact that I had put
my foot on the very lowest rung of the social ladder. Caste among the
Europeans was a reality that no one could escape and the outdoor staff
in the Customs were almost like the untouchables in India, and nearly
as low as the Eurasians. The indoor staff in the administrative offices
were, on the other hand, very high on the social scale. Fortunately, 
an ex-sailor has few, if any, social aspirations, and I had none.12
While this account may be exaggerated for literary effect, the humble 
position of outdoor staff in the Service clearly contrasts with that of the
indoor staff. In a further illustration of this disparity between the indoor and
outdoor staff, Williams, a Customs Commissioner, includes in his memoirs
an excerpt from the treaty port press, the Shanghai Mercury, outlining a
humorous account of the day in the life of an Assistant Examiner.13 This
account makes a successful satire of the underlying tensions between the
overworked and underpaid outdoor staff shouldering dirty and sometimes
monotonous assessment responsibilities in contrast to their sheltered and
comfortable indoor counterparts.
The disparity between Chinese and foreign staff was also noticeable 
in the CMCS. It was not until 1929 that the idea that Chinese could fill
equal posts to foreigners gained any currency. This was due to a com-
bination of factors: the new leadership of IG Maze, who was sympathetic
to Nationalist aspirations, and the directives of the GMD to see the end
of foreign staff in the Service.14 Rivalry also existed between the various
nationals represented in the Service. Williams recalled being disgruntled
when made joint charge of the general office at Jiujiang, a small port 
on the Yangzi. His Commissioner was a German and had been most 
disappointed not to receive a German assistant, who he believed would
have been more efficient than any Briton. Williams bore the brunt of this
dissatisfaction and, as he details, ‘[the Commissioner] put me in joint
charge of the general office with a Chinese clerk – an indignity which 
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I think it would be hard to beat!’15. Williams’ mortification was on two
counts: first, that he had previously been in charge of a general office and
therefore was being compelled to take a backward step; and second, that
he was made to work alongside a Chinese clerk.
Regulating and rewarding staff
Commissioners were entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that staff
were adequately trained. In a customs circular of 1924 IG Aglen stressed
that it was important that indoor staff regularly changed responsibilities
around the office to ensure they developed the necessary administrative skills
for all aspects of their work. This cultivation of versatility, he reasoned,
would enable staff to fill vacant posts with a minimum of disruption:
I consider it a grave reflection on Commissioners when they are
compelled to report – as is much too often the case in the last Confi-
dential Reports to hand – that such and such a man ‘has not performed’
(several classes of duties) ‘at this port’ after a stay of several years
there.16
Aglen encouraged Commissioners to inspect their subordinates’ work
regularly and to set examinations for them, in a bid to ensure that they
understood the principles on which they were operating. He emphasized
that this principle should be applied even more so to the Chinese indoor
staff as they were moved between ports much less frequently than their
foreign counterparts and therefore did not have as many opportunities.17
As part of their employment, all foreign Assistants were expected to learn
the Chinese language. To encourage this, each Assistant, during his first 
six years, was given an allowance of $10 per month to employ a native
teacher. Examinations were administered regularly to monitor progress.
There were three certificates, A, B and C, set at varying points in the
Assistant’s career (C: three years in China; B: not later than five years; and
A: optional). Results in these determined the rate of promotion. Assistants
who made little effort to learn Chinese were dismissed. Similarly those who
had not progressed were liable to have their promotions withheld. It was
envisaged that all Assistants would attempt Certificate A, although it 
was optional. Only Assistants who held Certificate A were considered for
the rank of Deputy Commissioner or Commissioner. Williams, who like
many employees devoted much time to the study of Chinese did not, how-
ever, believe that it greatly benefited his upward mobility in the Service.18
He recorded a dinner conversation that revealed uneasiness within Customs
circles that learning Chinese would affect one’s mental balance:
At a dinner-party given by one of my colleagues, his wife remarked
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Chinese invariably go mad!’ Then, hastening to cover up her faux pas,
she added: ‘Of course, you are an exception to the general rule!’19
Williams claims to have known one Customs employee who, in a bid to
improve his Chinese skills, had pasted Chinese characters all over the walls
of his bedroom and ‘lived in a continual atmosphere of complicated brush-
work’.20 He went mad and had to be invalided home. On the way back to
England this fellow refused to speak anything but Chinese; furthermore,
he refused to bathe as he explained the Chinese rarely did.21 While know-
ledge of the Chinese language could lead to promotion, employees had to
take care not to go native.
Outdoor staff also came under scrutiny from the Commissioner. Aglen
encouraged all Commissioners to inspect their work regularly. He
instructed:
Periodical visits should be paid to the wharves, jetties, godowns, and
other places where Examiners work; books, samples, etc., inspected,
methods of examination investigated, advice given, criticism or censure
administered where slackness or bad work is revealed.22
In the larger ports, however, the Deputy Commissioner or another senior
employee handled these inspections. By continually regulating staff 
Aglen believed any problem employees could be identified with reason-
able speed and then either be cautioned or dismissed. The Commissioner
or senior staff recorded their inspections in detailed confidential reports 
on each employee.23 After the Commissioner’s approval these reports were
submitted annually to the Inspectorate each December. The reports pro-
vided the Inspectorate with an indication of each man’s ability, character
and his qualifications. Employees’ work abilities were scrutinized along-
side personal traits such as trustworthiness, industriousness, intelligence,
discretion, temperament and manners. A general scale of reference regu-
lated all reports; in this way a comparison of staff performance could be
made more accurately. Decisions on transfers and promotions were made
on the basis of these reports. In the case of an unfavourable report the
employee was notified and given the opportunity either to amend their
actions or to answer any allegations.
With staff hired from such a diverse and broad base, the CMCS had to
maintain a strict code of conduct. Corruption was a continual concern for
the Service and from Hart’s time onwards there were instances where
dishonest staff were dismissed. One problem among the outdoor staff was
that foreigners were recruited from varied backgrounds and often held
sympathies with traders and smugglers. Rasmussen gives an example of
these conflicting loyalties. He explains that, while at Zhenjiang, he often
went out on preventive patrols at night as he was tempted by the rewards
given to those who uncovered salt smuggler activities and also by the lure
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of adventure.24 Other staff would turn a blind eye to salt smuggling, as
they didn’t want to risk their personal safety. Rasmussen recounted the
thrill in pulling up alongside seagoing junks and jumping on board:
They were mostly trading junks with their papers in order, and if they
did carry a moderate amount of smuggled stuff occasionally I let them
keep it. The sailor in me was still very much alive, and I had a sneaking
regard for people who had the good sense and decency to give their
ships eyes to see with. It was for this reason I often closed my own
to many irregularities.25
Thus staff sometimes interpreted Customs regulations to suit their own
purposes. Rasmussen’s patrolling for smugglers was more to alleviate 
his boredom than to see Customs regulations carried out. Staff sympathies
with smugglers and also their reluctance to antagonize these organized
groups constituted an ongoing concern for the CMCS.
The CMCS code of conduct also covered non-Service activities. Conse-
quently staff were ‘not allowed to engage in trade or to interest themselves
either directly or indirectly in the importation or exportation of merchan-
dise’.26 Furthermore, they were forbidden to receive any remuneration for
services without the IG’s written permission. They were also required to
abstain from expressing political views or criticism in public.27 Particular
offences that would leave an employee liable for dismissal included collu-
sion with customs brokers, absence without leave, malversation and gross
immorality. Offences leading to suspension and investigation included
negligence, lack of respect for superiors and the criticism of superiors or
government matters in the public press or in addresses.28 The Commissioner
was responsible for the censure or suspension of staff guilty of, or charged
with, misconduct.29 Any such action, however, became the subject of a
report and the more serious cases were referred to the IG.
Problems of corruption were not only isolated to the ranks of the outdoor
staff. Indoor staff were regularly transferred from port to port in a bid to
prevent them from forging any ties with local merchants or foreign traders.
Neutrality and aloofness from the business world was the ideal. Yvonne
King recalled instances where both her father and husband received lavish
gifts (including jewellery, chinaware, flowers and fruit) but that these were
always returned (much to her dismay when as a child she saw fruit and
delicacies normally unobtainable in China) as there was a consciousness
that they did not want to become indebted to anyone.30 Such gifts could
have tempted indoor staff to enter networks of favours or guanxi (rela-
tionships) with Chinese merchants.31 Such a culture of indebtedness would
have seriously compromised the position of CMCS staff.
In a contrast to its punitive mechanisms, there was a detailed system for
rewarding meritorious or loyal duty. Two awards are mentioned in the
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the Chinese Customs Medal for Meritorious Service.32 They awarded the
Financial Medal to staff who had made contributions to the financial affairs
of the Chinese Government. It was open to any employee from the finance
department but also to others who had made a contribution to the govern-
ment’s financial dealings. It was awarded to staff who had, for example,
served meritoriously for more than five years, or authored special finan-
cial publications, or were responsible for discovering a case of smuggling
that resulted in a seizure of goods valued at more than $10,000.33 There
were nine divisions of Financial Medals: 1st Class (three grades), 2nd Class
(three grades) and 3rd Class (three grades). The Medal for Meritorious
Service was designed as recognition of staff who had served 25 years of
continuous and distinguished service. It had three grades – Gold, Silver
and Bronze – and these medals were conferred by the Ministry of Finance
at the recommendation of the IG.
Financing the Republic
As a well-organized fiscal institution, the CMCS was an invaluable source
of revenue for the Chinese Government. With its immense revenue poten-
tial, the Service was intimately tied to the general financial health of the
Republic. By the 1920s and 1930s, not only was the CMCS an import-
ant revenue source but it also provided a security against which internal
and foreign loans could be issued. The following section provides an 
exploration of the role of the CMCS in the finance of the Republic.
The CMCS served two key economic purposes. It assisted in the regu-
lating of trade to benefit both Chinese authorities and Western traders and
also provided the Chinese Government with a regular source of revenue.
In many Customs documents of the 1920s and 1930s a continual rhetoric
emerges, one that reinforced the image of the Customs as a prolific source
of revenue for China. Aglen often reflected on the evolution of the Service
during his leadership. The development of the Service as a major revenue
source was, in Aglen’s perception, closely linked to the finances of the
Chinese Government and also foreign interests in China. He outlined:
It seems to me that the Service has gone through two stages and is on
the eve of a third. At first it was a purely Chinese institution main-
tained and supported by the Government because we supplied a certain
income which the Gov. [sic] found very useful. Then the loans came
and we became a foreign interest with the Chinese Gov.’s interest still
predominant: the Indemnity gave the foreign Governments a financial
interest in us; the revolution which gave us control of revenue and
loan service, transformed us into an unofficial foreign Caisse de la
dette, a position full of anomalies, but on the whole suitable to the
times. . . . The last stage in this development has been reached owing
to the virtual cessation of central Gov. authority and the necessity of
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carrying on administration with borrowed money. The Customs is now
an imperium in imperio34 practically independent in matters of Govern-
ment finance but in the last resort asking not rather Chinese Gov. but
on this foreign powers.35
Further to this Aglen cited the Boxer indemnity and other foreign loans
between the Qing court and the foreign powers that were secured against
the Customs as evidence of this independence. He also touched on the
development during post-revolutionary turmoil where, after 1917, Custom
revenue was placed into foreign banks and only after loan and indemnity
payments were met did the Chinese Government receive any surplus. 
By the 1920s the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation was the
sole custodian of the Customs account.36 Aglen’s comments highlight 
the interdependency between the Chinese, the CMCS and Western interests
in China.
Literature on the Nationalist era presents a widely divergent picture of
the Nationalists’ attempts at handling the Chinese economy, and, while not
necessarily agreeing as to whether the Nationalists were a success or an
outright failure, the existence of a deficit problem, fuelled throughout the
Nanjing decade, is widely recognized. In his work, The Government and
Politics in Kuomintang China 1923–1937, Tien examined the institutional
developments (or in many instances the lack thereof) implemented by the
GMD government during the Nanjing decade. In the course of this study,
Tien draws attention to the deficit of the government as it channelled funds
into its military and debt service.37 Preceding Tien’s work, Pauuw’s article,
‘The Kuomintang and Economic Stagnation, 1928–37’, discusses the deficit
of the government and its focus on the military as a means for achieving
tangible unification of China.38 Research by Rawski, Endicott, Wright and
Osterhammel also contributes to the picture of Nationalist China as a finan-
cially tenuous period compounded by internal dissension and world
depression.39 The budgetary reports referred to in the following pages illus-
trate the scope of China’s financial dilemmas. Receipts for each year were
heavily bolstered by loans, this in itself being the contributing factor
towards the government’s deficit problems.
The foreign powers had a vested interest in the development and progress
of the Nationalist Government. During the Republic British officials and
merchants continued to cling, albeit naively, to the dream of China’s unlim-
ited market that, one day, might be opened.40 For their investments to
develop, however, they needed a relatively stable environment; something
that Jiang Jieshi’s government appeared to promise once it was in power.
The CMCS represented a key element in this financial stability. In the
China Year Book (CYB) of 1931, there is a commitment on the part of the
Nationalists to strive for greater stability of their economy and the financial














































An institutional review 31
Foreign lenders will not seriously discuss loans to China unless China
has balanced its budget, or has adopted and is carrying into effect a
programme of readjustment which will result in stabilizing the finances
within a reasonable time.41
Further to this Song Ziwen (better known as T.V. Soong), the Finance
Minister, warned that, while loan projects were receiving popular atten-
tion, they would take considerable time to bring to fruition, even though
at the outset they might have appeared ‘within the realm of practical
finance’.42 The overwhelming message in such comments was the recog-
nition that there was no easy solution to China’s budgetary problems.
The foreign powers wanted to ensure the repayment of their loans and
indemnities and this encouraged intervention in China’s finances. The loan
consortium that emerged just after 1911 and existed throughout the Repub-
lic is a prime example of foreign involvement in China’s finances. This
consortium, consisting of representatives of Britain, Germany, France and
America, was created to avoid inter-rivalry between the principal lending
groups to China and to present a united front to the Chinese treasury. This
group had British Foreign Office backing from the outset and was closely
allied with political ambitions. As Kann shrewdly observed, ‘as a matter
of fact politics became closely intermixed with finance’.43 One avenue
through which Britain could ensure its interests were protected was the
CMCS. The Service represented a vital security for foreign loans to China.44
Financial reports were submitted to the CYB by the Minister of Finance
but were not always issued or received promptly. The CYB for the 1923–37
period regularly devoted a chapter to the financial situation of China. The
material contained in these chapters often consists of a proposed budget
(in the years prior to the Nationalists’ ascension to government) and/or a
financial statement of revenue and expenditure for the previous fiscal year
(1 July–30 June). A commentary by a Western ‘expert’ or observer accom-
panied such reports. In some instances Customs reports and government
reports as to revenue do not necessarily correspond. This can be largely
attributed to the fact that figures were compiled separately by the Ministry
of Finance and by the CMCS’ Statistical Department.
Table 2.2 draws on the official reports provided to the CYB by the
Ministry of Finance. The CMCS represented the largest proportion of 
the Government’s revenue for each year. It ranged from 42 per cent to 
54 per cent of total revenue. Any large disruption in the functioning of the
Service therefore would conceivably have a direct effect on the financial
state of the government. The two other substantial sources of revenue for
the government came from salt taxes and proceeds from borrowing. These
sources combined contributed around 40 per cent of total revenue. The
National government did not receive all of the proceeds from salt taxes,
however, as a proportion was allocated to each province. The fact that net
proceeds from borrowing represented between 16.8 per cent and 30.3 per


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cent of total revenue emphasizes the scale of China’s deficit problem. 
The year 1931 was the high point of government borrowing with revenue
from loans doubling in value from 1930. Another source of revenue that
was not listed in official reports was that of the cultivation and sale of
opium. While this was illegal in theory, in practice it was officially con-
doned and provided a valuable income to the government and provincial
leaders.45
In terms of government expenditure the two most significant demands
on existing finances were clearly military expenses and loan servicing. For
example, in the early 1930s military expenses represented in excess of 
40 per cent of total government spending.46 Such high levels of expenditure
serve to indicate how highly militarized the GMD remained, and alludes
to the ongoing difficulties Jiang faced when attempting to curb the size 
of China’s armed forces. Military expenditure placed significant strains on
the government’s finances. The CYB for 1934 discussed the problems such
exorbitant spending on the military caused the government.47
Loan servicing was the other main demand of government revenues. 
This constituted from 24.4 per cent to 35 per cent of total expenditure.48 In
each balance of payments not only did the government have a substantial,
ongoing loan repayment commitment, it also continued to issue bonds 
and to take out loans, both internal and foreign. This reveals the serious
deficit problem the government was struggling to control. Foreign loan 
consortiums were clearly in a powerful position by virtue of the Chinese
Government’s continuing cycle of indebtedness. The foreign powers, know-
ing that the bulk of revenue was absorbed by military and loan repayments
with little left over for civilian expenses, were aware of the possibility 
that the government might be tempted to rashly spend loans for day-to-day
budgetary purposes rather than long-term goals.49 Military expenditure 
and loans took anywhere from 70 per cent to 80 per cent of government
revenue. Such large commitments left limited revenues available to the 
government.50
A great proportion of China’s foreign loans were secured against the
Customs. This suggests the close connection between Western interests in
China and the role of the CMCS in the Republic. Foreign loans to China
were deeply influenced by international politics and, while China’s obliga-
tions were direct to the actual banks or syndicates advancing the money,
these obligations were regarded by the interested foreign powers as a mat-
ter of vital concern in their general policy towards China.51 The securing of
foreign loans against a foreign-dominated CMCS lends further credence the
idea of the Service as centripetal to the practice of Western imperialism in
the Republic. In 1931, the loans secured against the CMCS included the
Chinese Imperial 4 per cent Gold Loan of 1895 (£15,820,000); Chinese
Imperial 5 per cent Gold Loan of 1896 (£16,000,000); Chinese Imperial 4.5
per cent Gold Loan of 1898 (£16,000,000); 5 per cent Reorganisation Loan
of 1913 (£25,000,000); 5 per cent Gold Loan of 1925 (US$43,893,900);
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and Chinese Republic 6 per cent Gold Loan of 1928 (US$5,000,000). 
These loans were not the only secured loans made by foreign powers to 
the Chinese Government but the most substantial loans were all secured
against the CMCS. Through this the Service was not merely a revenue-
generating institution for the Chinese Government but, rather, was inte-
gral in generating revenue for the foreign powers, albeit in an indirect 
manner. This revenue was realized in the form of a security for foreign 
loans and also an assurance of regular repayments of interest. Importantly,
the prerogative for the payment or defaulting of loans was not left to the
Chinese Government; instead the CMCS managed this as one of their
responsibilities.
Internal loans were similarly secured against Customs revenue. The value
of loans authorized and issued between 1928 and 1933 against the Customs
totalled in excess of two billion dollars.52 The sheer size of these loans
has two significant implications. First, the amount of these loans illustrates
the heavy reliance the Chinese Government was placing on the Customs,
not merely to generate revenue but to provide the security for the floating
of large internal loans. Second, the Customs revenue was reliable enough
to provide security for such amounts but it could never realistically be
capable of repaying such debts. Presumably though, the releasing of bonds
would have been directed at the foreign consortium and also towards
wealthy Chinese investors.
Through the CMCS the Chinese Government was able to gain, most
importantly, security for foreign and internal loans. The foreign basis of
the Customs in turn provided an extra element of security for the foreign
powers and therefore their investments. Through this Chinese dependency
foreign investors could gain some ascendancy in China’s economic affairs.
Certainly, the indebtedness of China and the need to secure repayment
implied the potential for foreign intervention in Chinese affairs. There was
a definite dependency cycle established between the government and the
foreign powers through the Nationalists’ deficit. The Customs represented
a significant revenue source for the government, even more so because it
was an institution that offered stability as one of its central tenets.
After having examined the significance of the Customs to the national
government’s finances, it is essential to explore what constituted the rev-
enue of the Service. Statistics featured in CYB and in the Customs Annual
reports are the primary mode for assessing the economic performance of
the Service. As illustrated in Table 2.3, figures for CMCS revenue for the
1923–37 period reveal constant growth. During this time there was an
increase of almost 350 per cent. This growth, however, was not steady
and, for example, in 1931 there is a dramatic peak in the total of Customs
revenue due in part to the initiation of the collection of inter-port duties
and famine and flood relief surtaxes in response to hardships in some
regions and the inundation of the Yangzi.53 The 1931 total was, as a result,
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would also have been a result of the Nationalists having gained tariff
autonomy and having increased their tariffs accordingly. Import and export
duty constituted the largest sources of revenue for the Customs. Of these,
however, import duties always remained the dominant concern. These two
duties confirm the significance of the Service in moderating and controlling
trade to and from China.
As the revenue of the Service increased, the calls made on this source
were twofold. They involved maintaining the Service and also contributing
to Chinese Government interests. Wright’s detailed work on the CMCS
provides a thorough account of not only the claims on the revenue but also
the disposal of the Customs surplus. He discusses the ‘first charges on the
revenue’; namely, all expenditure necessary to maintain the service in full,
all costs incurred in the collection and banking of the revenue. This also
encompassed ‘special appropriations for the upkeep of the Service and
allied interests or as grants to the Government for specified objects which
have been approved by the Diplomatic body’.54
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Table 2.3 Revenue of the Maritime Customs Service, 1923–37
Year Import Export Coast Inter- Transit Ton- Revenue Famine Total
duty duty trade port duesb nage surtax or flood
dutya duty dues relief
surtaxc
1923 50.64 35.32 4.13 – 5.00 3.74 – – 98.94
1924 59.37 36.05 3.97 – 4.85 4.19 – – 108.43
1925 56.66 38.28 4.12 – 5.73 4.07 – 1.33 110.19
1926 66.77 40.92 4.35 – 5.16 4.52 – 3.60 125.32
1927 54.38 39.67 3.87 – 4.88 4.28 – 0.07 107.16
1928 72.47 42.16 4.21 – 4.85 4.62 – – 128.27
1929 167.10 56.54 5.66 – 3.85 4.95 – – 238.11
1930 211.64 55.38 6.30 – 3.25 4.84 – – 281.41
1931 314.69 47.83 – 15.65 – 5.24 – 1.60 385.00
1932 236.29 26.78 – 20.55 – 4.27 5.07 19.02 311.98
1933 265.61 23.24 – 18.00 – 4.40 14.13 14.14 339.52
1934 260.22 24.70 – 16.97 – 4.30 14.22 14.24 334.65
1935 250.17 20.73 – 13.21 – 4.32 13.53 13.56 315.52
1936 254.54 24.47 – 13.68 – 4.03 13.94 13.97 324.63
1937 261.29 29.07 – 20.15 – 3.22 14.58 14.59 342.90
a On 1 January 1931 coast trade duty was abolished. CYB 1931 699.
b On I January 1931 transit dues were abolished. CYB 1931 699.
c This was a 10% customs surtax on all goods (except those exempted) to contribute to the
cost of famine relief along the Yangzi. CYB 1934 497.
Figures in millions of standard dollars St.$.
The above table is presented in standard dollars, using the officially set exchange rate of
Haikwan tael (Hk.Tl) 100 = $155.80 to calculate the 1923–5 figures and to randomly check
other figures.
Source: Maritime Customs reports and CYB 1934.
Clearly the foreign powers held considerable interest in China’s finances
and most particularly in the fate of the Service. This is understandable
considering the CMCS’ importance in relation to China’s financial health.
As can be seen in the preceding section, the Customs, over time, came to
represent a significant force for the economic prosperity of China. It played
a vital role in financing the Republic and provided a secure source for
foreign loans. Foreign powers could rest easy in the knowledge that the
Customs would secure their interests because a hard-working foreign
Inspectorate was firmly at its helm.
The London Office
[The London Office] acted as a kind of stationery and supply office for the
whole Service, also as an information bureau and an examination center.
That much was known of it. But a large part of its work was highly confi-
dential, and all who joined it were under a pledge of secrecy not to divulge,
under the severest penalties, what was done. It was a hush-hush office.55
From the 1870s the Service maintained a LO. This office served a diverse
number of roles in supporting the CMCS, not just administratively but by
being responsible for a lot of the behind the scenes promotion of the
Service. The LO vetted the majority of recruits for the indoor staff who
were then sent off to serve in China. This section examines the LO and
the roles it played in supporting and perpetuating foreign interests in the
CMCS. While touching on the LO in the early IMCS era, the follow-
ing examination will focus on the 1920s and 1930s. This office remains 
an intriguing aspect of the CMCS, its existence alone providing further
evidence of the British dominance of the Service.56
The legendary Hart was responsible for the establishing of the LO for
the Customs with a Non-Resident Secretary (NRS) in 1873. The office was
located in 26 Old Queen Street Westminster, at the heart of London’s diplo-
matic and administrative precinct. The functions of this London ‘outpost’
of China’s Customs Service are largely unexplored in academic works;
likewise the relationship between the IG and the NRS remains shadowy.
This obscurity may be due in part to the perception of the peripheral role
played by this office in relation to the Customs establishments throughout
China. Such perceptions are deceptive however, as the LO constituted 
a significant link for the CMCS and its British supporters, the import of
which should not be underestimated. The establishing of the NRS in 
London emphasized the ascendancy of British interests in the Service and
a continued imperialist agenda.
Hart’s motivations for establishing a London branch of the Customs
were influenced by the practicalities of having a London agent to handle
Customs affairs. James Campbell, who had been in London for several
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by handling such sensitive matters as the contentious von Grumpach case.57
Therefore in August 1873 Hart discussed the possibility of an arrangement
with Campbell that would make the need for an agent unnecessary. He
outlined to Campbell:
I must remember that, from the way you have acted during the last two
years at home, it is evident you would, in other important ways, be
useful to me as a man who knows China (as you do), and no one could
be fully employed and usefully employed except a man thoroughly
trusted by me (as you are) and personally loyal to me (as I fully believe
you to be).58
Hart stressed the need for a man he could not only trust but that import-
antly had personal loyalty to the IG. This reflects to some extent the
tensions that had been placed on the Customs by the British diplomatic
body during its early years, these pressures culminating in several chal-
lenges to the authority of the Customs establishment in China. As IG Hart
had the need for a London contact that would not only offer support to
the Inspectorate but who also could be relied on to defend the best inter-
ests of the service.
The selection of Campbell’s official title as NRS had implications on
what direction the London establishment would take. While Hart had
initially considered calling Campbell Supply Secretary or Chinese Com-
missioner, he discarded both as being understated and too grandiose
respectively. He was aware of the need to select a title that would neither
restrict Campbell’s activities nor bring him under critical scrutiny from
Diplomatic or Chinese circles.59 Campbell’s role would be twofold: buying
and forwarding supplies and attending to confidential work delegated by
the IG. Through this simple outline of the duties of the NRS there were
indications that the LO could, in time, further expand the scope of its
activities according to the needs of the Inspectorate.
The LO was a small administrative establishment. It appears that only
a typist-clerk, office keeper and office boy supported the NRS. While 
Hart was the originating force behind this office, his letters often betray
reluctance to continuing to commit funds to the upkeep of such an estab-
lishment.60 The staffing numbers of the LO did not dramatically change
during the course of its existence but in the 1920s a new recruit to the
Service would often spend some time as an assistant to the NRS before
being sent to China.
Ironically, even with the increasing significance of the CMCS revenue
during the mid years of the Republic (when compared to the struggle Hart
and the IMCS often had to meet indemnity and loan commitments), the
LO faced threats to its continuation in the 1920s. During Aglen’s leader-
ship the existence of the LO came under intense scrutiny, both in Britain
and China. An income tax ruling in 1924 (Aglen was unable to secure an
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exemption) meant that Customs staff in London were taxed according to
British law.61 He wrote:
The Foreign Office may be able to help us. They understood the situ-
ation, or at any rate it can be explained to them, and, seeing how much
depends on the Customs and what a very considerable British interest
it is, they might be able to bring some weight to bear in the direction
of freeing us from embarrassment. But when all is said and done we
cannot expect that Great Britain will alter her laws for our benefit.62
Aglen concluded that it might be possible to use a bluff that the LO would
relocate to either Paris or Washington but that this would not eliminate the
fact that the CMCS wanted to retain a recruiting office in London regard-
less of the outcome of the tax ruling. From the sentiments in Aglen’s letter
and the way the Service worked around the inconvenience of these taxes,
it is apparent that the LO was considered indispensable to the Service.
This income tax ruling caused concern for LO employees, since their
China based colleagues had no such taxes. This income tax was consid-
ered a disadvantage when working at the LO which, along with the higher
cost of living, was exacerbated by the fact that staff were often not given
choice in their appointment to this post. To counteract this, their wages
were safeguarded against rises in the exchange and they were accorded a
rent allowance.63 In response to the income tax ruling, there was an exam-
ination of the numbers of staff at the LO and also the composition of the
staff. Aglen suggested the possibility of recruiting permanent staff from
London and thus allowing the CMCS staff to return to China. NRS Bowra
(appointed in 1924), however, sounded a note of alarm at this prospect,
as he believed there must be at least a second in charge who was from
the Service. He advised Aglen:
I am inclined to think that on the whole (and even if the service has
to pay his income tax for him) it would be better to have as No 2 here
a China-trained man who knows China and the Service. Otherwise 
the burden on the N.R.S. would be an unduly heavy one, as he would
have to interview personally everyone who wants to know anything
about China or Service conditions . . . leaving him little time for
anything else, in view of the constant string of callers here.64
Should the NRS fall ill or take leave, Bowra was convinced that an able
and experienced Customs man would be needed to fill the void.65 Despite
these discussions, no further action along these lines was taken. The
employment of local staff in the LO came under scrutiny again during
Maze’s leadership. A review of the LO, submitted by M.O. Law to Maze
(c.1930), outlined in detail the cost of running the office.66 It also suggested
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China staff being retained in London when locally employed staff could
as easily fill their jobs. After approximating the annual cost of running the
LO at around £5,444, Law proposed downsizing that he predicted would
reduce the annual running costs by half. He suggested that the NRS lived
on the premises to cut down rental allowances.67 Whether or not this 
was acted upon is unclear; however, it is significant that the IG solicited
such reports.
During the Hart and Campbell era, the LO fulfilled roles more suited to
a Chinese legation. Moreover, the LO of the IMCS era could be seen as
both presenting and representing China in Europe. In 1873 it organized a
Chinese display at an exhibition in Vienna, and until 1905 continued to
make successful representations in exhibitions in the West. The IMCS
presented the arts, produce and industries of China at these exhibitions.
Wright comments that they helped ‘the world to understand and appre-
ciate better the life and culture of the Chinese people’.68 Campbell often
coordinated such displays, and in this manner the IMCS was part of the
colonial desire to represent Asia to Europe.
The NRS was no mere secretary of supplies. Indicative of the post is
the fact that Campbell played an integral role in negotiations over the
‘Feihoo affair’, involving the French Navy’s arrest of the IMCS cruiser in
October 1884, and also disputes in relation to Tonkin (1885).69 Such far-
reaching influence, however, was not enjoyed by the LO in the Republican
period as China’s legation in London was well established and, in a reflec-
tion of the Nationalists’ rise in China (looked on with a certain amount of
regret and trepidation by some CMCS staff and old China hands), the lega-
tion could well manage its own affairs. Gone were the days when the
Chinese legation in Britain had taken its lead from the LO.70
In the 1920s and 1930s the LO linked the Service with affairs in Britain.
Moreover it provided an opportunity to raise the profile of the CMCS in the
eyes of British business and political leaders. A discussion between Aglen
and Bowra with regard to the role of the LO is telling, as Aglen specified
that the office should not assume any representative functions, nor should
it compete socially or officially with the Chinese legation.71 This discussion
confirms that the LO had in the past offered a challenge to the Chinese lega-
tion and alluded that potential competition did in fact remain through its
network of contacts. Bowra for his part, was conscious of underlying ten-
sions between the LO and the Chinese legation. In his memoirs he described
the Chinese legation in London as ‘eyeing us [the LO] with jealousy’ and
that he had realized ‘any attempt at self-assertion on our part would have
made difficulties for the IG in Peking’.72 Clearly, throughout the Republic
there was a consciousness that the LO needed discretion in its dealings.
Despite the focus on support the LO was simultaneously cultivating a
network of allies. These contacts reached into the echelons of the British
Foreign Office, banking circles and Parliament. Aglen instructed Bowra:
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There are one or two people that we must keep in touch with but they
are extremely few and, so far as I know, the only ones who are specially
important are: the Bank, Sir John Jordan, the Far Eastern Department
of the Foreign Office, Admiral Learmouth, Trinity House, and perhaps
it would be a good thing to get to know the people in the Overseas
Department of the Board of Trade. Then there are, of course, Ambas-
sadors whom one has previously known in Peking; they are always
disposed to be friendly and it does no harm to call on them if they
are appointed to London. But I don’t want any pushing of the London
office in a social way; I much prefer people to come to us and for our
having a ready means of access to such people as it may be necessary
for me to keep in contact with.73
Aglen obviously expected certain channels of communications to be main-
tained especially with influential and, even more importantly, sympathetic
personages. This desire to keep Chinese affairs in prominence in Britain
is echoed throughout the Z Letters, with Aglen encouraging Bowra to hint
to politicians to keep China in the public gaze.74
The maintenance of a sympathetic network continued throughout the
1930s under the watchful guidance of Maze. On several occasions NRS
Macoun reported to Maze the courtesy calls he had been making as part
of his duties. Groups or individuals frequently mentioned included the
Foreign Office, the Department of Overseas Trade, Sir John Pratt, the China
Association and Sir C. Addis (a prominent banker). Of his duties, Macoun
wrote: ‘I realise how useful it is to be in close touch with official, banking
and commercial people in London who exercise influence in matters
connected with China.’75 Evidently the maintenance of influential contacts
was integral to the role of the NRS. Owing to tensions between Maze and
the British Minister in China, Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson, Maze often
directed informal correspondence to the Foreign Office through the NRS.
Most obviously during Maze’s leadership, the LO was a useful avenue for
gauging establishment reaction to different issues through informal chan-
nels. This was particularly the case during the proposed Hong Kong–China
Trade and Customs Agreement, which dominated attention in 1930 (this
is discussed in detail in Chapter 5).76 The office provided the IG with intel-
ligence on the general British stance before any official discussions were
entered into. As the CMCS was drawn deeper into Chinese political affairs
during the Nationalist era, the LO increased its profile in the influential
circles of finance and government back home.
The LO played an integral role in recruiting employees for the indoor
staff of the Service. In doing so, this office had a significant part in shaping
the CMCS by virtue of the type of men it sought to recruit. Certain qualities
were deemed desirable in the recruiting process, and in the development
of entrance requirements, including examinations and procedures, the NRS














































An institutional review 41
Through this sense of an ‘ideal type’ an image of the ‘Customs man’ begins
to emerge.
The Inspectorate continually represented personal integrity and principles
as being synonymous with life in the Service. The Inspectorate often sought
to advance the ideal of the trustworthy and diligent Customs man.77 In 
a semi-official circular of January 1923, Aglen stressed the need for not 
only the outdoor staff, but all staff, to keep a high moral standard as ‘the
fundamental reason for the employment of foreigners in the Maritime
Customs Service is their personal integrity and that on this personal integrity
alone the continued employment of foreigners depends’.78 The emphasis
on integrity and resisting a degeneration of standards can be found through-
out many of his admonitions of staff. Supporting this was the fact that
annual confidential reports on all staff took into account personal qualities
of the employee, including manners, trustworthiness and discretion.79
Nominations for admission to the recruitment examinations could only
be made directly to the IG. Consequently the IG was often approached by
acquaintances (many of whom were in China) for consideration of a young
relative at home.80 Nationals from all countries having treaties with China
were eligible to apply.81 Recruitment to the indoor staff demanded not only
scholarly ability but also recommendation from a rather exclusive group,
including retired Customs’ staff, old China hands, and the family and
friends of current indoor staff. Applications were to be made in writing to
the IG, including educational standards, testimonials, a photograph and
health details.82 Although the suggestion of newspaper advertisements for
the recruiting of staff was discussed between Aglen and the NRS, it was
never implemented, furthering the image of a rather exclusive Customs
network for appointing young men. The preferred age for candidates was
between 19 and 23, although this could be extended at the IG’s discretion.
The CMCS sought to attract potential civil service candidates to its ranks.
In 1921 NRS Acheson wrote to Aglen that he believed the salary ques-
tion was also important as ‘men who are willing to join us at £250, the
present value of a junior’s pay, are not as a rule the men we want’. He
concluded that to get the right type of man it was ‘necessary now as it
always has been to go one better than the British Civil Service’.83 There
is little evidence to substantiate whether the CMCS really was successful
in competing with the British Civil Service; although it is unlikely that a
career in China was regarded as being as prestigious as the careers of those
engaged directly in building the empire in India or other colonies.
In a further development of entry requirements in 1921, NRS Acheson
wrote to Aglen with a proposed outline for the literary examination of
candidates. It included English skills, essay writing, arithmetic and general
knowledge along with an option of colloquial French or university stand-
ard entrance papers.84 The examination served primarily as a measure of
general education skills and aptitude. A pamphlet for candidates published
in 1922 introduced the CMCS and also included Forms A.-170 and 
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A.-171, which directly pertain to admission to the Service.85 This guide-
line deals with the process of recruitment to the indoor staff. The NRS
bore the main responsibility for setting the exam papers, the organizing of
examination times, and the subsequent selection of the most successful
candidates. The standard required for recruits was that of a good secondary
education, and for the British applicants (who were the largest in number
– in keeping with British dominance in the indoor staff) this meant that
for ‘British Candidates, in the absence of a university degree, Oxford and
Cambridge Higher Certificates, etc., a place in the highest form in a public
school of the first rank would be sufficient’.86 Educational tests alone did
not always suffice in revealing those best suited to work in China. Certainly
though, the CMCS attracted its share of recruits who later became scholars,
writers and commentators on the China situation (this is perhaps a reflection
on the often scholarly predilection of indoor staff recruits).87
The presentation and character of candidates came under scrutiny. In the
vetting of candidates a mandatory luncheon became almost something of
folklore and a rite of passage among CMCS staff. In a practice first imple-
mented by Campbell, there would be time allowed during a scheduled
examination period for him to have lunch with each prospective recruit.88
These lunches were designed to allow the NRS a better insight into the
personality of the candidate but, of course, at the same time their table
manners, attitude and general demeanour was assessed.89 Lunches were
invariably held at the Thatched House Club, which was closely connected
to the Conservative Club.90 By the 1920s the Thatched House Club had
become a meeting point for retired CMCS staff and other ex-China men.
Recruits to the indoor staff had similar backgrounds to those of the 
officials of the diplomatic services in China.91 As previously discussed, the
Service attempted to lure prospective civil service recruits to its ranks by
offering better pay. Hart, himself being a prime example, had left a post in
the diplomatic corps to take up his position in the new IMCS. Within the
treaty ports the indoor staff of the CMCS mixed socially with the diplo-
matic corps and leading merchant class. There are also parallels between
CMCS indoor staff and employees of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation. Similarities are found in recruitment criteria and also the
encouraging of a sense of social identity through a sporting ethos.92 The
CMCS paid attention to candidates’ sporting abilities and hobbies; they
were eager to employ good all-rounders. The similarities are evident in the
Bank’s desire to implement a language programme based on the model of
the CMCS language programme. Because of a lack of incentives, however,
they did not have as much success as the CMCS.93
The rates of pay for the indoor staff of the service were quite generous,
especially as accommodation was provided at each port.94 With satisfac-
tory conduct, study of Chinese and adaptation to Service life, 4th Assistant
Bs were recommended to 4th Assistant A position within six months of
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forms for the indoor staff specified that candidates must be unmarried.95
Not only was the ‘marriage of junior employees’ not approved but in
extreme cases of marriage after only a few months in the Service, the
employee was likely to be dismissed. Men who married while still in a
junior position had no claims to Customs housing and generally had to
then find their own living quarters.96 This restriction on marriage was 
very similar to the stipulations of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, although it had a ten-year constraint on its junior staff.97 As
recruits were unmarried and, in most cases, enjoying their first taste of
long-distance travel, there was concern that they might be corrupted by
their first China experiences. Acheson wrote:
The objection I feel to recruiting lads of 19 is that if they are trans-
planted to a China port at that age, they inevitably adopt China port
standards of life and no other: if they were invariably posted to Peking
and looked after when there, it would be another matter.98
Shanghai – the ‘Paris of the East’, a dynamic and vibrant city – offered dance
clubs, bars and more temptations to the new arrival in China.99 For instance
gambling was a ‘popular illegal pastime’ and with easy access to credit
systems many newcomers to the treaty ports lived beyond their means.100
With the knowledge of such distractions, the admission form for candidates
indicated that all new recruits would have their behaviour observed during
the first years of their Service.101 Furthermore, the IG reserved the right to 
discharge any staff who had proved to be unsatisfactory.
The physical health of candidates was an important consideration. Each
candidate had to undergo a medical examination before they could be
accepted into the Service. This procedure is understandable, as the often
unsanitary conditions in various ports and Customs outposts often took its
toll on the newer and, therefore, less resistant employees. In his memoirs,
Rasmussen described his first posting to Zhenjiang and recalled that, while
the small concession had a doctor who was a good surgeon, it was a
hospital and skilled nursing that was most needed. He cited the prevalence
of diseases such as cholera, typhoid and smallpox, and that in the event
of someone falling seriously ill, all the men would share the nursing respon-
sibilities.102 Poor health was a hazard and often curtailed careers.103
Consequently, candidates who were in poor physical condition in London
were never given an appointment to China.
The inevitable stresses caused by being thrust into a foreign culture also
exacted a toll on some recruits. When discussing illness among the employ-
ees, it was the junior staff who were mentioned with most frequency. In
one such letter Aglen writes:
Arrangements are being made to send home young Warry who has
broken down in much the same way as P.L.O. Hill, and he will have
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to be invalided. By the way Hill’s case is at a loose end and it will
now have to be taken up. Acheson was in favour of allowing him to
return to duty, but I consider that the risk is too great. I think I must
make it a rule that when once an employee has become incapacitated
owing to mental breakdown he must sever his connection with the
Service. . . . Young Robillard is making a great fight for his life and
is holding his own although his condition is extremely critical.104
Mental breakdown often claimed a share of employees. From such letters
it is indisputable that China service held a certain amount of personal risk.
It was important, therefore, for the NRS to try to ensure that candidates
were both physically and mentally strong before sending them to China.
The role of the NRS in vetting and examining new recruits for the indoor
staff drew to a close in the Nanjing decade. With the GMD’s rise to power
the position of foreigners in the Service was brought under intense scrutiny.
In 1927, following the dismissal of Aglen, the recruitment of foreigners
was suspended.105 In the Customs circular of January 1929, the principle
for equality for Chinese and foreign staff was put forward. In addition a
cessation of the recruitment of foreign staff was called.106 Chinese staff
would fill any vacancies; the only exceptions to this would be when a tech-
nical expert was needed. Consequently, by 1927 the LO had ceased its
role as a recruiting office for staff; instead it devoted more energy to
supporting the Inspectorate and developing its network of contacts.
The LO was a vital complement to the foreign inspectorate. This Office
supported the IG and provided him with an unofficial network of contact
with influential figures known to be sympathetic to not only the CMCS
but also Britain’s interests in this Service. The position of NRS was a
highly esteemed posting, a prized position for senior staff wishing to spend
their final years before retirement in London. It was also a position
requiring a skilled and energetic diplomat. From its inception and right
through the Republic, the LO was never merely a supply office for the
CMCS; it was a key element in ensuring and maintaining British interests
in the Service. It did this not only through its recruitment processes but
also through the maintenance of a network of allies.
‘A family along the China coast’: life in the CMCS
The overall impression of the Service from CMCS reports is one of a large
and routine bureaucracy, dealing with cargoes and tariffs, traders and ship-
ping. This is only a partial view. If the Service was all about tariffs and
trade, it was equally about dealing with merchants, uncovering smugglers,
making sure your Chinese boy did not take advantage of you, and doing
the rounds of dinner parties. Commissioners and their senior staff mixed
freely with consular staff of all nations and also with the representatives
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in the CMCS opened a window to the wonders of China and also to the
often-hectic social scene of the treaty ports.
Yvonne King, née Le Bas (1913–), was born in Longzhou, where her
father was stationed.107 Yvonne and her siblings grew up in the CMCS.
Taking her involvement with the Service beyond her childhood years,
Yvonne married a Customs man, Harold King, in 1931. So the first 37
years of her life were largely spent in China and intimately connected 
to the Customs. Her recollections teamed with other reminiscences of
Customs men (predominantly the indoor staff) and consular staff provide
a glimpse, albeit dimmed with the passing of time, of the privileged lives
led by those in the upper echelons of the Service. King described her life
in the CMCS:
Being in the Customs was a bit like having a large family scattered
around, up and down the China coast, as well as in many inland cities.
There was always news of various members and of their doings, trans-
fers, promotions and so on.108
While there was a sense of camaraderie and of extended family among
CMCS staff, family lives were fragmentary. Life in the Service did not
lend itself to a settled existence. Duty at each Customs house was transi-
tory and it was therefore difficult to establish lasting friendships. Wives
and children would often return to the United Kingdom, Europe or America
for long periods of time while husbands remained at their Customs posts.
The Service provided allowances for men with families but most often
children were raised and educated away from China.
Since indoor staff rotated from port to port with reasonable frequency,
families also encountered disruption. When recalling their early life in
China it is not surprising that some recalled a childhood lacking in a sense
of permanency and the security of a family house.109 To further illustrate
the frequency of these moves, an overview of Yvonne King’s China experi-
ences is useful. With her parents and then her own family she moved 
every three years (sometimes sooner) from 1913 right through to 1950.
This included China postings, as well as leave time in Europe.110 Perry
Anderson’s reflection on his father, James Carew O’Goram Anderson’s
Customs career (1914–42) also shows a similar pattern of constant travel
throughout China.111 James Anderson’s ports of duty included Mukden,
Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai (on more than one occasion), Beihai, Mengzi
outposts in Manchuria, Hong Kong, Hainan, Shantou and Longzhou. 
Home leave was also interspersed among these postings. While there was
a sense of uncertainty with such constant movement, Briggs (a member of
the Marine Department and Captain of various cruisers) recalls it as a
worry-free existence as on arrival at a port a house would be ready and
domestic staff available;112 these houses were often furnished, making the
relocation somewhat easier.
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Customs employees were generally not married when they were sent out
for their China service. Life in China could become tumultuous or even
dangerous and wives faced such conditions alongside their husbands, as
the Customs regulations reminded all. Health risks were exacerbated for
women in terms of childbirth and raising a young family, as medical facil-
ities were not always available.113 However, whenever possible, medical
services were covered for Customs staff.114 Once married, they could rely
on suitable accommodation being provided for their wives and families as
they were transferred from port to port. Generally there were Chinese
servants who ‘went with the house’.115 Servants consisted of a boy,116
cook, coolie, wash-amah and gardener.117 For couples with a young family, 
it was relatively simple to find amahs (or Chinese nannies) to help in 
caring for the children. For example, Mrs Le Bas hired two amahs to help 
care for her five children. One of these was originally employed as a 
wash-amah, but became a valued addition to the family and stayed with
the Le Bas family for around 60 years, caring for the next generation of
children.118
Family life in the CMCS could be difficult as the scarcity of educational
opportunities for children was a concern. Governesses were often employed
to give the children a good foundation for their future schooling. The
appointment of governesses was, however, not always as straightforward
as families would have liked. Yvonne King writes about her first governess:
Mademoiselle Morange, it appears, was a most attractive young lady
and Mother and Father had a difficult time coping with the many male
admirers who flocked to the house hoping for an introduction or left
notes asking her to contact them. Hence, one of the last things Father
said to Mother before we left was ‘for goodness sake, the next gov-
erness you bring out, make sure that she is a really ugly one!’.119
And sure enough, the family’s next governess was very plain!120 Upon
reaching secondary school age, children were generally sent to be educated
either in Britain or Europe.121 Unlike many of the other Customs families,
the Le Bas family did not send all their children home to the continent for
an education. In 1920, when the three eldest children were roughly nine,
ten and eleven years old, the family returned to France to arrange for their
schooling. Yvonne and her sister Jacqueline had some schooling in France
but were considered too young to be left there when their parents returned
to China. As a result they remained with their parents and were educated
at the various foreign schools around the ports.
For the single men in the Customs, families in the Service often provided
the comforting reminders of home. Yvonne King recalled that in Beijing
(1926–8) there seemed to be no shortage of young men dropping in to
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there was always something happening and the gramophone was kept
busy! Besides, our dear Mother, I have to add, was the original, authen-
tic motherly type and so she ‘adopted’ quite a few of them, having an
idea that they were rather homesick, many having only recently arrived
from England, France or wherever!122
Families like the Le Bases clearly offered a refuge from loneliness and
homesickness for the single employees of the Service. It is probable that
the presence of such families also served to moderate some of the less
desirable behaviour of the young recruits. As Anderson reflected, a concern
was that young men often ‘found solace’ with local tea girls or concu-
bines.123 It is not surprising that such entanglements occurred as China
presented a strange environment with no ‘visible morals’ for young
recruits.124 Shanghai: A Novel has as its main character a new recruit to
the IMCS and traces his challenges in adapting to life and the temptations
offered in the treaty ports. These temptations included the lure of opium
and Chinese ‘sing song’ girls.125 Moreover, even for married men, long
separations from the families often meant it was tempting to revert to their
bachelor ways.126 No doubt then, Customs families provided some restraint
on the behaviour of the single men.
Summer holidays were spent either house boating, touring, or at Customs
holidays bungalows.127 These bungalows were located at the resort area of
Beidaihe, ideally located some 80 miles from Beijing. Yvonne King recalled:
Our two summers were spent by the sea at Peitaiho. The Customs had
three bungalows there and as ours was the largest family, we got the
big one with a tennis court. It was great fun for us and all the various
friends who came to stay for their holidays.128
Holiday surroundings such as these must have provided a pleasant change
from the hot Beijing summer. Tennis, horse riding, paper chase and hunting
parties were other activities staff enjoyed in their leisure time.129 When
allowed a year’s long-term leave, after every five years of service, staff
would voyage home.
Customs Commissioners were provided with spacious and comfortable
accommodation. This was not only conducive for family life but permitted
the Commissioner to entertain and to host visiting dignitaries. Foreign staff
could generally have accommodation ready for them in a port, by renting
houses or apartments when their counterparts were on leave.130 Briggs
described the senior CMCS staff as living in ‘a suitable style and a certain
amount of luxury, though extravagance was unheard of’.131 Luxury is
equated with comfort and servants. Yvonne King described the Commis-
sioner’s house at Zhifu as ‘large and rambling with a messy garden and a
tennis court’.132 This house also had an annexe with two bedrooms, a study
and bathroom. Anderson’s first wife, the novelist Stella Benson, described
their house at Beihai as ‘almost palatial’, set in a large compound filled 
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with flowering trees and shrubs.133 The Customs Commissioner’s house in
Macao gives a good indication of the conditions enjoyed by the more senior
staff. This house was newly built when the Le Bas family moved into it
in 1926. It had spacious grounds, generous verandahs and a tennis court;
it also boasted a billiard room.134 This residence not only made an impres-
sive mark on the streetscape, it also commanded exceptional views across
Macao’s harbour. (See Figures 2.2 to 2.4.)
Indoor staff enjoyed good social standing throughout the treaty ports
and often Commissioners were in close contact with the legations. The
diaries of British Minister to China Sir Miles Lampson often gave refer-
ence to social engagements with Customs staff, illustrative of their standing
in treaty port society.135 Williams reflected on his contact with Lampson:
I have memories of many delightful receptions given by him in the
magnificent Chinese open pavilion opposite to his official residence.
Here I mixed with a thoroughly cosmopolitan throng of diplomats and
military officers in uniforms glittering with decorations, and ladies and
children attired in brilliant colours.136
One would suspect that only the more senior indoor staff would be invited
to such functions. In his role as Deputy and then Acting Commis-
sioner at Tianjin, Williams writes of often calling on gunboats when they
visited port and of the hospitality he was always shown.137 In return he
would invite the naval officers to tennis parties or to go out for picnics 
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Figure 2.2 Customs Commissioner’s house, Macao c.1926 with Le Bas family in
the foreground (reproduced by courtesy of Mrs Yvonne King)
Figure 2.3 Customs Commissioner’s house, Macao c.1926; Commissioner Le Bas
(left) entertaining guests. (Yvonne King née Le Bas is the child seated
at the right) (reproduced by courtesy of Mrs Yvonne King)
Figure 2.4 View over Macao from the Customs Commissioner’s house (reproduced
by courtesy of Mrs Yvonne King)
golden age in family legend’ filled with fêtes, children’s parties and social
engagements.138 Thus the Customs Commissioners in particular took a lead
role in social gatherings for the foreign community in their respective port
or outpost. Briggs, as a member of the Marine Department, represents
another facet of the Service, and he described the position of CMCS staff
in Hong Kong as not fitting with any social group but having ‘ready made
friends’ within the Service.139 He mentions that they were eligible for the
various clubs (such as the Royal Hong Kong Golf Club) and that he often
socialized with Service people as well as other friends. There is a sense
here that the transient lifestyle of CMCS staff made it sometimes difficult
to form friendships outside the Service.
While Customs Commissioners could mix freely with consular staff and
merchants, there was, however, an unspoken hierarchy in the order of
precedence each group should expect. Yvonne King recounted a story of
when she and her husband were stationed in Xiamen. A visiting Admiral
invited them to a dinner on his British battle ship. She explained:
We were asked to go on board to dinner together with people like the
Hongkong bank and from Butterfield and Swire and all those people.
Now the British consul in Amoy at the time didn’t have a wife or at
least his wife was in England or something . . . I was only twenty-
nine or thirty at the time and I was rather overcome because I had to
sit at the right of the Admiral and all the other older women were
sitting at the lower part of the table. This struck me very much you
know, the fact that the Customs were always before any merchants
but after the consular people.140
A sense of status and decorum was important in treaty port community
and also within the Service itself. Briggs recalled a social highlight in
Shanghai being a dinner hosted by IG Maze and his wife.141 This was a
formal affair and care was taken that people of compatible rank were
invited. Socially, wives played an important role, acting as hostesses and
putting forward a good face when entertaining. The ability to play either
bridge or mahjong was considered essential as social invitations often
centered on these activities.142
The pressure of social norms and underlying racism also affected the
social lives of CMCS staff. While there was a division between foreign
or local, and outdoor or indoor, there was also a consciousness of who
one mixed with. A number of Customs men married Russian women and
also Eurasians.143 But it was the Eurasian community that received greatest
disapproval, this no doubt being largely due to their challenging of social
norms by the blurring of racial boundaries. Briggs described them as not
accepted by either the Chinese or foreign communities. He recounted that
when in Shanghai he accompanied the Secretary of the Coast Inspectorate,
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parties were also present. On enquiring as to Brigg’s identity, Lady Maze
reportedly offered the following advice: ‘tell him that his wife may not be
accepted here, when she comes out, unless he changes his friends.’144
Briggs recalled he had a number of Eurasian friends but few in Shanghai.145
Although the CMCS community was considered warm and welcoming, it
too was governed by larger preconceptions of socially acceptable relations.
Customs cruisers were often employed not only in preventive work but
also for social purposes. Commissioner Bell would often take his family
out in one of the Customs armed merchant cruisers for a picnic at one of
Hong Kong’s bays.146 Customs launches were also employed for hosting
larger groups of the foreign and local community. Guests could be invited
by the Commissioner to enjoy a day on the water, considered a rare 
treat.147 Obviously, this would also have served as a good public relations
exercise for the Customs Commissioner. Expenses for such outings were
covered by an entertainment allowance from the Inspectorate. Williams
also fondly recalled leisure outings. When stationed at the outport of
Jiangmen in South China, he enjoyed many picnic parties on the Customs
launch while making visits of inspection along the river.148 He mentioned
later buying a sailing-houseboat, which his family used for picnics and
shooting trips.149 Similarly, inspection trips to lighthouses often meant a
day of adventuring and picnicking for the children of the Commissioner.150
So for the indoor staff and their families, life at the ports was rarely isolated
or dull. Even at the smaller posts the foreign community was commonly
close knit and in this way there was always a steady stream of social
engagements and activities to partake of. (See Figures 2.5 and 2.6.)
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Figure 2.5 Social function aboard a Customs Cruiser, hosted by Commissioner 
Le Bas c.1926 (reproduced by courtesy of Mrs Yvonne King)
This brief interlude provides a glimpse of a lifestyle long since vanished
along with treaty port China. Those fortunate to be enlisted into the indoor
staff of the Customs service enjoyed privileged lives in the ports. Despite
the often-harsh realities of an underdeveloped environment, Customs em-
ployees led a comfortable life, residing in well-equipped, spacious homes
attended by servants. They moved in the elite social circles of the treaty
ports. In many ways then, Customs staff were sheltered from life in China;
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Figure 2.6 Social function aboard a Customs Cruiser, hosted by Commissioner 
Le Bas c.1926 (reproduced by courtesy of Mrs Yvonne King)
3 Gunboats and revenue,
1923–7
This chapter charts the CMCS as it encountered the rise of the nationalist
GMD and anti-imperialist sentiment. For the CMCS the 1920s repre-
sented a rapidly shifting political kaleidoscope within which the Service
had to chart its direction. The maintenance of the Service’s integrity 
was paramount during this unstable period. From 1923 to 1927 there were 
three prominent challenges to the CMCS, namely the Guangzhou (Canton)
Customs controversy, the Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott and the
dismissal of Aglen as Inspector General (IG). These events and the issues
surrounding them signify a dramatic shift in the fortunes of the Service.
While in 1923 the CMCS was protected by gunboat diplomacy, by 1926
the Service was noticeably alone in defending its integrity. This was 
further emphasized with the dismissal of Aglen by the northern militarists.
This evolution in the status of the Service, in foreign and Chinese eyes,
signified an uncertain future for the CMCS in the Republic.
This chapter is, in many ways, an attempt to rewrite the CMCS back
into the events of 1923–7. This is especially important as, while texts and
documents relating to the Service are available, the actual role of the CMCS
is marginalized. When exploring the events that embroil the CMCS, the
fate of the Service is brought to the fore. Throughout the events in
Guangzhou and Hong Kong, the CMCS was consistently in the background
despite its having direct involvement in what was happening. The end
result of this being the mistaken assumption that those events went on
around the Customs without there being much reaction from the Service.
This chapter redirects attention to the Service to allow a better under-
standing of the CMCS and its experiences as it encountered the rise of the
Nationalists.
Sun Yatsen and the Guangzhou Customs, 1923
Sun Yatsen’s claims for a pro rata share of the Guangzhou Customs revenue
in 1923 triggered a rallying of foreign naval forces in Guangzhou’s harbour
to dissuade him from action. Gunboat diplomacy, in the form of a multi-
national naval demonstration, was employed to protect not only the integrity
of the Customs but, more importantly, foreign interests in the Service. The
Guangzhou Government’s claims against the Customs were indicative 
of a chaotic struggle for political survival. Tensions surrounding the
Guangzhou Customs lasted from September 1923 to early 1924. In response
to stalling tactics by the diplomatic body,1 Sun’s claims (which had at first
been restricted to a pro rata share of revenue) became more aggressive,
threatening to oust the Customs administration if they did not comply with
his wishes. Prompted into action by such threats, the diplomatic body
showed a united front against Sun’s challenge to their interests. While 
the powers were successful in thwarting Sun’s claims, their actions fuelled
anti-foreign sentiment. This in turn encouraged the further expressions of
Chinese resentment against the CMCS and all that it represented.
In the months prior to his claims against the CMCS, Sun had resumed
leadership of the Guangzhou Government, which was beleaguered both by
local rivalry in the form of Chen Jiongming’s forces and also by militarist
factions to the north. In 1922 Sun fled Guangzhou, ousted by the military
forces of his government loyal to Chen.2 During this interlude in Shanghai,
Sun began to foster connections with the Soviets and was visited by Adolf
Joffe to discuss the possibility of developing a special relationship between
the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).3 After returning from
Shanghai to Guangzhou in early 1923, Sun re-established his leadership
as Generalissimo of the Nationalists and sought to extend their tenuous
hold in the south-west.4 This was the third Guangzhou Government that
Sun headed, and as leader he was faced with a movement with poor internal
organization and, arguably, no devised strategy for achieving any reform-
ation of China’s political arena.5 Apart from local challenges to Sun’s
government, namely Chen’s forces, the Guangzhou Government faced
threats from the Beijing regime under warlord Wu Peifu. Hostilities were
constant between the GMD forces and the Zhili faction that held power
in Beijing.
Political desperation drove Sun to claim a share of Guangzhou Customs
surplus.6 A pronounced financial strain among Sun’s ranks fuelled the
desire for reclaiming a pro rata share of the Guangzhou Customs surplus
to ease his Government’s economic crisis. Sun had been well received
during a visit to Hong Kong in 1923 and held some hopes that merchants
there would be forthcoming with funding.7 But these loans never materi-
alized, and Sun’s finances rapidly deteriorated. During this time, Sun
reportedly also had to buy the loyalty of his soldiers. To redress this added
strain, his regime attempted to squeeze taxes out of all and sundry but with
little marked success.8 Sun turned to the most readily available source of
revenue, the Customs. The Guangzhou Government (on the suggestion 
of the IG) had previously been accredited 13.7 per cent of revenue through
negotiation with the Beijing Government and the Inspectorate of Customs
in 1919.9 When Sun was forced to flee Guangzhou in 1922 these funds
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At this juncture it was not only a pro rata share of current surplus that
Sun requested but also access to the funds collected when he had been
overthrown. The amount that had been held was Sh. Tls. 2,513,950.10 When
renewing demands for these funds, Sun claimed that he was simply
requesting his government’s rightful dues.
The main justification for Sun’s claims was based on the pursuit of his
government’s legitimate right. Furthermore he stressed the need for equity
of treatment for what he saw as essentially China’s two rival regimes. In
a letter to Sir James Jamieson, the British Consul General of Guangzhou,
Sun’s Secretary of State Wu Chaoshu (Dr C.C. Wu, who concurrently held
the position of the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Guangzhou
Government) outlined the background to his government’s claims on behalf
of the south-western provinces, explaining:
I write in reference to the claim of the South-western provinces for
their share of the Customs Surplus. There is no doubt that there is
ample surplus remaining after the foreign obligations charged on the
Customs revenues are paid and that at present it goes to pay past debts
contracted by Peking. It thus sets free other revenues which are
employed by the northern militarists to make war against the Southwest.
These provinces are then forced to raise funds to meet attacks funded
by what rightly are their own monies. They therefore suffer a double
loss: loss of funds which should be used for constructive purposes and
which, turned over to northern militarists, are actually used to insti-
tute war against them, and loss in that for every one of these dollars
employed against them they have to raise one or more dollars in self
defence. Such a situation is not only impossible but also insufferable.
It has been tolerated so long already; it obviously cannot be endured
any longer.11 [emphasis added]
The Guangzhou Government’s claims appealed for fairness, insisting that
a great injustice was being committed by denying one regime funds while
the other regime was able to access extra funding to make war against its
rivals. At the crux of this letter is the inference that by permitting such an
intolerable situation continue the foreign powers were in fact failing to
remain neutral in political events in China. While the allocation of Customs
funds to the Beijing Government might have been an expedient measure
only, its ramifications meant the CMCS might be seen as partisan to
political events in China.
Wu’s letter omitted any discussion of funds available to the Guangzhou
Government. The government’s access to all of the province’s salt revenue
was cited as a significant source by both the foreign powers and in press
reports.12 This was estimated at nearly three million Guangzhou dollars
from May to December 1923.13 This income was however, insufficient 
to allow for any expansion of GMD activities in southern China.14 The
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Customs was understandably attractive to Sun as a further avenue through
which he could access funds. The Guangzhou Customs revenue represented 
the fifth largest revenue collected in 1923.15 British Minister Macleay,
however, used the threat of restricting Sun’s access to the salt revenue as
leverage for the argument that Sun had more than his fair share of finances
and therefore did not require a pro rata share of the Customs revenues.16
He intimated that to redress all ‘injustices’ they should also ensure the
Central Government enjoyed a pro rata share of the provincial salt revenue
which was at the time at Sun’s exclusive disposal.
From the outset Sun’s claims against the Customs do not appear as
particularly provocative. He had not demanded all of the Custom revenue
nor had he threatened the functioning of the Customs house. In the early
months of this controversy, Sun voiced no intention of interfering with or
intimidating the staff of the Customs administration. He was simply seeking
to reclaim a right previously accorded to his government in 1918 and 1919.
It is significant that requests laid against a share of surplus previously
enjoyed by Sun’s Government elicited such a mixed reaction from the
foreign powers.
The foreign powers’ initial response to Sun’s claims was ambivalent.
The powers believed that they could employ a policy of procrastination,
which had been adopted since Sun first raised the issue in the summer of
1920.17 The rationale behind this deliberate stalling was the prediction 
that an imminent collapse of Sun’s government would cause him to again
flee and in doing so relieve the need to find a solution to the problem. In
the months that elapsed between Sun’s renewed claim against the Customs
and his ultimatum issued on 5 December 1923, the powers failed to move
towards constructive negotiations. The Guangzhou Government expressed
frustration at what became a three-month delay in addressing their
demands. A statement by Sun on 19 December illustrated this frustration.
He wrote, ‘[s]ave for a bare telegraphic intimation on September 28th that
this memorandum was under the consideration of the diplomatic body, no
reply was vouchsafed to this Government until the 3rd instant – after nearly
three month’s delay.’18 As the months passed, moreover, Sun’s govern-
ment did not collapse. For the foreign powers action was now unavoidable
and the diplomatic body in Beijing sent a telegram to the Guangzhou
Government warning that they were prepared to take whatever forcible
measures were necessary to protect the Customs.19
The tensions surrounding the Guangzhou Customs acted as a catalyst 
in creating the need to define the CMCS as either a Chinese or foreign
concern. Throughout the controversy the powers attempted to disassociate
themselves from what they described as purely Chinese concerns. Ironic-
ally, though, the powers simultaneously threatened active intervention
should Sun attempt to act on his claims. In a personal and confiden-
tial letter to Wu, the British Minister R. Macleay sought to clarify what
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in relationship to the Customs issue.20 Macleay stressed that the CMCS 
had always been considered as Chinese Government, or rather, national
revenue. He concluded that any issues arising as to proportionate distrib-
ution of surplus were a ‘matter affecting the internal administration of
China to be settled by the Chinese themselves’. This letter, however, had
a proverbial sting in its tail: ‘Whatever the rights or wrongs of your case
against the Central Government I must impress upon you that in self-
defence, and for the protection of their interests, the Powers cannot admit
any interference with the Customs administration.’21 No effort is made to
veil the threat of foreign intervention. When reading this confidential letter,
it is apparent that the Customs controversy was being played out in several
arenas, public and private, formal and informal. The Nationalists and the
foreign powers appear as the two dominant forces in the negotiations; 
the CMCS was evident in a passive role. Sun’s claims had gone beyond
challenging the auspices of the CMCS and were interpreted by Macleay
as a threat to foreign interests in China (however, at no stage were 
the Westerners working for the Customs threatened). So, in this instance,
the recognition of the CMCS as a Chinese institution appears confused;
Macleay’s response alone indicates that he considered the CMCS more
than a Chinese concern.
Macleay’s threat that the powers might be forced to act in self-defence
is indicative of a concern of anti-foreignism. Some newspaper accounts
during the controversy meticulously detailed meetings or assemblies by
Chinese protesters. One North-China Daily News (NCDN ) article in partic-
ular wrote of a mass meeting held in Guangzhou on 16 December, reporting
that, when the procession approached Shamian, protestors shouted, ‘[w]e
will destroy Shameen and kill the foreigners’.22 In a later article the
Americans were reportedly perturbed by an element of anti-American senti-
ment evident in Guangzhou.23 While in earlier times such threats would
have been passed off with a minimum of concern, an act of anti-foreignism
in May 1923 had shaken the sense of security the foreigner had held in
their privileged position in China.
Until 1923 the privileged position of the foreigner in China had not been
placed under threat of great magnitude since the Boxer Rebellion. Isolated
reports of brigandage, robberies and attacks on Western travellers and
missionaries were reported with regularity, but the scale of the Lincheng
incident in May 1923 shook the foreign powers’ confidence in their secur-
ity in China. Bandits held up a train at Lincheng and this act resulted in
one Briton being shot dead and 26 other foreign passengers taken hostage.24
Macleay reported:
On the 6th May there occurred a brigand outrage, which was remark-
able for the unexpected and daring manner in which it was planned
as well as for the success, from the brigands’ point of view, which
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attended its execution . . . it would be no exaggeration to characterise
it as one of the most serious incidents which have arisen between
China and the Powers since the events of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.25
Although all hostages were eventually released, this incident and its clear
anti-foreign motivation unsettled the powers. That bandits were so embold-
ened to undertake such a large attack to some extent reflected on the law-
lessness and militarization of Chinese society during the warlord era. It also
signified a lack of fear of foreign retribution particularly as foreigners were
deliberately targeted. It is not surprising then, with this incident fresh in
their minds, that the powers were concerned about reports of an apparent
rise in anti-foreign sentiment in Guangzhou.
The Lincheng incident had a direct influence on the powers’ response to
the Guangzhou situation.26 This brazen attack shook the complacency of
foreigners in China and provided the impetus for a defensive reaction 
by the powers, but in reality they had allowed months to elapse before
responding to Sun. An NCDN editorial supported the powers’ response to
the challenge to the CMCS:
We certainly would not appear to be putting Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the
bandits of Paotzeku in the one boat. But it is none the less clear that
in combining to prevent his interference with the Canton Customs, the
Powers are applying the principles of the Lincheng Note. Their posi-
tion, a perfectly legitimate one, is no more visibly assailed by a bandit
attack on their nationals than by an attempt to seize the Customs or
by illegal taxation.27
This editorial cast any response to Sun’s demands in the shadow of the
bandit outrage. This incident was a culmination of increasing brigandage
in China, a situation that had long disturbed and frustrated the powers. In
response to this attack the diplomatic body issued two notes to the Chinese
Government, part of which addressed their concerns for guaranteeing the
safety of foreigners in the future.28 In the first Lincheng note, the powers
stated that if the Government failed to take adequate measures to protect
foreigners then the diplomatic body ‘would be obliged to consider what
further steps should be taken’ to protect foreign lives and interests in
China.29 The diplomatic body’s commitment to these principles was tested
by the Guangzhou situation.
The powers resolved to defend the Customs. When discussing 
the demands of Sun’s government, they revealed their attitude to the
Guangzhou forces. Macleay was instructed by the diplomatic body to ‘warn
the local Government of Canton’ that the foreign powers would not allow
interference with the Customs.30 By referring to Sun’s government as 
a local government, regardless of how appropriate this may have been,
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remained unconvinced that they were dealing with what might become the
national government.
Gunboat diplomacy
During the Victorian era and even into the early part of the twentieth
century, Western powers used gunboats as a mechanism for forcing a reso-
lution to disputes.31 Such vessels embodied much of the imperial mentality
of the time, most particularly, the paternal and civilizing ideals of the 
imperial age. The gunboat allowed Britain, in particular, to police its terri-
tories, advance its interests and protect its nationals in China.32 Gunboat
diplomacy, it may be argued, was still evident in the foreign presence in
Republican China. The threat of force was a mechanism through which
foreign interests could be advanced. Such leverage was exercised to defend
the diplomatic body’s stake in the CMCS. A foreign naval demonstration
was assembled in Guangzhou’s harbour to dissuade Sun from taking action
against the Customs. This concentration of forces consisted of nine vessels
(four British, two American, two French and one Japanese).33 During an
interview with Sun, Owen Mortimer Green, the editor of the NCDN, asked
whether he would fight against these forces. Green reported: ‘Dr Sun said
that he could not overcome such a force, but then he would have the glory
of being beaten by all the Powers which he would regard as an honour.’34
Sun’s enigmatic responses in this interview with Green were printed in the
NCDN and a paraphrased version also appeared in The Times.35 Allusions
to Sun’s desire for martyrdom were also mentioned in British Foreign
Office reports. British Minister Macleay expressed concern that Sun was
presenting himself as glad to be defeated by Britain as ‘she [Britain] would
then have made herself responsible for dealing the death blow to democ-
racy in China’.36 Sun’s emotive comments prompted an increased naval
presence the harbour.
By mid-December the foreign naval presence in Guangzhou’s harbour
had grown to 15 vessels. The nations represented in this collective force
were Britain, America, Japan, France, Italy and Portugal. The American
representation included destroyers 225, 226, 343 and 346, the cruiser
Ashville and gunboat Pampanga. The British assembled their gunboats
Tarantula, Magnolia, Bluebell, Moorhen and Robin. The French gunboats,
Malicieuse and Craonne, the Portuguese gunboat Patria and the Italian-
chartered steam-launch Guangdong (manned by Italian sailors) supple-
mented these forces.37 Foreign troops were briefly landed in the foreign
settlement in response to reported anti-foreign rhetoric. This display of
force effectively stalled Sun’s actions but also prompted an anti-foreign
backlash from the Nationalists.
The NCDN’s editorial line hotly defended foreign and particularly British
involvement in the naval demonstration. A leading article entitled ‘A New
Policy Needed in China’ emphasized the unity of the diplomatic body. The
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article explained that it was merely a question of seniority that determined
the representative of the diplomatic body and ‘the fact that a British subject
presents the foreign communications to Sun’s Government is of no more
importance than that in Peking a Portuguese subject does the like to the
Northern Government’.38 The reality of British predominance in the CMCS
could only mean that claims of equality of interest, such as those vehe-
mently expressed in the NCDN, were superficial. Britain obviously stood
to lose more than the other powers should the CMCS be attacked; more-
over Britain had always maintained a dominant position among the other
powers in China. Rhetoric of unified action, furthermore, was designed to
shield Britain from bearing the brunt of any Chinese unrest. An article by
George E. Sokolsky outlined China’s mistreatment of international treaties
and conventions. His tone was unmistakably defensive, writing:
No foreign Power wants the expense and irksomeness of maintaining
soldiers and gunboats in China or of exercising extraterritoriality. No
foreign Power wants all the trouble of protecting its nationals in China.
It would prefer a situation here such as exists, let us say, between
Great Britain and the United States, where equals work together for
the common benefit. But that is now impossible and the Chinese people
are to blame.39
There is a sense of moral justification in this article. Sokolsky focused on
the duty the British were compelled to perform by virtue of their powerful
imperialist status.40 This duty, he believed, entailed the maintenance of a
military presence in China.
Such sentiments as these were echoed throughout other materials pro-
duced during this era. While the height of British imperialism had passed,
such imperialistic sentiment still remained evident in commentaries and
reports on China. The NCDN, with its ‘impartial not neutral’ motto alone,
represented a bastion of imperialistic values in the East. In matters not 
of direct concern to British interests, the paper declared itself ‘impartial’.
In events that directly affected Britain or Britons in China it was ‘not
neutral’.41 Authoritative works such as Rodney Gilbert’s What’s Wrong
With China (1926) urged foreign intervention in Chinese affairs. He wrote:
What is wrong with China and will continue to be wrong with her, is
that the Chinese are children, that their world is a world of child’s
make believe; and that they have no more right, in their own interest
or in humanity’s larger interest, to govern themselves or shape their
own course of education, than pupils in a school have to boss the
faculty and to dictate what they will learn and what they will not.42
Gilbert explained it as inevitable that China would resent the power (or in
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Through moral and physical force, though, the Chinese would be subdued.43
This sense of moral duty was also advanced by Sir John Pratt in War and
Politics in China when discussing British predominance in Sino-Western
relations during the Republic: ‘it was the penalty she [Britain] had to 
pay for greatness’.44 Although Britain’s economic predominance in China
was challenged by Japan and America by the mid-Republic, Britain still
remained anxious to protect its interests, both economic and political.45
The NCDN and similar writings supported British and other foreign inter-
ference in China as inevitable, and in fact desirable.
Where was the Service in the Guangzhou controversy?
Sun’s demands in Guangzhou directly embroiled the CMCS. In the months
during the Guangzhou Customs controversy, the CMCS was most notice-
able by its silence. This is not to deny the centrality of the CMCS to the
incident, but beyond the Service being the focus of Sun’s claims, there is
very little evidence of reaction. The silence of the CMCS gave, by infer-
ence, the impression that the Service remained inert in the face of Sun’s
claims. This is puzzling since, even at the outset, the claims of the
Guangzhou Government presented a threat to its integrity.46
Aglen’s actions throughout the controversy were muted to say the least.
Moreover, he was on leave through most of the months in question, with
correspondence being handled by Officiating IG Cecil Bowra. Aglen’s
choice of Acting IG was shrewd as Bowra was older than Aglen and there-
fore did not see himself as a likely successor to the top job.47 There was
little possibility then that Bowra would seek to glorify himself to the detri-
ment of the Service. After a long career with the CMCS, Bowra was well
equipped to handle the situation that arose at Guangzhou and there was
little doubt of his loyalty to the Service and the IG. But the power of office
was not entirely with him. The key to the seeming inertia of the CMCS
did not lie then with either an avaricious or inexperienced Acting IG, but
can be identified in Customs documents. Commissioner A.H. Harris was
in charge of the port.48 On 9 October Bowra sent instructions to Harris
that the concern of issuing the Southern Government a pro rata share of
the Customs revenue was ‘in the hands of the Diplomatic Body, a deci-
sion on it will, no doubt, in time be communicated to that Government
through the Dean of the Consular Body in Canton’.49 While seemingly
innocuous, this comment alone encapsulated the Customs’ attitude to Sun’s
threats. The Service was protected by the powers and contented to ride the
situation out under the protective gaze of the gunboat flotilla. The powers
had shown themselves prepared to physically defend their interests in the
Customs and, therefore, the Service could allow the powers to go into
battle on their behalf.
The available Customs-based accounts of the controversy share noncha-
lance in summing up the incident as amounting to nothing more than a dead
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letter. The assurance that the matter of distribution or non-distribution of
surplus rested in the diplomatic body’s hands allowed the Customs a sense
of complacency. Evidence of CMCS apathy is illustrated in a letter between
Aglen and Acheson (Non-Resident Secretary (NRS), London). Aglen writes:
Sun Yat-sen had made up his mind, I think, to seize the Custom house
with the idea that he would be able to obtain the Canton revenues,
and this produced a naval demonstration, and there the matter rests for
the moment.50
In a later letter Aglen praised Bowra’s judgement as Acting IG in having
taken a firm stand against Sun. He reflected, ‘I was not pressed in any way
for revenue funds.’51 The CMCS was protected by gunboat diplomacy 
but this was not a lasting solution for the IG or the foreign element of the
Service in what became an increasing difficult political climate.
The foreign reaction in Guangzhou can be explored as both an instinc-
tive response after the attack on Westerners in the Lincheng incident and,
further, as an example of British determination to maintain its dominance
of the Service.52 Both interpretations are appropriate, but others may also
be drawn from this event. The Custom’s ability (and hence the treaty
powers’ ability, by virtue of their gunboat diplomacy) to either support or
thwart Sun’s claims has direct impact on our understanding of the agency
of political legitimacy in the Republic. In the foreground of the CMCS’s
decisions were the foreign powers, which, in this instance, had what appears
to be the ultimate say over the outcome of Sun’s requests. By granting 
the Guangzhou Government access to the pro rata share of revenue, the
foreign powers, through the CMCS, were also tacitly approving this regime.
By withholding these funds, therefore, the foreign powers displayed their
possession of the necessary leverage, namely control of the CMCS, to
influence Republican politics.
In the British Foreign Office Annual Report for 1923, Minister Macleay
commented that Sun’s return from refuge in the French Concession in
Shanghai to the ferment of Guangzhou’s power struggles was one of the
year’s most remarkable events. Even more noteworthy was the fact that
Sun managed to reclaim and maintain power without having troops attached
to him personally.53 By British accord Sun was no longer considered a
serious player in the struggle for political hegemony. Western observers
who underestimated his tenacity, therefore, had not anticipated Sun’s
resilience in returning to the fray in Guangzhou. The deliberate policy of
procrastination adopted by the foreign powers reflected a belief that,
through using diversionary methods, they could negate the threat. The
desperation of Sun’s situation was widely publicized, and in spite of 
such compelling evidence that he was once more battling for survival, his
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Throughout the Customs controversy the Western press generally repre-
sented Sun in an unflattering light. Thus in London The Times published
a report on Sun’s lack of credibility. The article described Sun as regarded
by all classes in Guangzhou as ‘a ravening wolf, devouring the fat and
blood of the people in order to sustain his obsession that he is destined 
to be the saviour of the country’.54 In a leading article on the issues sur-
rounding the Guangzhou Customs, the NCDN stopped short of accusing
Sun of fabricating or manipulating information but suggested it just the
same.55 Sun was the focus of many such articles during this time.
A key issue throughout the controversy was the perception of Sun as a
failed revolutionary. Among the powers there was a lack of faith in Sun.
They no longer viewed him as a force for the unification of China. Painted
as a deluded idealist, Sun’s claims against the Customs, however justified,
were viewed in a light jaundiced by perceptions of his incompetence.
Aglen, in a letter to Bowra discussing Sun’s failure in Guangzhou,
described what he saw as the end for Sun, who had lost command of every-
thing except a portion of the city. Aglen wrote: ‘[Sun] has no control over
his subordinates, and, if the truth were known, he is probably not in full
possession of his faculties.’56 Such reflections indicate that Sun was seen
as more of an annoyance than a powerful force in China.
The representation of the events in Guangzhou in December 1923 as a
‘Customs crisis’ is not unusual. Such terms were bandied about in press at
the time and have been readily absorbed into academic treatment of this
incident. What may be argued, however, is that the Guangzhou Customs
was never really in a position of great danger from Sun; the presence of
the foreign gunboat flotilla in fact provided a fait accompli to resolving the
incident in Western favour. Sun had control of the Guangzhou Government
but only ever held tenuous control over the military. Even with the full
support of his forces, it is dubious that Guangzhou’s firepower could ever
be a match for the well-armed gunboat flotilla. The display of naval fire-
power was intended to intimidate Sun without resorting to actual use of
force, and this is integral to the nature of gunboat diplomacy.57 Calling the
incidents of December 1923 a crisis is overstating the whole affair. Sun’s
actions had caused some discomfort on the part of the foreign powers but
it is not evident that the diplomatic body had anything but the upper hand
in negotiations with Sun. And, most significantly, the CMCS remained
untouched by events.
The Guangzhou Customs controversy raises questions as to the role of
the CMCS in condoning political legitimacy in the Republic. By exten-
sion of this idea these events also allow an investigation of imperialism
in China and how the CMCS was used as a mechanism to influence events.
The CMCS represented a security for foreign interests and investments in
China and therefore threats against this Service were met with resistance
from the powers. The defence of the Customs in this instance, while
protecting the integrity of the institution also protected avenues for the
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foreign penetration of China. The powers’ demonstration against Sun had
far-reaching repercussions on the position of the foreigner in China. The
Powers had succeeded in protecting their concerns in the Customs but in
doing so they had not only provided impetus for the rousing of anti-foreign
sentiment in China but had identified the CMCS as a prominent target for
resentment.
Anti-imperialism and the CMCS
You would be amazed at the China which is now confronting us were you
here. The foreign prestige bubble having been completely pricked, the
Chinese are getting away with things in every direction.
Aglen to Bowra, 20 November 192558
Aglen’s apprehensive forecast for the future of the CMCS and the foreigner
in China was tinged with both incredulity and regret. Comments in similar
vein to Aglen’s are echoed throughout British accounts from 1925–7. 
For the CMCS employees and other foreigners in China, the Guangzhou
Customs controversy did not fade from mind as an unpleasant incident as
it became a forerunner of further unrest. When the May 30th incident
occurred in Shanghai in 1925 (see next section), it sparked nationalistic
fervour that swept through the treaty ports and elsewhere, presenting 
an ominous challenge to the security of foreign communities in China. 
While anti-foreign but particularly anti-British acts and protests were
recorded throughout China during 1925–6, focus again fell on Guangzhou.
This southern entrepôt became the centre for virulent anti-British protests
that were expressed through pickets and the boycott of Guangzhou and
Hong Kong and lasted for almost sixteen months. Guangzhou was the
traditional base for the GMD and hence their adoption and development
of anti-imperialist platforms in the 1923–5 interregnum found expression
most readily in this region.
While it may be argued the Guangzhou Customs controversy was
resolved to the satisfaction of the foreign powers, their actions had 
given impetus to the rise of anti-imperialism in GMD ideology, which no
amount of foreign gunboat demonstrations would be able to stem. Ironically
a defeat for Sun and his Guangzhou Government had turned the tide against
the treaty powers in China. Although seen by the West as a discredited
political leader, Sun’s strength lay in his ability to use the symbolism of
his stand against the foreign powers to arouse the support of the south-
western populace.59 Moreover it was only after the Guangzhou Customs
controversy that Sun began to develop his ideas of China’s ‘subcolonial’
status and presented imperialism as the root of all of China’s problems.60
At this time the GMD had entered into a closer allegiance with the 
Soviet Bolsheviks and the CCP and it was this collaboration that brought
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surrounding the Guangzhou Customs house can therefore be interpreted as
representative of China’s experience with the foreign powers. In this the
Guangzhou Government, representing the forces for democracy and reform
in China (as opposed to the reactionary and tradition-bound northern
militarists), was seeking its due recognition in the form of CMCS 
revenue. Thus the CMCS and access to its funds were tied to the growth
of democracy in China. The foreign gunboat flotilla was moving to crush
not only Sun but Chinese nationalism, the emergence of which would have
threatened their privileged position. The unity of the foreign powers in this
action reflected China’s domination by many powers. This interpretation
has some basis in Sun’s interpretation of China’s subcolonial status. The
heavy-handed approach of the powers to Sun’s demands was detrimental
as it merely gave him more justification to speak against imperialism in
China. It gave Sun a focus for rallying against the foreign presence in China.
Sun’s San Min Zhuyi (The Three Principles of the People), presented as a
series of lectures in 1924, articulated the need for the Chinese people to
struggle against foreign privilege in China.62
Anti-foreignism was not a new phenomenon in China. Popular uprisings
such as the Boxer Rebellion, the 1911 revolution and the May Fourth Move-
ment were in part a response to China’s failure to modernize and, simul-
taneously, a protest against foreign encroachment and the imposition of the
humiliating Unequal Treaties. Anti-foreignism can be best understood as
an often irrational, emotive sentiment, rather than an ideology, which was
often aroused to achieve short-term political benefits.63 Without any guid-
ance or ideological anchoring, such sentiment could be volatile and rapidly
run out of control. The united front formed by the GMD–CCP had anti-
imperialism as one of their common platforms. In this sense they harnessed
radicalism by focusing anti-foreignism to opposing foreign exploitation 
and oppression. Such oppression was most readily evident in the existence
of the treaty ports. That is not to say then that anti-foreignism and anti-
imperialism are one and the same thing; rather anti-imperialism harnessed
and gave direction to the popular resentment of foreign impositions.
In Sun’s January 1924 outline of the GMD’s political manifesto, the first
statement is particularly significant in revealing how the Nationalists had
adopted anti-imperialism as a guiding principle. In turn this had direct
implications for the future of the CMCS. It read:
All unequal treaties, such as foreign concessions, extraterritoriality,
foreign control of customs, and all sorts of political power exercised
by foreigners in China and prejudicial to her sovereignty, are to be
abrogated and new treaties negotiated on a basis of equality and mutual
respect for each other’s sovereign rights.64
Clearly the CMCS, with its foreign Inspectorate and treaty port origins,
constituted a visible affront to the GMD. Most particularly it represented
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an imposition by foreign powers and leverage for foreign interference in
China’s affairs. The other points in the manifesto covered the revision 
of treaties that were harmful to China; the responsible financing of loans;
that the Chinese people should not be responsible for the loans contracted
by irresponsible Beijing regimes; and the need to explore how to throw 
off foreign loan debts and to free China from its subcolonial status.65
Of all of these points the first was the most radical66 and, in addition, it 
presented the best possibility of inciting anti-imperialist action among 
the population.
The Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott of 1925–6
So far the customs revenue has been able to withstand the rapacity of the
Tuchuns,67 a fact solely due to its being rigidly under foreign control and
collected at the ports where foreign warships if necessary, afford protection.
Miles Lampson68
A recurring theme throughout this chapter is the connection between
gunboats and Customs revenue. Less specifically the association lies
between the functioning of this (Chinese) fiscal organization and the threat
of foreign force being employed to maintain it. The surfacing of this link
serves to illustrate the Customs close alignment with the imperialist pres-
ence in China. In 1923 a fleet of foreign gunboats was assembled to protect
the Guangzhou Customs and yet by 1926 the British were alone in their
desire to commit to active protection of the Service. By 1926 the most
immediate deterrent for the powers was a fear of being targeted by the
virulence of anti-foreignism. The emerging resentment against foreigners
expressed itself most threateningly in the outbreak of strikes, boycotts and
demonstrations stemming from the May 30th incident of 1925. The British
bore the brunt of this violence and any symbol of British influence in China
was targeted. The CMCS was a highly visible reminder for the Nationalists
of not only foreign interference in Chinese affairs but, more specifically,
of British interference in China.
The May 30th incident was the result of ongoing unrest between Chinese
workers and Japanese mill owners in Shanghai. Demonstrations intensified
throughout May and on the 30th the foreign settlement was the focus for
an extended protest. A student demonstration in the Nanjing Road vicinity
swelled its ranks from 300 to over 2,000 protesters and had become,
according to Police Inspector Everson, very menacing in spirit; protesters
began calling ‘Kill the foreigner!’.69 In response to this ominous gathering,
members of the Shanghai police (comprising European and Indian offi-
cers) fired into the crowd, after a brief warning. They killed four protestors
instantly, mortally wounded five and injured another fourteen. This heavy-
handed response by the settlement’s police became the focus of further
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it began to be generally realised that the disturbances of the 30th May
had by now completely lost their original character of a mere student
demonstration and were becoming metamorphosed under the skilful
promptings of the Soviet and Kuomintang wire-pullers into a purely
political movement involving a definite challenge to foreign life and
property throughout China.70
A state of emergency was subsequently declared in the Settlement. After
an unsuccessful diplomatic inquiry in June, a judicial inquiry in October
found that the officers had little choice but to fire. A compassionate grant,
however, was given to the wounded and the families of those killed. By the
end of the year it appeared that disturbances and protests in Shanghai had
subsided but reactions to these events spread throughout the treaty ports.
The May 30th incident sparked off protests and boycotts throughout
China. During June and July there were few towns of any size that did not
respond to the incident in some way.71 The incident in Shanghai served as
a catalyst for a surge of anti-British expression and nationalistic protests
against foreigners in China. In such an emotive environment it is quite 
conceivable that any grievance could be blown out of proportion; local 
and isolated incidents were swept into the May 30th incident.72 In Beijing
demonstrations and processions by students became a daily occurrence and
Britain was the subject of violent press attacks.73 The NCDN ran constant
reports on the unrest, detailing riots, strikes, attacks and outrages commit-
ted against foreigners.74 As a reflection of the climate of fear, the paper
reported rumours that the Chinese were manufacturing poisonous gas 
and had brought in German and Russian chemists to assist them with this
insidious scheme.75 This report both hinged on foreigners’ fear of further
Chinese attacks and also revealed a preoccupation with the Soviet threat
against foreign interests in China. The NCDN openly blamed the CCP and
the Nationalists’ association with the Soviets for having fuelled the volatile
climate of strikes and protests. An editorial reads:
our quarrel is not with China. Our quarrel is with the destructive force
of the 20th Century, the germ that is polluting our great cities, the
beast that has come out of the dark forests of Russia to disrupt and
corrupt the civilization of the universe, Bolshevism. Against this
dreadful plague the civilized world must stand united.76
Britain and the other foreign powers were, in accordance with the above
excerpt, not standing firm to aggravate or thwart Chinese nationalism but
they were defending civilization as a whole against the Bolshevik threat.
The CMCS was affected in the reaction to May 30th and in some instances
difficulties extended beyond that of the original incident. Hankou is a prime
example of such prolonged unrest. On 6 June there were anti-British demon-
strations and only five days later these protests turned violent, with rioting
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and mob attacks against foreigners.77 A landing party from the HMS Gnat
succeeded in driving back the crowds without resorting to use of firearms.
A voluntary international force was mobilized to protect the foreign con-
cession.78 The Customs house was defended by British troops.79 This unrest
culminated in the British retrocession of leased territory, an unexpected
windfall for the Nationalists.80 Settlement of outstanding land issues (includ-
ing the Customs house at Hankou, which encroached on to British leased
territory) remained, however, an ongoing concern even in the early 1930s.81
Hong Kong became the focus of a strike by Chinese workers. In the
months prior to the May 30th incident, Hong Kong authorities had already
harboured concerns over the militancy of Chinese workers’ unions.82 The
events in Shanghai added a further dimension to anti-British sentiment and
by 19 June the strike had begun. Propaganda secretly printed and circulated
throughout the colony urged workers to leave Hong Kong and to travel to
Guangzhou. As a result there was a mass exodus of Chinese as workers 
and students alike travelled to Guangzhou.83 Trade was crippled. A volatile 
clash during a protest in June near Shamian, Guangzhou’s foreign enclave,
exacerbated existing tensions and galvanized the strikers into further boy-
cotts against British trade and Hong Kong. While Hong Kong authorities
had optimistically forecast a speedy resolution to the strike, by July there
was every indication the boycott would be a protracted standoff.
By early June the Guangzhou Customs had taken defensive measures
against possible unrest. The Customs house had been closed by the
Commissioner, Edwardes, and remained closed in the face of disturbances
following the May 30th incident.84 All office work had been removed to the
Assistant’s Mess on Shamian.85 In a report by Schjoth, the Acting Deputy
Commissioner of the Guangzhou Native Customs, Shamian was ‘fortified
with trenches and barbed wire all round, with volunteers on duty day and
night’.86 The majority of foreign women and children were removed to
Macao under the care of Commissioner Le Bas. All private and official
Chinese servants had left their positions. On visiting Edwardes to report on
the situation, Schjoth noted that Commissioner Bell from Hong Kong was
also present to discuss the growing tensions.87 This meeting was an indica-
tor of the seriousness of the situation.
The Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott was pre-empted by the response
to the events in Shanghai. In Guangzhou the ‘smouldering embers of anti-
foreign hatred were ever ready to be fanned into flame’88 and on 23 June
at Shamian a demonstration escalated into a violent exchange of fire with
serious repercussions. Both British and French troops on Shamian had 
been prepared for defensive measures in response to a march planned to
pass alongside the foreign settlement. The march, however, led to a clash
between the foreign troops and the protesters. It remains unclear who
started firing but the Shaji bridge incident resulted in the deaths of at least
37 Chinese and one foreigner with several wounded.89 The muddiness
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The NCDN shifted blame away from the Chinese and the British and French
troops, instead blaming Bolshevik forces for inciting the violence. It
reported the ‘Detestable Trick of the June 23 Outrage: Schoolgirls Massed
in Parade While Russians Shot from the Windows to Provoke Foreigners
into Firing’.90 These events became the catalyst for an intensifying of anti-
British feeling in Guangzhou and for protracted boycott of Guangzhou and
Hong Kong that extended for almost 16 months.91 Anti-British feeling ran
high during this blockade.
As investigations into the Shaji incident foundered, a blockade came
into force. On 13 August the Strike Committee issued three new regula-
tions with the tacit approval of the Guangzhou authorities. These stipulated:
all steamers, except those of British and Japanese nationalities, were
permitted to take part in coastal trade, provided they do not call at Hong
Kong; all vessels, on entering port, must be inspected by labour pickets;
and export of raw materials and food-stuffs was prohibited.92 As indicated
in the first instance, Britain and Japan were both targets of the boycott;
restrictions against the latter, however, were only a formality and lifted
within a matter of days.93 The regulations that involved inspecting vessels
directly infringed upon the mandate of the CMCS and would inevitably
lead to tensions.
As it unfolded the Shaji incident had direct repercussions for the
Guangzhou Customs. Prudently steering clear of direct involvement,
Commissioner Edwardes and other staff had secured a vantage point for
watching the procession from the Customs Mess window.94 When fighting
erupted, however, Edwardes was shot in the knee by a stray bullet. As a
result of this injury he was promptly removed from the Customs house
and his Deputy, Talbot, took charge. Later Edwardes was commended by
IG Aglen at a time when many Customs houses had suffered as a result
of the ongoing unrest since the May 30th incident. Aglen commented:
The conduct of those concerned has been worthy of high praise, and
I wish to convey to them especially my appreciation of their patience
and courage in the most arduous circumstances that prevailed. The
wounding of the Canton Commissioner, Mr. Edwardes, by a stray
bullet while he was on duty and engaged in measures for the protec-
tion of his staff, which necessitated his withdrawal from Canton, was
deplorable, but I am glad to find that instances of personal injury to
life or limb were rare.95
In this circular Aglen also discussed the hardships endured by Customs
employees who were deserted by the wholesale strike of their Chinese
servants. Schjoth’s account details the loss of Chinese servants in
Guangzhou; he reported they left without receiving pay as they believed
‘they would return as masters’.96 While the loss of servants was hardly a
threat to the functioning of the Service, it meant daily hardship for staff
70 Gunboats and revenue, 1923–7
as their households ground to a halt and it heightened the sense of crisis
gripping the foreign enclaves.
The outdoor staff fared worse than their indoor colleagues and had 
been chased from their quarters. They managed to keep some of the 
river launches running without Chinese crew.97 The Superintendent of
Customs and Acting Commissioner Talbot reopened the Customs house
on 28 June with police protection.98 Hayley Bell took up the post of
Commissioner. As the situation in Guangzhou was severely strained a
capable Commissioner was required. Throughout the boycott and pickets,
Bell continually showed he was a strong leader, determined to protect the
Customs. In an unusual move Bell, who had formerly been in Hong Kong,
arrived with two of his young children and his Chinese servants: ‘no doubt
he thought a baptism of fire would be excellent training for his children
and teach them to face danger with fortitude’.99 In contrast, most Customs
wives and families had been removed to Macao prior to the Shaji inci-
dent. Possibly, Bell’s military background had toughened his nerve in such
trying situations (Bell had distinguished military service during the First
World War, rising to the rank of Colonel).
When patrolling the Shamian Bund, Bell opted to wear his military
uniform, although such dress was not what might have been expected 
of a civilian Customs Commissioner.100 In Hewitt’s account, Bell was
described as ‘a tall slim figure, handsome in uniform, a 1914–18 steel
helmet, khaki jacket emblazoned with medal ribbons, fawn breeches and
riding boots, a 4.5 pistol in a holster’.101 This description of Bell is note-
worthy as he was ostensibly a servant of the Chinese Government and yet
was patrolling the Shamian Bund in full military regalia. In other accounts
of the unrest in Guangzhou, CMCS staff took up arms for self-defence but
there was never any mention of them patrolling the Bund or reverting 
to military dress.102 It is possible that Bell may have joined a voluntary
militia but this is purely speculative. This use of military uniform and 
the symbolism of military apparel may have been readily acceptable in
places like India or British Malaya, but Guangzhou was not a British
colony. To find Bell in military mode as Commissioner might have 
added to tensions in Guangzhou, and fuelled resentment against himself
and the Service. According to Yvonne King’s recollections moreover, 
Bell’s choice of military attire did not find support among CMCS staff. 
In fact he was considered foolhardy in choosing to wear his uniform.103
In what was already a volatile situation Bell’s parading of military garb
was inappropriate and provocative.
While not directly interfering in the Customs administration, pickets
stopped vessels after their examination at the Customs house with the
purpose of extorting further funds. In some instances the Strike Committee
would carry away ‘enemy goods’ from the ships directly to their head-
quarters. These goods would then be disposed of at a profit. The CMCS
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even more serious threat to the functioning of the Service occurred when
the Strike Committee seized five boats that were heading to the Customs
house for examination. In response to this threat Bell resorted to personal
intervention. In a letter to Amery, the British Secretary of State, Governor
Clementi of Hong Kong recounted the events surrounding Bell’s success
in regaining control of these vessels: ‘He [Bell] with his Chief Tide surveyor
and some Chinese Tidewaiter literally “sat on” these boats for ten hours
until they were surrendered to him by the strike pickets.’105 Such confronta-
tional behaviour could not have been carried out if Bell did not have the
security of extraterritoriality and a tenacious character. Bell not only enjoyed
this success, but through threatening to close the port to trade he lessened
the possibility that the integrity of the Customs would be compromised.
In what was seen by the Western press as an omen of times to come 
Bell was the victim of an attack by strike pickets on 22 April. The NCDN
reported the incident under such headings as, ‘Lieut.-Col Hayley Bell
Assaulted. Attack By Strike Pickets Armed With Bamboos’.106 This attack
was presented as a typical example of the lawlessness condoned by the
Guangzhou Government through their inaction in curbing the pickets. Bell
was a victim, but at the same time it should not be forgotten that he had no
doubt inflamed resentment through his choice of military garb for patrolling
the Shamian Bund and his direct challenges to the Strike Committee. He
was reported as being set upon by the strike pickets when he was ‘walking
quietly from his office to the Shameen simply with a rain coat over his arm’.
When Bell resisted a picketer’s attempt to snatch the coat, a tussle broke
out and ‘without warning the Commissioner was set upon and beaten unmer-
cifully by a gang of five or six men armed with sticks and bamboos’. Bell
was knocked to the ground. The NCDN declared, ‘It seems quite possible
that murder would have been done had not a foreigner on Shameen who
noticed the occurrence, rushed to Colonel Bell’s assistance.’107 Elizabeth
Bell witnessed the attack on her father. The assault was described in detail:
Suddenly he was viciously attacked, brutally beaten with bamboo
poles, his helmet knocked off, his head smashed by rifle butts, cut by
swords, thrown defenceless to the ground, kicked and left there like a
dead animal. . . . Chinese Customs officers rushed to his aid, picked
up the unconscious, frail, limp body and carried the bleeding man to
the Consulate. For days he lay unconscious and temporarily blind,
suffering greatly from severe head wounds.108
The viciousness of the attack is constant in both this account and the press
reports of the time. The extent of Bell’s injuries were unclear but according
to both sources he was badly injured. In Hewitt, Bell was described as
being unconscious and temporarily blind for days, suffering from severe
head wounds.109 The attack on Bell had dual significance: not only was he
a British national but, more importantly, he represented the CMCS.
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After such graphic accounts of Bell’s beating it is surprising to discover
that his injuries were, at his own admission, only minor in nature. It is
possible that Bell wanted to underplay any real injuries but, had his injuries
been serious, it is likely the press would have run follow-up stories on 
his condition. Further to this in a letter to Sir Cecil Clementi, Bell 
related his version of events that casts a different light on the representa-
tion of the attack.110 In his view, reports on the affair were much overdone.
Bell recounted:
This is what occurred: I resisted personal search by the Pickets at the
French bridge (as I always do and always will). When grabbed, I hit
him and two then attacked me with sticks two more coming from
behind with carrying poles which they took from coolies. I was quite
happy even so and had disposed of two; but after two blows on the
head I could not see and fell back in the direction of the gate where
they dragged me in. I did quite as much damage as I received and I
never fell nor did anyone come to my assistance. In the end there were
eight or ten at me and they were in each others way – I went back 
2 hours later the same way and they left me alone.111
Bell concluded that the overall impact of this affair was good, as he had
received apologies from the strike pickets and police detectives were now
manning the gate. From this account, there is the sense of the inevitability
of such a clash. But whatever the personalities of this case, it remains a
significant encounter as the CMCS was facing a strong challenge from the
Nationalists, primarily through their inaction in moderating the Strike
Committee. Furthermore Bell’s letter provides a reflection of the uneasiness
that the foreigners remaining at the port were experiencing.
While foreign CMCS staff were in most instances safe from attacks by
the picketers, Chinese staff of the Customs were prime targets. They were
subjected to both intimidation and physical attacks were made against the
Chinese staff and Bell wrote of this to Clementi.112 Although the letter
does little to hide a desire for a sense of high drama, Bell’s response to
these attacks was to characteristically tackle them head on. He explained
that he was virtually ‘under siege’ in the Customs house and commented
that the Strike Committee had for months been ‘capturing my men in 
twos and threes and taking them to strike headquarters and the Tung Yuan
where they have generally tortured them’. If power could not be brought
to bear on the Committee, Bell recounted that he went on several occa-
sions ‘to the Tung Yuan and just sat there until they got worried about me
and let them go’.113 While it is difficult to ascertain what Bell meant by
his staff being ‘generally tortured’, it is made amply clear that all Chinese
staff were under threat of physical violence because of their association
with the CMCS. From his description of his response, it is evident that
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Chinese staff. The methods he employed appeared to be rather unorthodox
and dangerous but they were successful in keeping the majority of the
Chinese staff safe from the ire of the Strike Committee.
The Guangzhou Customs not only encountered external pressures but
also internal challenges to its functioning. Problems emerged with some of
the Chinese outdoor staff. Bell was obliged to dismiss two men who were
leading figures in a Customs union that was created during the boycott.
These union leaders, the chief carpenter and his mate, were exerting pres-
sure over other members of staff to join through intimidation and acts of
violence. Bell approached Sun Fo of the government and the Superintendent
of Customs warning them that ‘the Customs will have no Union and that
I shall dismiss if it be necessary every man on the staff outdoors until they
understand this’.114 Bell’s firm stand against demands to have the workers
reinstated was in response to his perception of the main issue at stake. The
crucial issue for him was not whether men would or would not serve 
the Customs (as many men worked without problem) but rather:
the far more important question at issue is whether or not a Commis-
sioner is to be defied by a group outside the Customs calling itself a
union. . . . I believe I am right in saying that no government department
in Canton permits such a union against itself to exist and I assert that
the Government should not have permitted a Customs Union. As I read
my duty this administration does not and will never recognise a Customs
Union. If one exists I prefer to meet it now once and for all.115
Bell’s stand on this issue was a definitive one and he declared he would
only reinstate employees if the union was declared illegal and the men
were prepared to resume work. The CMCS was a symbol of foreign influ-
ence in China, but throughout Bell’s letter the image of the Customs as a
Chinese institution is emphasized. In this way Bell was seeking to assert
his authority not as a foreigner but as a servant of the Chinese and in doing
so to keep his position tenable.
Commissioner Bell: lone defender of the Service?
This account of the Guangzhou Customs during the months of the boycott
was not intended to be a critique of Bell’s ability to handle crises. His
tenacity, however, in protecting the Customs is quite apparent throughout
all accounts from this time. While the wisdom of his actions was some-
times questionable (there was always the underlying possibility of a more
serious attack on the Commissioner), it is surprising that he acted at all.
In the 1923 Guangzhou Customs controversy, the Commissioner remained
practically invisible throughout the threats and counter threats, but, in this
instance, Bell played a dominant role in events. It may be conjectured that
had the Customs still enjoyed the protection afforded by the foreign powers
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and expressed through gunboat diplomacy, there would never have been
a necessity for Bell to be boarding and reclaiming ships, rescuing Chinese
staff, and scuffling with representatives of the Strike Committee. Aglen
reflected on the changing of fortunes of the CMCS:
We have hitherto weathered every storm but we have depended to a
large extent on a foreign prestige which no longer exists. I have never
believed that the foreign anchor alone would hold us and I am now
even beginning to be doubtful whether the Chinese anchor will be
strong enough – time only will show.116
There is little doubt that the foreign prestige that the CMCS most heavily
relied on was that of Britain. As British prestige in China was under 
attack, the IG was facing the realization of a turbulent future for the 
Service exacerbated by a lack of tangible foreign support in an increas-
ingly volatile political climate. Aglen’s concern also related to an appre-
hension of the GMD and possibly a premonition that the growing control
of the Nationalists would disrupt the CMCS.
When the CMCS was faced with a threat, the role of the IG was vital
in guiding the institution through its difficulties. Aglen’s leadership was
not always apparent. The inaction and sometimes absence of Aglen during
the Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott was similar to the 1923 Guangzhou
Customs controversy. Apart from the actions of Bell, little can be detected
of the Customs reaction. Throughout the boycott Aglen was absent more
often than he was in office.117 While an Acting IG was appointed, this
recurring void of leadership points to a need to question the effectiveness
of Aglen as IG in what were the final years of his administration. The
absence of the IG has several possible implications: first, that Aglen was
simply unlucky in his choice of travel times; second, he may have become
complacent with regard to the security of the Service. There is the sugges-
tion that Aglen was not a well man.118 If this was indeed the case, it
indicates that Aglen should have realized the need to relinquish his pos-
ition to an able successor. Ill health may account in part for the fact that
Aglen’s Z Letters during the 1924–6 period are filled with pessimism over
what he perceived as the demise of foreigners in China. He may have felt
he was no longer capable of coping with the Nationalistic China he was
now seeing. Also, within a semi-official circular, his tone shifted between
trepidation and admiration for what he saw as the beginning of the ‘real
revolution’ in China:
It will at once be apparent to all that the situation which confronts the
Service to-day is in no way parallel to the situation of 1911–1912.
Ground which for decades has seemed as solid as a rock is crumbling














































Gunboats and revenue, 1923–7 75
is making demands which are calculated seriously to interfere with
Service discipline; national aspirations are difficult to reconcile with
the foreign Inspectorate system; and the Service is of course involved
in a wave of anti-foreign feeling which has been evoked for the
purposes of political propaganda.119
Clearly Aglen’s concern was how the CMCS could weather these changes.
It must be borne in mind that by 1926 Aglen had filled the role of IG for
16 years, of which the last few years were under trying circumstances.
Aglen’s absence from events surrounding the Guangzhou boycott may
simply be a reflection of a personal crisis, his having little energy left to
devote to his position as leader of the CMCS. Aglen’s absence at a crucial
juncture is apparent again in 1927, when, ignoring urges from Lampson,
the British Minister, to return to his post, Aglen was dismissed by the
Northern Government.120
As the boycott stretched out for months the British found themselves the
focus of GMD demands for a judicial inquiry to determine responsibility
for initiating the Shaji shootings. While French troops had also been directly
involved, the Nationalists marginalized their participation. The sense that
Britain was being made a scapegoat for the incident caused a defensive
reaction from British representatives. Acting Consul General in Guangzhou,
Brenan, detailed his negotiations with the Nationalists for a settlement of
the anti-British boycott and among these discussions was mention of French
involvement. Brenan drew the Nationalists’ attention to the fact that French
concessions formed part of Shamian and that French forces had been 
equally as involved in the incident. His reasoning for shifting the focus to
French complicity in this incident was that it was both unjust and illogical
for the Chinese to hold a judicial inquiry without the French also present.
In an almost hopeful tone Brenan stated that French evidence was essen-
tial, and ‘they might conceivably be found to blame’.121 Newspaper articles
throughout this time reflect this sense that Britain was being isolated by the
diplomatic body and was devoid of anything more than tacit international
support. Editorials entitled ‘Will Britain Stand Alone?’ and ‘The British
View of China’ both possessed defensiveness in their content, reflecting the
pressure British interests in China were experiencing.122
Throughout the Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott not only was Britain
bearing the brunt of anti-imperialist attacks, it was also very much alone
when considering any action to bring the boycott to an end. GMD offers
of ending the boycott with the financial assistance from Hong Kong in
paying wages for the strikers was rejected by a frustrated Brenan as nothing
short of blackmail.123 Ultimately the British followed a policy of riding
out the unrest as they realized that alone they were unable to contemplate
any decisive action. A secret telegram from the Secretary of State Sir W.
Tyrell to British Minister Macleay reported on the China issue as discussed
by the Committee of Imperial Defence:
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As regards China generally, offensive action on a large scale is not
possible for the British Empire acting alone, and finality could not be
hoped for from any operation within our capacity. Offensive action on
a large scale can only be international, and even on that basis it would
probably be unprofitable.124
As a result, British Foreign Office approaches to the United States to sound
out the possibility for joint naval action in seizing the Strike Committee’s
boats in September 1926 (the boycott was lifted the following month) were
unsuccessful. Mr Kellogg replied with regret that his government was ‘not
in a position to associate itself’ with the action contemplated by the British
government.125 Macleay commented that there was no doubt the other
powers were little interested in what was happening in Guangzhou. As
they were not being affected they had little compulsion to help Britain
relieve Hong Kong’s discomfort.126 The boycott had proved successful in
isolating Britain and as the other powers did not want to be similarly
targeted they were effectively discouraged from taking any supportive
action. For Britain a lone military offensive was not feasible.
When the boycott was finally lifted in October 1926, it was on the condi-
tion of a surtax being accepted. Authorities were to levy a special
consumption tax of 2.5 per cent on ordinary imports, 5 per cent on imported
luxuries and 2.5 per cent special production tax on exports.127 This special
tax was in reality a realization of the Washington surtax that had not been
put into action. British policy was inclined to simply accept this in exchange
for an end to the anti-British boycott. This acceptance, according to Aglen,
directly affected the CMCS, and unless the tax was approved by all the
powers it could not be implemented except with force. In response to this
delay the GMD established a rival Inspection Corps to enforce the surtax.
This Corps was disbanded when the powers agreed to honour the taxes
conditional on the CMCS handling them. Pratt of the British Far Eastern
Office reasoned:
His Majesty’s Government have decided to acquiesce in these new
taxes and to favour assistance being rendered by the customs solely
because that seems to be the only means of terminating the boycott
and because the price we are called upon to pay is not too heavy.128
This was an opportunity for the CMCS to develop its relationship with the
GMD, which had often been tenuous. Up to this time the IG had remained
in Beijing and was responsible to the Northern Government. Aglen did
travel south in order to contact the GMD leadership, especially concerning
the Customs at Hankou. This, however, gave the Beijing coalition the
pretext to dismiss him from office. The period 1926–7 was extremely sensi-
tive politically for Aglen. Any recognition of GMD forces was immediately
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therefore provided the Beijing regime with the pretext it needed to remove
Aglen from office. Aglen had often written of feeling besieged by Beijing’s
demands but had refused to be drawn into their schemes. Because of this
he would have earned their resentment.
The Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott marks a turning point for the
CMCS in the Republic. Prior to this the Customs had enjoyed the highly
visible and arguably effective protection of international naval forces.
Shortly after the end of the boycott Aglen was dismissed, thus bringing to
an end 17 years of Customs administration. The rise of anti-imperialism
and the virulence of anti-British actions that swept through the treaty ports
after the May 30th incident sounded warnings for any foreign power that
was approached to lend assistance to Britain during the 16-month blockade.
By drawing on anti-Bolshevik sentiment in the West, Britain attempted to
unite the other foreign powers behind them. In doing so Britain maintained
it would not only defend its place in China but would weaken the Soviet
influence in the GMD.
Throughout this chapter, the close connection between the Customs and
the foreign powers, but most particularly Britain, is evident. While
protected by foreign military force, in the form of gunboat diplomacy, the
Service took an almost passive role in the 1923 Customs controversy. It
was not the CMCS but the treaty powers headed by Britain who were
instrumental in defending the integrity of the Service. The use of gunboat
diplomacy, while initially effective, fuelled the anti-imperialist spirit of the
Nationalist movement and, after being confronted by the intensity of anti-
foreign backlash, there was a distinct reluctance on the part of the powers
to stage any further demonstrations of military force in Guangzhou. By
1925 political conditions had changed and the GMD emerged as serious
contenders on the national stage. During the Guangzhou boycott, the
Customs house was active in defence and, in large part as a result of Bell’s
leadership, was a significant force to be reckoned with. For the CMCS,
the 1923–7 period marked the end of a sheltered existence and of being
protected by the treaty powers. Instead the Service was forced, to all intents
and purposes, to stand alone. The CMCS was no longer able to sidestep
China’s political turmoil. It had become a potent symbol of foreign influ-
ence in China and the success of the Northern Expedition had far-reaching
consequences on the Service.
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4 Nationalist ascendancy 
and the politics of being 
Inspector General
In old days one could have thumped the table, mobilized the fleet and even
threatened to withdraw from Peking. Nowadays things are very different.
Miles Lampson1
The above comment conjures wonderfully lucid imagery of Lampson
pounding the table until his crockery rattled, while exclaiming over the
China situation. This whimsical reference, however, points to recognition
of the changes that were forcing a recasting of Sino-Western relations. The
Nationalists had embarked on the Northern Expedition and their early
successes brought forth mixed reactions from the foreign powers, whose
main concern was the maintenance of their privileged position in the treaty
ports. Lampson’s reflection reveals the British realization that the era of
gunboat diplomacy was drawing to a close. Aglen’s dismissal in early 1927
precipitated a succession crisis. The leadership imbroglio served as
evidence of the deterioration of Britain’s position in China. The struggle
for the Inspector General’s (IG) position that was waged from 1927 to
1929 served to highlight that the use of diplomacy, veiled threat and coer-
cion were no longer effective in protecting and promoting British interests
in the Service or elsewhere.
The dismissal of Inspector General Aglen
Leading up to his dismissal, Aglen had been placed under increasing pres-
sure from the northern militarists to release extra funds, in the form of
approved loans, for their ventures. In a letter to Bowra, Aglen discussed
what he saw as a deliberate persecution being waged against him by the
disgruntled finance minister.2 Rather than merely a clash of personalities,
the IG saw the issue at stake as being much greater:
There is no income of any kind except the Customs income and it














































to be devoted to maintaining credit and acknowledged obligations or
whether these are to be thrown to the winds and the whole question
of revenue thrown open.3
This extract reveals that the threats to the Customs houses, which occurred
in the aftermath of the May 30th incident and the Guangzhou–Hong Kong
boycott, were indicators of a deeper crisis for the Service. The CMCS was
being pushed to change its fundamental position in Chinese affairs, a move
that Aglen was resisting. Aglen took on an embattled tone as he described
his response to the threats posed:
The only thing for me to do is to retire into my shell and sit tight. 
No money that I control can be got without my signature. The Chinese
Government cannot get my signature against my will. The only way
in which money could be got would be to relieve me and obtain some-
body else’s signature and they are not yet prepared to take this step.
When they are prepared to do so of course they will do so, and they
will have to accept the consequences which would be in many direc-
tions very serious.4
Such pressures being placed on the IG may account to some extent for his
relative silence during the crucial Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott. Aglen
gives the impression that he believed that he was struggling to maintain
not only his position but also the future direction of the CMCS.
Aglen’s dismissal by the Central Government came at a crucial juncture
for the CMCS. The Central Government was pressing Aglen to order the
collection of surtaxes in all ports and maintained that, as the Inspectorate
was answerable only to the north (Beijing), their orders must not be
challenged. While negotiating the proposed collection of these surtaxes,
Aglen came under renewed attack from the Central Government who were
clearly unhappy with his travelling to Shanghai. Lampson discovered that
it was Zhang Zuolin’s intention to dismiss Aglen and advised strongly
against this. At the same time he urged Acting IG Edwardes to telegram
Aglen to ‘return from Shanghai and face the music’.5 Aglen, moreover,
knew nothing of the threat of dismissal until 29 January and then contacted
Edwardes (Commissioner in Guangzhou 1926) for more information.
Lampson expressed the suspicion that Aglen did not want to remain IG.
He hypothesized, ‘[r]eal trouble is I believe that I.G. would only be too
pleased to resign and get out of this mess here’.6 Lampson made several
requests for Aglen to return to Beijing, all to no avail.7 He chose to remain
in Shanghai to talk with bankers as he considered it vital to what was 
happening in the north. Aglen’s dismissal was declared on 1 February 1927.
In an official circular discussing the circumstances surrounding his dis-
missal, Aglen rationalized his actions as an attempt ‘to prevent if possible,
disruption of the service’.8 He reflected:
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I desire to express my deep regret that I have been compelled to relin-
quish the helm at such a critical time, and I wish that my departure
could have been contrived in a manner more befitting the dignity of
the great institution which for 70 years has served China so well.9
Aglen’s dismissal was, however, not completely unexpected. His defen-
siveness was previously expressed in his letter to Bowra and it is not
surprising that the Central Government simply created a pretext on which
to remove Aglen. As IG, Aglen was stubborn despite the pressures that
had been placed on him. This was a credit to his integrity and vision for
the CMCS, but such rigidity had provided the catalyst for his removal.
Furthermore, it is highly unusual that he disregarded advice that he should
return north to defend himself. Lampson mentioned that Aglen was very
confident that, even if he was dismissed, the native banks at Shanghai
would ‘clamour for his immediate reinstatement’ but this never eventu-
ated.10 Misguided confidence had lulled Aglen into a false sense of security.
His dismissal was protested by Lampson and echoed by the diplomatic
body at Beijing. Lampson recorded: ‘I harangued Koo until I had exhausted
my vocabulary, I mobilised the Diplomatic Body all to no avail.’11 These
protests were unsuccessful in reversing the dismissal.
Lampson regarded the dismissal of Aglen as contemptible and embarked
on negotiations with the government to secure the future of the CMCS. He
recorded Aglen’s departure from China with regret saying, ‘[a] great crowd
of foreigners but practically no Chinese at all – the swine. Aglen is a great
landmark gone. I wonder if I handled that case strongly enough.’12 He was
aware, despite his personal disgust at the Chinese treatment of their ‘loyal
servant’,13 that foreign interests in the CMCS were the larger issue dom-
inating these events. He explained to Koo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the reasons for British interests in the Service: that the Customs provided
an efficient machine for the conduct of foreign trade and a security for
foreign loans. He also discussed ‘the fact that the Service was built up
under British auspices which gave us a traditional interest in maintenance
[of] its integrity’.14 Lampson was perturbed by what he saw as a deliber-
ate action by the Central Government to move the Customs into the sphere
of internal politics. Such a perception is curiously naive, however, as 
the CMCS had since its inception been closely tied to the internal affairs
of China. What was now different was the vulnerability of the Service 
once the foreign powers had shown themselves reluctant to defend it.
Consequently the CMCS had to develop new approaches to its close con-
nection with the internal politics of China, and the removal of IG Aglen
heralded the desperate need for a new direction for the Service.
1927–9 in perspective
For the British Foreign Office 1928 stood out as a critical year in Sino-
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Customs, in fact, more so than in the whole of the Service’s history.
Lampson wrote: ‘Looking back on the many crises it has passed through
during the year, it can only be a matter of surprise that the service has 
survived the ordeal comparatively unscathed.’15 The chaos endured by the
CMCS was primarily a result of its need to reconcile with the GMD’s 
establishing of its Nanjing regime. The reference to the Service surviving
‘comparatively unscathed’ is central to this chapter’s exploration of the
1927–9 period. Within these years the Service was not only beset with a
succession crisis but was simultaneously being drawn into a much closer
relationship with the Nanjing Government. The appointment of IG Maze
over the Foreign Office-supported Edwardes signified a Nationalist-inspired
breaking away from the protection that had hitherto been afforded to the
CMCS by Britain and the other treaty powers.
The challenge by Frederick Maze to Aglen’s appointed successor, Arthur
Edwardes, and the flurry of negotiations that passed between the British
Foreign Office, Lampson and the diplomatic body, have been the focus of
works on the CMCS. This struggle has been reviewed as endemic of the
need for the Service to adapt to Nationalist China. The Customs crisis is
presented by Aitchison as a result of the Nanjing Government’s revisionism,
which threatened the existing unequal relationship between China and the
foreign powers.16 While also referring to the customs succession struggle
as representative of the recognition of the need for adaptation, in contrast
Atkin’s research tends to dwell more on the personalities and bitterness of
this rivalry.17 This chapter is a synthesis of these two approaches. In partic-
ular the Nanjing Incident of 1927 and its ramifications for the British
handling of the challenge to the Customs has received little attention; the
succession crisis can be seen as representative of larger forces at play in
Sino-Western, or rather GMD–Western relations during the 1928–9 period.
For the treaty powers the nominal success of the GMD in its Northern
Expedition was a cause for uneasiness. While the internal chaos of the
warlord era had caused consternation among the powers that despaired of
China ever unifying, the possibility of a cohesive and strong China was
looked on with very real trepidation. There was a reluctant realization 
that foreign interests in China must undergo some form of change or
adaptation to survive in the Nanjing era. As the Nationalists became estab-
lished, it appeared that internal dissension would no longer allow for the
flourishing of foreign trade under the protection of extraterritoriality. 
A new era was dawning for China and for its relations with the West. The
CMCS can, in many instances, be seen as a microcosm of Sino-Western
relations. Therefore, the changes that were forced on this service by the
GMD provide a reflection of the general experience of the foreign inter-
ests in the treaty ports. For the Customs the Northern Expedition was the
backdrop to a serious threat to the functioning and fabric of the Service.
GMD success plunged the foreign powers into a quandary of recognition
or non-recognition and the Customs was also affected.
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The establishment of the Nanjing Government in April 1927 marked a
watershed for Sino-Western relations, particularly how this relationship
was manifested in the treaty ports. The defeat of Zhang Zuolin’s regime
in Beijing in June 1928 and his son Zhang Xueliang’s allegiance with the
GMD in December of that year heralded a unity in China that had not
been experienced since 1916.18 This realization of a nominally unified
China further reinforced the need for Britain and the other foreign powers
to recast the relationship they held with the Nationalists. Lampson recorded
Zhang Zuolin’s demise with much regret as he sensed that political tension
would inevitably increase. He reflected:
I certainly regret his failure. I think it might well prove to be a case
of ‘out of the frying pan and into the fire,’ and I have little doubt that
when Chang has gone and we find ourselves up against the Nationalists
in earnest in our daily routine we shall look back with regret to the
peaceful days when Chang was here. Of course I know that Chang
was an anachronism and was bound sooner or later to go: he had no
real hold on the people and no political insight or knowledge, yet he
represents a type which is easier to deal with – I would almost say
more honest – than the brand of Chinese with whom we are now
confronted. I never knew him not to keep his word, and that is distinctly
unusual in China to-day.19
Lampson’s appraisal of Zhang is insightful as he realized that the warlord
had become an anachronism in Nationalist China. He also appeared
conscious of the challenges that the Nationalists were going to present 
to the status quo of foreign interests in China. So too the CMCS as an
integral part of the treaty port system and foreign interests in China was
confronted with the prospect of change. This challenge came in two
predominant forms, the succession crisis and the GMD’s move for greater
control of the service as evidenced through the quest for tariff autonomy 
and the sinicization of the CMCS. After breaking Beijing’s power the
Nationalists possessed the authority to appoint the IG of the Service. The
crisis, which had emerged from the Customs succession, was, as Aitchison
explains, partly due to Lampson’s strenuous opposition to the Nationalists’
favoured candidate. It was Lampson’s influence that had prevented Maze
being appointed.20 This, however, is an overly simplistic view of the situ-
ation. The agreements under which the Service was first created (as the
IMCS) noted that the nomination and recommendation of a candidate to
the position of IG was integral to the foreign relationship with the service.
Regardless of the political climate of the 1920s, the British retained their
sense of ‘obligation’ to maintain their interests in the Service. While aware
of the historical justifications of their claim, the British Foreign Office
believed that it would be fruitless and possibly damaging to wider British
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was brought to bear; Lampson’s heavy involvement in the succession crisis
amply demonstrates that Britain still held considerable interests in the
future of the CMCS and still sought to maintain its predominance in this
influential institution.
The Nanjing Incident
British interests in China were faced with ongoing blows to their prestige
from 1925 onwards. The Nationalists, moreover, once ensconced in govern-
ment in Nanjing, sought to ease the singling out of Britain for attack 
and instead sought to be on better terms with what remained arguably 
the most influential of the foreign powers. The December Memorandum
(18 December 1926) marked a distinct shift in British attitudes towards
China and a more conciliatory attitude with regard to the Nationalists.21
By the Nationalist era British influence was already a shadow of its pre-
First World War strength. The Service, with its close ties to British interests
in China, provides a useful vehicle for the chronicling of what has been
termed as both British decline and retreat in China.22 The CMCS succes-
sion crisis and the subsequent failure of the British Foreign Office to assert
its will on the Nationalists in winning its approved candidate the IG’s post
reflects the deterioration of the power once wielded by Britain in Chinese
political affairs.
The GMD seizure of Nanjing in March 1927 and the lawlessness that
ensued prompted the foreign bombardment of the city. Soldiers ransacked
the foreign concessions. Foreigners in the city, both men and women, were
attacked, leading to several fatalities.23 In response foreign gunboats
bombarded the city, providing cover for their fleeing nationals. This could
be seen as one of the last distinct acts of gunboat diplomacy in the Republic.
As with earlier deployments, the gunboats’ bombing of the city caused
more long-term ills than good. Subsequent negotiations were strained 
as the Nationalists demanded apologies for the foreign attack. The sack of
Nanjing was evidence of the ‘public erosion of the status of Britons in
China’.24 The chaos in the city certainly would have added to the British
sense of demoralization in China. The attacks against the foreigners in the
city further exacerbated foreign fears of the anti-imperialist predilections
of the Nationalists. This incident is particularly important to an under-
standing of the succession crisis, as it influenced all subsequent dealings
between the Foreign Office and the GMD.
Shortly after reaching a settlement to the Nanjing Incident, the press in
Shanghai enthusiastically seized on a report of an attack on the Customs
Commissioner in Nanjing, Johnston. He was assaulted by four Nationalist
soldiers. The attack was reportedly unprovoked and particularly vicious in
nature, with Johnston being abandoned as dead by the soldiers. The NCDN
demanded, ‘if soldiers cannot be kept in proper control in the capital, what
are they likely to be elsewhere?’.25 Johnston’s position in the Customs was
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highlighted in the newspaper reports even though this appears to have had
little to do with the attack. Both Hewlett’s memoirs and British Foreign
Office material further confirm that Johnston’s position in the CMCS was
incidental to the assault. In fact in his memoir Forty Years in China Hewlett
suggests that the attack was instigated by Johnston’s chauffeur, ‘whom he
[Johnston] had cursed in public for not obeying a police signal, and had
also beaten across the shoulders for driving a little lad on a bicycle into
a ditch’.26 Revenge then was a motive. Hewlett moreover expressed frus-
tration at the way in which his host reacted to the attack. Seeing Johnston’s
later actions as more inflammatory than constructive, he commented:
‘[Johnston] refused to give the police any help in their investigations, but
added to my difficulties by giving the Shanghai press all the details.’27
Regardless of whether the CMCS was an issue or not in this assault, the
NCDN clearly sought to sensationalize the attack – not only had a Briton
been subjected to such outrages but the victim was also a high-ranking
Customs employee. It is possible that reporting such as this was designed
to encourage some scaremongering among the foreign community in China
and to create further indignation over the events in Nanjing.
The physical outrages perpetrated by the Nationalist soldiers and the
counter-attack by the foreign powers obscure much of the significance 
of this event. What is crucial within the framework of this chapter is the
mentality with which the British Foreign Office approached the need for
reparations. This incident provided further evidence of the ‘public erosion’
of the position of the British in China.28 This served also to increase 
tensions in the early negotiations between the Foreign Office and the
Nationalists. Lampson’s correspondence with Austen Chamberlain pro-
vides a reflection of the significance with which he viewed the need for 
a settlement of the Nanjing affair:
Though the results to be expected from a settlement are not easily esti-
mated, a breakdown might be a far more serious matter than is apparent
in London. Prejudice will be occasioned to all outstanding questions,
Hankow, salt, Shanghai municipal representation, the Customs and so
on, while the British subjects and their businesses in Nationalist terri-
tory will all suffer. I am also apprehensive of a further volte-face on
the part of the Nanking authorities should we rebuff them, and, though
one cannot be certain in such matters, Russia is always the alternative
to ourselves. . . . We are not therefore simply concerned with the
Nanking incident, but our whole position vis-a-vis the Nationalists is
at issue, perhaps at stake.29 [emphasis added]
In the above passage what becomes apparent is the overwhelming appre-
hension on the part of Lampson that any loss of ground to the GMD would
provide the catalyst for the disintegration of all British interests in China.
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The further shaking of British confidence that occurred in Nanjing and the
subsequent difficulties in reaching an agreement with the Nationalists
perceptibly influenced the outlook of the British Minister and the Foreign
Office. The Customs succession, therefore, took on a new significance in
the wake of the Nanjing Incident. It heightened British concerns for the
preservation of ‘face’ against the Nationalists. Events such as the Nanjing
Incident and the CMCS crisis amplified sensitivities to the preservation 
of the status quo. By 1928 the Foreign Office realized that Britain’s rela-
tionship with the Nationalists needed more than the recasting directed in
the seminal December Memorandum of 1926. It needed a new understand-
ing and a cautious approach.
The succession crisis
Before the significance of this incident to the future of not only the CMCS
but also British interests in the Service can be explored, it is necessary 
to outline the manoeuvrings that took place, guided most diligently by 
Sir Miles Lampson, to secure the right man for the coveted position of IG.
Lampson was, however, largely frustrated in his attempts to secure the
post for the most suitable Edwardes, but not through lack of trying. 
Rather, it was a gradual easing of Foreign Office support that hampered
Lampson as officials had come to see Maze’s succession as inevitable.
Edwardes’ propensity to act without consulting the Minister often had
embarrassing consequences. Combined with a shift in power in the GMD
government, this meant that the sympathetic Song Ziwen (T.V. Soong)
was replaced by a stronger, anti-Edwardes faction, which contributed to
Edwardes’ resignation from the Service.
Edwardes’ claims to the post of IG should have been unrivalled. Aglen
had personally selected and groomed him as successor. He was, however,
challenged for the leadership by the Commissioner of Shanghai, Frederick
Maze. Despite favour from Lampson and the Foreign Office, Edwardes
was not successful in assuming leadership of the Customs. Aitchison repre-
sents the difficulties in Edwardes’ rise to leadership as stemming from the
success of the GMD in their Northern Expedition. This interpretation of
the main obstacle is rather too simplistic. It is possible, although slightly
controversial in light of the other works on this incident, to contend that
Edwardes’ failure was a fait accompli even at his naming as successor.
When Aglen had been dismissed and had appointed Edwardes as his 
hand-selected replacement (undoubtedly a successor in whom he could be
confident that his vision for the CMCS would be maintained), this was
already a portent of disaster.
After Aglen’s dismissal Edwardes was appointed as the Officiating IG.
Aglen handed over charge of the CMCS but retained his title and remained
as IG on the Service List for a further year.30 In doing so, the need to 
definitely secure a replacement for the top post was effectively held in
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abeyance. This arrangement was achieved through the offices of Lampson,
who also ensured that he got ‘Aglen the G.C.M.G., which had some moral
effect’.31 Aglen’s dismissal had marked the end of an era for the Customs,
one that had been considered quite difficult, but the CMCS would be
confronted with many more serious challenges in the succession struggle
and the years to come. By March 1927, Lampson had come to believe that
the position of foreigners in China’s service was endangered, with both
events in the Customs and threats to the postal service further confirming
this. He reflected:
What a splendid country we live in to be sure. All foreign employees
are clearly to be driven out: that is the programme of both North 
and South, though the former set about it in a more regular and less
revolutionary way.32
With such a sense of foreboding, it is not surprising that in the struggle
for the appointment of IG (predominantly played out between Lampson
and the Nanjing Government) Lampson seized on the challenge with such
vigour. For Lampson, the decline of British influence in the Service needed
to be stemmed before it destroyed the foreign inspectorate.
Aglen departed for London in March 1927 and does not appear to have
severed all links with the Service. Although Edwardes may have not known
it, the possibility of Aglen’s returning to the post of IG was still given
some credence. Lampson intimated in a letter to Clementi that the deal to
allow Aglen to be listed as IG served to cover any eventualities. He wrote:
‘If this arrangement goes through there is just a possibility, should there
be a change of government here, that Aglen may be fully reinstated. In
any case, the door is at least kept open.’33 No doubt the success of the
GMD in establishing their Nanjing Government would have made it clear
to Lampson that any hope of Aglen returning had become impossibility.
The later GMD success in June 1928 in forcing Zhang Zuolin to flee
Beijing would have further confirmed the permanency of Aglen’s removal
from the Service.
During June and July 1927 the possibility of a divided Service came to
the fore. Lampson, when recounting this to Chamberlain, refers to Maze
(without specifically naming him, but the inference is clear) and the 
efforts being made to divide the Service. He commented that such moves
had ‘received some encouragement from interested individuals in the
Customs Service at Shanghai’.34 To counteract this Lampson made personal
representations to the Nanjing Government, which responded favourably,
inviting Edwardes to travel to Shanghai for discussions. Zhang Zuolin,
who had recently established a military dictatorship in Beijing, prevented
Edwardes from doing so. Despite the need for such representations,
Lampson saw that the situation involving the CMCS would remain
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brought to some resolution. Later in the same dispatch he mentioned the
IG issue and the overarching concern of Nationalists’ claims of control of
Inspectorate as being ‘for the moment dormant’.35
Edwardes and Maze: The rival candidates
Before delving deeper into the actual events surrounding the struggle for
the position of IG of Customs, it is timely to briefly introduce both candi-
dates for the position.
Edwardes was the Foreign Office-endorsed candidate and was strongly
supported by Lampson in particular. Edwardes was Aglen’s appointed suc-
cessor and therefore was considered acceptable by the British and other
foreign establishments.36 As Edwardes was seen to follow Aglen’s lead, 
as regards the CMCS relations with the Nationalists, his candidature even
at the outset promised difficulties with the Nanjing Government. He had
developed a good relationship and even friendship with Lampson, most
probably spurred on by their common experience of being new to their
posts in Beijing37 and also through their contact in the lead up to Aglen’s
dismissal.38 This rapport is most visible in the numerous social meetings
with Edwardes, which are noted throughout The Killearn Diaries.39 Through
Lampson’s recommendation the Foreign Office viewed Edwardes as the
‘right man’ for what was potentially a difficult job.40 Importantly he inspired
confidence that British interests would be taken into consideration.
Edwardes perceived the role of IG as one that involved a close liaison with
the British Foreign Office. This is evidenced most clearly through his close
contact with Lampson and the extent to which he relied on the Minister’s
support.41 Edwardes also enjoyed the support of the Japanese. The Japanese
maintained their own agenda of ambitions for greater presence in the
Service but were supportive of Edwardes’ candidature.42
Edwardes, while being firmly supported by the foreign communities in
China and by the foreign powers, lacked any substantial Chinese support.
Apart from a consortium of Chinese bankers who approved of his tariff
plans, he was seen as merely a second Aglen (who, it must be remem-
bered had not established a good relationship with the GMD). Edwardes,
moreover, was recognized as having been demonstrably anti-GMD in 
his own right. According to Maze a constant objection raised by the
Nationalists against him was that he was not seen as acting in the Chinese 
interests.43 This was evidenced by the Nationalists when, during his
Commissionership at Guangzhou and in response to the Shamian incident,
he had shut the Customs offices despite instructions not to, and it was even
claimed he had been shot as a result of his being in the volunteer corps
of Shamian.44 The objections were not only personal: ‘the main feature of
the situation is the determination of the Nationalists not to recognize
Edwardes’ appointment in any shape or form’.45 In this way, the objections
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to Edwardes were presented as part of the Nationalists’ desire to completely
distance themselves from the excesses of Beijing (both under the Qing
dynasty and the warlord regimes).
As the challenger to the post, Maze did not find much support in British
or foreign circles, but appears to have enjoyed support from elements 
of the Nationalists. He had not been nominated as Aglen’s successor, for
although senior to Edwardes in length of CMCS employment, he was
considered too close to retirement age. A nephew to the legendary Hart,
Maze’s claims to the IG’s position were compelling in terms of experi-
ence and proven administrative skills. His candidature does not, however, 
appear to have been considered by Aglen when selecting a successor.46
Maze’s appointment as Commissioner at Shanghai had left him with little
choice but to work closely with the Nationalists, and in doing so he had
shown himself to be a capable administrator who never failed to appre-
ciate the longer-term picture of the Service. Maze was supported by neither
the Foreign Office nor Lampson, who saw him as scheming, disloyal and
frankly un-British, typified through his preparedness to allow himself to
be used by the Nationalists. Atkins provides an interesting suggestion as
to why Maze was such a maligned character throughout the succession
crisis and even after. He discusses that an underlying assumption had been
drawn in regard to Maze, that to collude with Chinese interests meant an
inherent corruption of one’s morals. Futhermore, he comments that Maze
had directly challenged one of the tenets of the ‘psychology of informal
empire in China: that Western logic and morality alone could decide the
right course for China to take’.47 Maze certainly appeared to run against
the grain of the predominant psyche of foreign communities in China at
that time. Even though Maze was maligned for dragging the Service into
politics, the CMCS had always been an inordinately political organ through
which the foreign powers could exert influence, but the link had not, until
the rise of the Nationalists, surfaced so publicly and in a manner considered
so threatening to British interests.
As late as January 1928, Aglen was still toying with the idea of returning
to China. Edwardes intimated to Lampson that Aglen was considering a
return to China, ostensibly to settle private affairs. Edwardes admitted to
Lampson that he had discouraged such an action. Lampson fully supported
his dismissive attitude towards Aglen.48 Certainly Edwardes had reason 
to be concerned that Aglen’s return may affect the present status quo in
the CMCS.
When Aglen’s leave expired on 9 February 1928, the position of IG was
formally vacated. The tensions and conflicts between the rival candidates
and their supporters emerged. The struggle had begun in earnest. Lampson
reported to the Foreign Office that Maze was known to be scheming with
the south for appointment as their IG. He feared that this would precipi-
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This would destroy the unity of the Customs Administration and be
the cause of extreme embarrassment to us, and a development of this
kind is most undesirable from every standpoint. Mr Edwardes was
chosen and trained by Sir F. Aglen as his successor. He is in the right
place as Inspector-General and has justified his appointment during
the last twelve months. . . . I shall afford Mr Edwardes full support if
an issue is to be faced.49
The reference of Edwardes being in the ‘right place’ to be IG is a curious
one. Undoubtedly Edwardes was appointed as Aglen’s successor but his
former chief was not endeared to the GMD and Edwardes was regarded
as the same by the Nanjing Government. As for physical location Edwardes
remained in Beijing, the traditional headquarters of the CMCS, although
it was readily apparent that, as the Nationalists dominated the government,
there was possibly a justification for relocating to Nanjing. By saying 
that Edwardes was in the ‘right place’ to be IG, Lampson must surely 
have referred to his being groomed for the position, of doing things the
‘right way’.
While supporting Edwardes’ claims to be IG, Lampson found willing
supporters in the Japanese. On several occasions he discussed the possi-
bility of enlisting the Japanese Minister, Yoshizawa, to bring political pres-
sure to bear.50 With Lampson’s encouragement the British and Japanese
consuls in Shanghai let their support for Edwardes be known and asserted
that any intended splits in the Service ‘would not be tolerated’.51 Japanese
support, however, did not come unconditionally. In January 1928, Edwardes
was perturbed at Japanese intimations that, in return for their support, the
Chief Secretary in Beijing, Kishimoto, would next succeed when Edwardes
retired. Lampson’s reaction, after giving Edwardes permission to dispel any
such ‘dangerous illusions’ was to further emphasize his own belief that the
IG would always remain British.52 He commented that ‘[the Customs] has
been built up on purely British lines, its whole tradition and character are
British, and under any but British leadership it would go to pieces’.53
Lampson was prepared to encourage Kishimoto being definitely confirmed
as Chief Secretary on Edwardes’ appointment but, despite this overture,
clearly did not entertain ideas of further aiding Japanese ambitions for 
the Service.
For Lampson the succession crisis held a deeper significance, broadly
representing all British interests in Nationalist China. He believed it was
essentially an issue not as to who was appointed but rather whether a ‘half-
fledged’ Chinese Government would be able to dismiss Edwardes for
purely personal reasons and to give preference to Maze. He saw Edwardes’
departure as representing a bad omen for anybody who tried to stand firm
in a foreign-controlled administration. In a message warning Chamberlain
of what he recognized as imminent danger to British interests, Lampson
wrote: ‘If Mr Maze is successfully appointed, the Nationalist Government
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will feel, and will rightly feel, that they have taken our measure and that
we no longer count. In short, our whole position and influence will have
been undermined.’54 In this warning he also urged that more consistency
in the FO’s backing of Edwardes was essential. Clearly he saw the outcome
of this crisis in a similar light to that of the Nanjing Incident – that failure
to assert British interests at yet anther critical juncture would have a flow-
on effect, allowing a deterioration of the already weakened hand Britain
enjoyed in Anglo-Sino relations. The Foreign Office paradoxically was, as
time passed, not so inclined to see the situation in the same urgent light
as Lampson. While the Foreign Office had gradually lost some conviction
that Edwardes was indeed the most suitable candidate, the prospect of
Maze’s appointment was not looked on with any renewed enthusiasm.
Pragmatism dominated the Foreign Office’s assessment of the situation,
and the attitude adopted was that should Maze be appointed despite strong
British urging against it, then all concerned should ‘try to make the best
of it’.55 This pragmatism contributed to Lampson’s growing frustration
over events surrounding the succession.56 Such a lukewarm response by
the Foreign Office led him to feel that his pressure alone was keeping
Edwardes as Officiating IG. To his chagrin this fact was something that
he felt he needed to remind even Edwardes.57
Throughout the gathering storm surrounding the Customs, Maze was
constantly referred to in terms of whether or not he was doing the right
thing and of doing the ‘British thing’. In early February 1928, as a response
to Edwardes and Lampson’s fears that the service was to be divided,
Lampson authorized Sir Sidney Barton to approach Maze on his behalf.
This was an appeal to Maze to withdraw his candidature and therefore
relieve what had become, for the British interests, a complicated and poten-
tially embarrassing situation. Maze was exhorted by Barton to be a ‘loyal
British subject’ and to consider his devotion to the CMCS.58 Apart from
protesting that the matter was really a concern between north and south
and not the foreign powers, Maze assured Barton that the outcome would
not greatly affect the CMCS interests. The most damning part of this
reported meeting, however, came when Maze repeatedly told Barton:
he [Maze] would be prepared to resign and to leave the field clear if
it were made worth his while to do so by the grant of a higher pension
and the bestowal of a decoration from His Majesty’s Government.59
This reply prompted Edwardes to announce his intention to resign rather
than to play any part in the consideration of Maze’s ‘blackmailing tactics’.60
As can be imagined, the response to such avaricious demands ranged from
the righteous indignation of Edwardes, who would rather resign than see
Maze ‘bought off’ in such a way, to Foreign Office references to Maze
as a man who ‘had his price’. This incident was significant in blackening
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was simply not the right person to be IG. The accuracy of Maze’s comments
is unclear; a passing remark could easily have been seized upon, out of
context, to discredit the less-favoured candidate, but conversely Maze
would not have been the first to seek compensation for laying aside his
claims. This may indeed have been the case, but Maze subsequently argued
he was misrepresented.61 Lampson was among many at the Foreign Office
who seized on Maze’s comments to Barton as further evidence of his
unsuitability for IG.
In a bid to create a rapport with the Nationalists, Edwardes journeyed
to Shanghai in mid-1928. Negotiations were arduous, with Edwardes being
forced to bluff Song and his government into action – threatening to leave
Shanghai and not return for further discussions until the Nationalists 
recognized him as head of the CMCS.62 Edwardes’ appointment and recog-
nition as Officiating IG by Nanjing in October 1928 was a hard-earned
concession, the basis of which had at times appeared quite shaky. The
NCDN devoted an editorial to ‘The Customs’, the tone of which was jubi-
lant when Edwardes had been chosen as chief of the Service. In the editorial
the NCDN declared that the widespread concern over the deterioration of
the Service could cease as Edwardes would serve with ‘loyalty, resolution
and honesty of purpose’.63 This appointment, paradoxically, was a hollow
victory for Edwardes. Conditions had been attached to his recognition that
essentially rendered his position no longer tenable; Edwardes had agreed
that the Ministry of Finance alone could appoint Commissioners, albeit
with his recommendation. More importantly his hands were tied as regards
his rival, Maze.
While Edwardes’ appointment as Officiating IG appeared to have
equipped him with necessary authority over the Service, the position was
a superficial one. Thus he did not have the authority necessary to once and
for all eliminate his rival, Maze. Moreover, as a condition of his appoint-
ment, Edwardes was specifically prevented from taking retaliatory action
and punishing Maze.64 As a further blow to Lampson and Edwardes’
efforts, Maze was appointed the substantive post of Deputy IG. This was
interpreted by the NCDN as an obvious compromise;65 it fuelled press
speculation that Edwardes might indeed resign his post. Lampson, who
was predictably perturbed by events, suggested a solution that Maze could
be sent home on leave.66 Edwardes supported this idea and without further
consultation with Lampson acted on this.
Edwardes tested the extent of his power as Officiating IG by attempting
to remove Maze. In what can only be considered an ill-judged action, 
he sent a telegram to Song, which, if agreed to, would have removed 
Maze from the Service. According to Lampson’s diary entries, this move
was precipitated by Shanghai Chinese bankers’ expressions of outrage 
on Edwardes behalf, imploring him to return to Shanghai to defend him-
self.67 Edwardes, no doubt buoyed by such promises of support, wasted
little time in telegraphing Song and enquiring:
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Will I, in capacity of Officiating Inspector-General of Customs, have
your authority to instruct Mr. Maze to proceed on a year’s leave imme-
diately with the rank of Deputy Inspector-General of Customs, with
retirement at the end of such leave?68
By sending this telegram Edwardes forced Nanjing to define the bound-
aries of his power as Officiating IG. This action marked the climax of the
succession struggle that had been waged for the past year.
The British Foreign Office response to this telegram was one of strategic
distancing; the pending question of tariffs was considered too important
to be jeopardized or eclipsed by the rash actions of Edwardes in the struggle
for leadership of the CMCS.69 For Lampson, Edwardes had not only dealt
him a blow through sending the telegram but had also failed to consult
him beforehand. He maintained that Edwardes had not only behaved badly
but had committed a blunder that Lampson feared he was unable to
rectify.70 The lack of discernment on Edwardes’ part cast a poor reflection
on Lampson as he had invested so much in nurturing this candidate.
In accepting his posting as Officiating IG, Edwardes was confronted with
the issue of removing the Inspectorate to Nanjing. Displaying his depend-
ency on Lampson, Edwardes referred this to his attention. The NCDN
reported Edwardes as ‘taking the Powers’ opinions on the question’, and
as the powers were not favourably inclined, Edwardes proposed to remain
in Beijing.71 For the foreign communities such inaction on Edwardes’ part
would have been a reassuring sign that he would not simply acquiesce 
to the Nationalists’ demands. For the Chinese this would have further
strengthened their objections to him. In the Customs circulars Edwardes
informed the Service that, as no suitable space could be found at Nanjing,
the Inspectorate would open a temporary headquarters in Shanghai.72 This
exacerbated the already existing rivalry with Maze and led Edwardes to
protest over the dual administration that he believed was occurring.
The GMD’s bid for revision of the pre-existing tariff system drew the
Foreign Office’s attention away from the Customs struggle. The Sino-US
Agreement (26 July 1928) afforded China tariff autonomy on 1 January
1929, conditional on ‘most favoured nation’ treatment and the consent of
the other powers. In his study of British policy in China at this time, histo-
rian Fung asserts that this action, while not conceding much to the Chinese,
implied de jure recognition of the Nationalists and their Government. This
therefore accelerated negotiations with Britain with the result that the
Anglo-Chinese Tariff Agreement was signed on 20 December. According
to Fung this had twofold significance. It cleared the way for better GMD
and Foreign Office interaction and also eased the way for filling the IG’s
position.73 In this contention Fung raises a significant factor that had served
as a foil throughout the succession crisis: the GMD’s desire to establish
better terms with the British. Under this light Lampson’s pressure to keep
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that could be used. Furthermore, it was not long after the Anglo-Chinese
Agreement that the succession crisis reached its climax and Edwardes
submitted his resignation. In following this line of argument, Edwardes’
initial successes were reliant on the desire of the Nationalists to see a
review of the offending ‘unequal treaties’. Moreover, his demise, despite
Lampson’s continued efforts, was due in part to the British Foreign Office’s
reluctance to jeopardize these negotiations.
Edwardes’ resignation on 31 December 1928 was the culmination of an
increasingly bitter impasse, which had held the Customs in its grip. The
NCDN presented Edwardes as a victim of scheming Chinese factions that
had deliberately sought to transform the Service into a political entity 
and, in doing so, secure their own financial interests. The partisanship of
the NCDN was apparent throughout the succession crisis. An editorial
commented, ‘reflection does nothing to dispel the ugly impression caused
by Mr Edwardes’ resignation’, effectively setting the tone for an article
lamenting the downfall of a man of integrity.74 The appointment of a
successor was written of in sketchy terms but a clear warning was held
for Maze. The article stated that a new IG should not have his powers
diminished in any way and that he should have ‘the ability to enforce
discipline, if he cannot count on loyalty’.75 It was with veiled barbs such
as this that Maze faced his appointment as IG of the CMCS. While the
succession crisis may have ended, it left a bitter taste for many that would
cause tensions lasting well into Maze’s leadership.
From the outset many readers of this incident may seek to write it off
as mere rivalry within the CMCS institution and in doing so fail to recog-
nize the significance of this crisis to the Customs. The struggle that ensued
over the appointment of the new IG affected the Service’s relationship 
with both the GMD and the West. Researchers may be tempted to ask: 
was there a crisis? Wouldn’t the appointment of a Chinese to the IG’s pos-
ition have been a ‘real’ crisis for the Service? These questions are some-
what misleading as, while the appointment of a Chinese to the leadership
of the Service would indeed have caused a crisis, neither the northern 
militarists nor the GMD leadership were prepared to antagonize the 
foreign powers by doing so. The Service was a lucrative source of income
for the Nanjing Government and such upheaval might have marked the col-
lapse of the Service and, therefore, of Chinese financial security. Had the 
northern leaders and the GMD leaders attempted to move control of the
Customs into Chinese hands, there was a great possibility of disrupting this
revenue source and antagonizing the foreign powers at the same time. The
crisis that emerged after Aglen’s dismissal did not stem from the Chinese
attempting to take control of the CMCS but rather from their support of a
candidate who had not received foreign (and therefore ‘official’ sanction).
The GMD’s support for Maze against the foreign-selected Edwardes is evi-
dence that the Nationalist leaders were attempting to assert more control.
Maze had not been nominated by the British Minister and was considered
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too pro-GMD for the liking of the diplomatic body and yet had enough
backing to displace Aglen’s successor, Edwardes. The bitterness of this
struggle and the resultant ostracizing of Maze by Shanghai’s foreign com-
munity further highlighted the importance of this succession to foreign 
interests in China, or at least to the perceived interests the foreign powers
held.
Although he expressed uncertainty with regard to the suitability of
Edwardes, Lampson decided to support Aglen’s nominated successor to
the best of his ability. On several occasions when Edwardes’ injudicious
actions threatened to undo all good work done on his behalf, Lampson
reflected that maybe he had not supported the most suitable candidate. He
commented, ‘throughout this business I confess I have never been entirely
at ease in my own mind that Edwardes is entirely the right man for the
job’.76 The main reason why Lampson was prepared to apply pressure as
necessary to support Edwardes was that of the whole thing being a matter
of principle. Aglen had nominated Edwardes to the post and, regardless
of the changing forces in the political climate, Edwardes was justified in
his claim to become IG. For Lampson there were personal considera-
tions at stake. Maze had shown himself as a ‘man who has his price’77
and therefore Edwardes, who knew how to play the game, was a much
more suitable contender for the post. For Lampson there was also the prin-
ciple of standing up for his beliefs – he had pledged his support to Edwardes
but was repeatedly frustrated by his increasing pessimism and also the
Foreign Office’s distancing itself from the situation. As Lampson wrote:
‘I have been placed in a thoroughly ridiculous and degrading position.’78
Not only did Edwardes’ failure to hold a substantive appointment reflect
on Lampson’s authority in China, it also threatened the severing of the
ties between the British Foreign Office and the Inspectorate, ties which
Edwardes’ relationship with Lampson had exemplified. While the succes-
sion crisis may at the outset have appeared as a proverbial storm in a
teacup, its ramifications were extensive and it marked the Foreign Office’s
conscious distancing from the Service.
An IG scorned: Frederick Maze
I would like to emphasise that if Mr Edwardes goes it will be quite
impossible for me to work with Mr Maze. I regard him as thoroughly
dishonest and dishonourable and as having at the time of greatest need
sacrificed [the] customs service to secure his own private interest.
Miles Lampson79
Edwardes’ resignation cleared the way for Maze. The tensions that had
surfaced between Maze and the British establishment in China during the
succession crisis threatened to continue. In doing so they created a definite
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service. For Maze, his success in becoming IG had been earned at a price.
His ambition, coupled with the GMD’s determination, left him a social
pariah in Shanghai. Maze was further marred by a campaign carried on
by the treaty port press. This campaign maligned him subtly (and some-
times none too subtly), associating him with opportunistic and downright
anti-British behaviour. The early years of Maze’s leadership saw unprece-
dented change in the Service, the benefits of such in prolonging the fate
of the institution, only grudgingly acknowledged by the British.
Maze was fully aware of the opposition or, at the least, resentment he faced
when first assuming office. By the time of Edwardes’ resignation, many
(including Lampson) had begun to question the suitability of one so readily
inclined to abandon his candidature and lacking in discretion.80 Despite this
Maze was not accepted as even a possible alternative, his machinations
earning him British disgust. When a desperate search for a third candidate
proved too late, it was accepted with regret that Maze should take the post
unopposed. He was aware of the reluctance of the British Foreign Office to
support what they saw as a further loss of their prestige in Chinese affairs.
Maze, through Non-Resident Secretary (NRS) Stephenson, sent a message
to Chamberlain demanding British support for his position. He deliberately
circumvented communications with the Ministry in Beijing, no doubt con-
scious of his poor relationship with Lampson over the succession. By going
straight over the Minister’s head, Maze placed him in the embarrassing posi-
tion of simply having to find out what was happening through sources at
home. Maze telegraphed Chamberlain:
Post of Inspector General is now one of unprecedented difficulty, and
if British Legation persists in antagonistic and unsympathetic attitude,
this difficulty will be needlessly accentuated and position jeopard-
ised. Furthermore, a dangerous atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust
inimical to British financial interests secured on the customs may 
be engendered unless I receive reasonable support from British
Government. – (Signed) MAZE81
Chamberlain gave this demand a cold reception, as he in fact sympathized
with the difficult position Lampson faced. Nevertheless Chamberlain
instructed Lampson to accord Maze the support and courtesies due to his
position in the interests of good relations with the Chinese and, more
importantly, for the survival of the Service. Clearly, the preceding months
had engendered much bitterness. It is noteworthy that Chamberlain wrote
of supporting Maze as giving him ‘his official countenance’;82 both the
Foreign Office and Lampson were forced to make the best of what they
considered a bad situation.
Throughout the Customs succession, the issue of the partisanship of the
candidates to either British or GMD interests was continually raised.
Unsurprisingly the loyalty, or rather protectionist tendencies, towards the
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British and other foreign interests in China displayed by Edwardes were
much better regarded than the manipulative and pro-GMD tendencies of
Maze. Both during and after the struggle for the IG’s post, the Western
press in Shanghai and beyond China often drew and redrew the connections
between Maze and the GMD. In an article by The Times that announced
the appointment of Maze to IG, mention was made of his early relation-
ship with Sun Yatsen. The article from the paper’s Shanghai correspondent
reads:
On the occasion of Sun Yat-sen’s triumphant return to Canton after
the revolution had been effected its leader was entertained at a garden
party given by Mr Maze at the residence of the Commissioner of
Customs, which stands at the far end of Shameen.83
A link with the Nationalists’ revered leader, Sun, appears to have little to
do with Maze’s appointment to IG of the CMCS and yet, the correspondent
felt it was noteworthy. Such detail may appear rather trivial but it is con-
ceivable that this was deliberately included as a further reflection of Maze
having long-held nationalist sympathies.
The ceremony that marked Maze’s appointment to office attracted further
criticism. As part of this official event Maze took an oath of office in which
he committed to serve the Chinese people but also declared loyalty to the
GMD and the Nanjing Government.84 The NCDN wrote of this as a ‘humil-
iating’ and more significantly ‘demeaning’ oath, and declared that it ran
directly counter to his ‘duty as a British subject’.85 The main objection,
the press felt, was not in Maze having made such an oath, but that he had
specifically sworn his obedience to the GMD. The article continued:
the pointed dragging in of the Kuomintang as the special object of
allegiance and arbiter of punishment, which is but one party in the
state, and, for all anybody can say, may have blown to pieces a year
hence, leaves a very unpleasant taste, intensifying the fear that the
Customs service has become a mere political plaything.86
Maze’s actions were interpreted as a confirmation of his pro-Chinese
tendencies. Furthermore Maze had made it clear through this oath that his
loyalties rested with the GMD. The Foreign Office also noted Maze’s oath
but Lampson made no discussion of it.87
Maze’s appointment had not only political but also social repercussions.
Following his appointment, Shanghai’s foreign community shunned Maze
and his wife. Lampson referred to the manner in which the foreign
community ostracized the Mazes, and in one instance appears to have
tacitly encouraged it. When visited in November 1929 by Malcolm
MacDonald, the son of the British Prime Minister, and learning that he
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this. He gave MacDonald a description of the feeling against Maze that
still existed in Shanghai. Lampson revealed his bitterness, writing:
I was careful to point out that I did not wish him [MacDonald] to
think that I had any bias against Maze personally. The Maze–Edwardes
question had been most unpleasant; but that was past and done with,
I hoped. But unfortunately the Shanghai community had taken it very
much to heart, and had more or less banned Maze. For myself, I thought
that it was unfortunate; for, after all, Maze was the head of a great
institution backed by British tradition; and although people might not
wish to take Maze to their bosom and might have their own personal
views about the whole question, nonetheless I thought they were wrong
to ban him openly.88
Lampson helped to arrange other accommodation for MacDonald with
McNaughton, the Vice Chairman of the Municipal Council. He saw that
this host would be ‘as good a person as anyone to keep him [MacDonald]
on the right rails’.89 Lampson had ensured that Maze’s offer was declined
and had made it clear that his own feelings were in accordance with the
Shanghai community’s. Maze was aware of Lampson’s disdain and
described himself as having been ‘systematically ignored’ by Lampson and
the Consul General. In light of these experiences he attributed the diffi-
culties of meeting with MacDonald privately as being a result Lampson’s
machinations.90
The Maze administration’s first year
The rhetoric with which Maze was ushered into office was one of the need
for change. To Lampson and the Foreign Office, this was interpreted as
an inevitable decline of the Service. In a responding speech to the Master
of Ceremonies at his appointment to office, Maze spoke of the need for
the Customs to change in accordance with the times. These comments were
criticized by the NCDN, which declared that Maze was wrong in his asser-
tions. An editorial on ‘The Customs’ demanded that the Service should
remain ‘solid and inviolable, proof against capricious manipulations of the
irresponsible and self-seeking’.91 Despite such portents of doom for 
the Service, the early years of Maze’s administration successfully brought
the institution into a better understanding with the GMD and, in doing so,
ensured its survival. This survival, however, was earned at the price of
weakening British contacts with the Inspectorate.
The maintenance of the IG’s headquarters in Shanghai and the later
establishment of a headquarters in Nanjing on 1 February 1929 was a
significant gesture to GMD interests on Maze’s part.92 This move not only
allowed Maze to assert his leadership over the Service, but it was a means
of demonstrating good faith to the Nanjing Government. It also coincided
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with the declaration of tariff autonomy. Maze’s move was a symbolic shift
away from the traditional CMCS base of Beijing into a new setting; a
reflection of his desire for the service to echo the GMD’s move away from
the past centre of administration and power. The real basis of Customs
administration however, remained in Shanghai. The new head office was
intended to act as a liaison office between the Inspectorate in Shanghai
and the Nationalist Government until it was possible to combine the two.93
While Nanjing may have been named the head office, correspondence was
directed to Shanghai.94
In Shanghai the local GMD headquarters chose to celebrate the declar-
ation of Customs autonomy. On 1 February 1929 a celebratory meeting
would be held. Furthermore the Nanjing Government would be petitioned
to declare the day ‘Customs Autonomy Day’.95 The NCDN presented the
new tariff agreement as undeniable proof of the sincerity of the Western
powers’ dealings with the Nationalists. In an editorial entitled ‘The New
Tariff’ the breakthrough for China was presented as evidence of the foreign
powers’ friendly desire to accommodate Chinese wishes.96 Despite this
confidence in the new agreement, the article foretells potential difficulties
the tariffs may cause to the Customs as the new system of classification
was regarded as too complicated.
The sinicization of the CMCS was a delicate issue that had long played
on the prejudices and fears of foreign interests in this institution. In April
1929 this issue surfaced again. Maze agreed with Chinese desires to see
greater opportunities for their nationals within the Service on the whole.
He explained to the Foreign Office (via the NRS in London) that he had
long recommended that Chinese be given access to posts of greater 
responsibility and that this principle had received official recognition. In
fact he claimed that, as early as April 1928, the Nanjing Government 
had contacted him about the status of Chinese employees.97 He was quick
to reassure the Foreign Office though, that despite these moves, the
Government to his knowledge had no intention of removing all foreigners
from the Service.
To further emphasize that the foreign element of the CMCS was not
under threat, Maze removed previous blocks on employing foreign staff.
From 24 February 1927 Edwardes had suspended the further recruitment
of foreigners. This was largely in response to the anxiety following Aglen’s
dismissal and concern that the Service should confine its expenditure.
Edwardes reasoned that not appointing any foreigners was a precautionary
measure and would remain in place until the uncertainty surrounding 
the Service was brought to a resolution.98 As evidence of his rapport 
with the GMD and his negotiation skills, Maze had this restriction lifted
and foreign tidewaiters were employed. In a circular sent to all ports Maze
sought to dispel concerns over the direction of the Service.99 In doing so
the improving status of Chinese employees was referred to in terms of
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As a further part of this sinicization of the Service, Chinese employees
were also given study scholarship opportunities.100 These competitive
scholarships, offered biannually, were designed to give successful candi-
dates an opportunity to study international customs systems firsthand. The
feared expulsion of foreigners from the CMCS did not eventuate but the
balance of Sino-Western relations inside the Service began to change.
Despite the understandably pessimistic view of Maze’s leadership taken
by Lampson, even he was forced to admit the imagined disasters facing
the Service had never materialized. As Aitchison elucidates, Maze’s critics
and the press seized on his appointment with the assumption that he would
head a deteriorating institution;101 the deft abilities of Maze, however, did
not allow such an eventuality. The Maze administration’s first year had
proved its harshest critics wrong. The Service did not collapse but rather
enjoyed an unprecedented relationship with the GMD that would not have
been imagined possible under Aglen or Edwardes. This success in directing
the CMCS in its relationship with the GMD was regarded with both relief
and, in some instances, grudging admiration. Lampson reflected:
there is a general feeling of relief, both inside and outside the Service,
at the restoration of its internal harmony and the comparative smooth-
ness with which the new regime is operating, as well as a general
recognition of the ability, tact and success with which Mr Maze has
directed the affairs of the Customs administration.102
Such commendations were echoed in Foreign Office reports. Moreover
Lampson admitted that the Service was in a better state than one could
have ‘dared to hope’ even a year previous.103 For Maze this respect for
his leadership was a hard-won concession but tensions still remained.
Concessions to GMD interests may have indeed been necessary in the
changing political climate but Maze’s behaviour had caused a rift between
the IG and the British establishment in China.
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5 Charting a new course
The proposed Hong Kong–China
Trade and Customs Agreement,
1929–30
It must be considered that we now live and have our being in post-Revolution,
post-War and post-‘30th May’ days; but Aglen put the telescope to his blind
eye, failed to read the writing on the wall, or, having read, to interpret
correctly its stupendous import. The gathering storm – hurricane, I ought to
say – was ahead and he should have altered his course and stood for safer
seas. But, no, he held stubbornly on, lost some of his sticks, and it fell to
me, at the eleventh hour, to assume command and put the ship about in order
to avoid total loss.
Frederick Maze1
Maze’s leadership of the Customs Service was tempered with pragmatism.
During the succession crisis and its aftermath, he had no illusions that he
was indispensable. Rather he continually sought to reaffirm the usefulness
of the CMCS and its foreign inspectorate to Nationalist China. In many
letters during 1930 Maze constantly drew on maritime analogies to describe
how he perceived his role as Inspector General (IG) and the future for 
the foreign staff of the CMCS. The reviving of negotiations with Hong
Kong authorities in 1930 surrounding a proposed agreement over the rights
of the Customs to operate within the colony’s waters was a significant 
event in the early years of Maze’s administration. This chapter examines
the significance of these negotiations, not just between Hong Kong and the
Nationalists but also for Maze’s leadership of the Service. For Maze 
the negotiations would serve several purposes: to secure and strengthen his
position at the helm of the CMCS; to steer the Service towards safer, calmer
waters; and, in doing so, to increase the usefulness of the CMCS to the
Nationalists. Maze’s involvement in these negotiations signalled a new era
for the Service as he had moved away from the semi-independent stance
adhered to by Aglen and instead actively pursued GMD interests. The nego-
tiations between the Hong Kong authorities and the CMCS, on behalf of
the Nationalists, however, were soon swamped by the rhetoric of self-
interest from both parties and the agreement never developed beyond














































colony’s waters and, therefore, revenue that had been previously lost. For
Hong Kong’s authorities, the proposed agreement caused a questioning of
the colony’s legal status. The agreement would give Hong Kong the bene-
fits of being a treaty port but would simultaneously infringe on its autonomy
from Mainland China. Clearly both parties wanted the proposals to be deter-
mined in their favour.
Significant challenges mark Maze’s first years of leadership as particu-
larly crucial in determining the future direction and, indeed, existence of
the CMCS. In the discussion of the proposed Hong Kong Agreement, Maze
was attempting to find some reconciliation to their often-strained relation-
ship with Hong Kong concerning smuggling in particular. The freedom of
Hong Kong waters had allowed piracy and smuggling to flourish, a bane
for the CMCS, which prided itself on regulating foreign trade with China.
The negotiations with Hong Kong, however, raised suspicions on either
side, as the British, fearing a subtle attack against their hold on the colony
and the New Territories, were not prepared to make any concessions
without corresponding allowances for British trade on the inland river
systems of China. The Customs Service and GMD in turn did not want to
weaken their own positions by setting dangerous precedents for British
traders’ penetration beyond the scope of Customs-monitored areas. While
negotiations travelled back and forth, between the colonial authorities and
Maze, China lobby and business groups, both within and outside China,
saw fit to lend their voices to an increasingly confused debate.
This chapter highlights the ambivalence of the CMCS in its relations in
China and more so with Hong Kong. The Service was synonymous with
foreign interference in Chinese affairs. Yet when it entered into negotiations
with the Hong Kong authorities regarding the patrolling of the waters, the
Service was perceived as a threat to the British colony. The idea of the
Customs as a potential threat to British interests in the East in general
appears to have gained some currency as even Lampson reflected on
the CMCS as being used to reclaim the New Territories. In this sense the
Service was a force that offered China a chance to consolidate its interests.
An ‘irreconcilable relationship’
The basis of the relationship between Hong Kong and the Customs was
primarily through the CMCS’s role as a watchdog of the China coast, regu-
lating trade and collecting revenues. Since Hong Kong was a major entrepot
for foreign trade, it often came to the attention of the Chinese Customs.
The relationship between the two has commonly been presented as ‘irre-
concilable’; China’s desire to protect her revenue through the agency of
the CMCS directly countered Hong Kong’s desire to be rid of the Service
with their depots and cruisers.2 Such assertions are borne out by the fact
that the Hong Kong–CMCS issue was the focus of intermittent and tense
negotiations for over a 70-year period. Invariably these negotiations
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foundered on the intractability of each party’s interests. Despite such a
history of unsuccessful negotiations, discussions were revived in 1930. The
motivation for the GMD’s willingness to re-examine the proposed agree-
ment was their declaration of tariff autonomy (1929), in which greater
revenues were at stake. For the Nationalists the implementation of new
tariffs had effectively provided the potential for increased Customs
revenue. Losses of revenue through smuggling from Hong Kong were
therefore increasingly significant.
Hong Kong’s waters and the leased territories’ inland river systems had
long provided a refuge for pirates.3 Even during the 1920s and 1930s piracy
was a common threat to ships passing through Hong Kong and on to the
south-east or to mainland ports. Reports of passengers being robbed or
taken hostage and commercial ships being plundered were not uncommon.4
No ship was safe from attack. Piracy became so much of a problem that,
in November 1928, the Hong Kong and Shanghai authorities dispatched
troops to travel on British vessels hoping to encourage any pirate elements
to think twice before attacking the ship.5 The CYB for 1926 and 1927
devoted a section to piracy and military interference with shipping. It
outlined the details of the Meiren, Dongzhou and Jade piracies among
others.6 Woodhead, the editor of the CYB, was one of the ill-fated passen-
gers on board the Dongzhou during the attack. The captain was shot and
wounded by the pirates who then threatened the passengers. The report
wrote of the pirates, ‘they insisted upon a course far out from land and
evinced murderous intentions every time another steamer hove in sight’.7
Fortunately no passengers were injured. The CYB for 1929–30 also listed
another nine piracies that had occurred.8
Smuggling was a large concern for the Service. Discovering hiding places
where goods may be stored was a regular activity for Customs staff. C.A.S.
Williams, a Customs Commissioner, devoted a chapter in his memoirs to
the ‘Art of Smuggling’.9 He gives a vivid description of smugglers encount-
ered in the course of a career in the Service. Goods could be concealed in
the vessel, on the person, in luggage or in boxes, and in baskets with false
bottoms. Williams details the strange examples of piglets being drugged
and disguised as human infants before being smuggled across borders, a
man smuggling diamonds inside his glass eye, a false bottom in a birdcage
and hollow bricks. He relates: ‘An old Chinese woman boards a steamer
at Canton with a basket containing a cat with five newly-born kittens; the
mother is very solicitous of their welfare even though they are dead and
stuffed with opium!’10 These ingenious measures were more the exception
rather than the rule. The expanse of the China coast remained a challenge
for the Service, which battled to maintain and monitor regular avenues for
trade. The introduction of China’s first National Import Tariff on 1 February
1929 provided the stimulus for the renewed vigour of widespread smug-
gling. Guangzhou and Hong Kong, by virtue of their geographical, political
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Hong Kong’s relationship with Mainland China was often underscored
with tensions. This is clearly evidenced throughout the Republic and often
broke out in conflicts – the Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycotts of 1925–6,
for example. As the Chinese sought to regulate and direct trade in the
treaty ports through the CMCS, tensions between the Hong Kong author-
ities, with their laissez-faire outlook on trade, and their Chinese counter-
parts increased. As early as 1868 the question of smuggling resulted in 
the fiscal blockade of Hong Kong.12 There were renewed negotiations 
over a proposed Customs agreement with the Colony in 1910 and 1917
also but these met with little success. For the Customs Service the free-
dom for vessels in Hong Kong’s waters had come to represent a thorn in
its side.
The CMCS had what could only be described as an ambivalent relation-
ship with the colony. Permitted to have an unofficial Customs office in
Victoria and a Customs house in Kowloon in as early as 1886, the CMCS
had agreed that the Commissioner would always remain a Briton.13 The
colony tolerated the presence of the Chinese Customs but never to the extent
that it was afforded any official capacity. The Kowloon Commissioner was
a visible but superficial concession to the Chinese. With the handing over
of the New Territories in 1899, the Service suffered a blow to its prestige
as the four stations it maintained therein were closed.14 In June 1898 
Hart stressed the need for the maintenance of these stations in a letter to
Sir C. MacDonald, as it was vital to the protection of China’s revenue.15
Hart’s suggestions were not greeted with enthusiasm and the CMCS, much
to its chagrin, was forced to establish Customs posts at the newly drawn-
up frontiers.
Hong Kong’s uneasy relationship with the Service was regularly punc-
tuated by attempts to come to some cooperative venture or, at the least,
some understanding of how the waters could be better patrolled. For the
CMCS it was a sign of their constancy in trying to serve the Chinese to
the best of their ability. The proposed Harris Agreement of 1910, named
after the Kowloon Customs Commissioner, sought principally to address
salt smuggling by allowing the Customs to function more freely in the
Colony. The Hong Kong Government sought to use the proposed agree-
ment as a lever for better negotiation of the Guangzhou–Kowloon Railway
Working Agreement. Predictably negotiations surrounding the Harris
Agreement were dropped once the Guangzhou–Kowloon Agreement was
successfully concluded.16 In 1916 the basic premise of the Harris Agree-
ment was again revived. Hong Kong authorities rejected it, however, as
they desired more from the agreement. Because of the detailed and local-
ized nature of the proposed Harris Agreement, representatives of the Hong
Kong Government and the CMCS carried out the negotiations. The British
Minister to China and the Government of China would sign any agree-
ment. As a result the Colonial Office lamented the scant material available
for examining the whole question.17
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The CMCS and its relationship with the Hong Kong establishment 
only receives limited attention in current academic works. Generally the 
relationship is glossed over in discussions on the development of Hong
Kong or its relations with China.18 The following section examines the
Customs agreement negotiations that took place in 1929 and 1930 between
the Hong Kong authorities and the IG. It was under the initially contro-
versial leadership of Maze that these negotiations were once again initiated.
At this time Maze instructed Stanley Wright, historian and Customs
Commissioner, who was present at the negotiations, to produce a short
work outlining the relationship between Hong Kong and the CMCS. This
work, Hong Kong and the Chinese Customs, was published as part of the
Customs’ own publication series.19 Maze’s motivation for encouraging
such a publication was to raise the profile of the negotiations and to put
forth the CMCS case from a historical perspective.20 The empathy of
Governor Cecil Clementi provided a glimmer of hope that the contentious
right to patrol the waters would be finally resolved.
Records of the Colonial Office provide a detailed account and discussion
of the negotiations that took place between the Service and the Hong Kong
Governor. The tenor of the discussions emerges with definite themes: the
problem of smuggling, the need for reciprocity with the Chinese, and also
concern over any possible changes to the Hong Kong–Chinese status quo.
The proposed agreement
Manoeuvring the CMCS through the negotiations between the Nationalists
and the Hong Kong authorities was a challenge for Maze. The negotiations
focused on the right of the CMCS to patrol the colony’s waters and in doing
so prevent smuggling to the China coast. A definition of the boundaries of
China trade was integral to negotiations but intrinsically difficult to achieve.
Dialogue between the interested parties often foundered. For Maze the 
proposed agreement marked the launching of the Customs on a course 
much more sympathetic to GMD aspirations.
The actual motivations for reviving negotiations between the Service
and Hong Kong are almost lost in the discussions that followed. In the
British Foreign Office’s Annual Report for 1929, Lampson commented
that in response to the alleged increase smuggling that had been largely
inspired by the increased tariff of 1929, the National Government deputed
the IG to proceed to Hong Kong during the summer to negotiate the agree-
ment.21 Wright, moreover, credited Maze with the initiative for not only
the trip to Hong Kong but also the customs agreement that was to be
discussed.22 On 24 June 1929 Maze had submitted a memorandum to 
the Chinese Government on the subject of smuggling and the measures 
he believed were necessary to protect revenue.23 In this document Maze
outlined that the new tariffs had not only given greater impetus to smug-
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taken by smugglers. The Kowloon and Lappa districts were listed among
those he felt needed to be specially guarded.24 Throughout the Republic
Customs launches had often engaged in preventive work, boarding and
inspecting vessels, but Maze noted that in recent times Customs launches
were experiencing increasing difficulty in gaining the cooperation of these
vessels. When approached, some vessels ignored Customs signals or, in
extreme cases, resorted to gunfire when challenged. Maze cited the case
of revenue launch Yangxing, operating from Kowloon. When approaching
threesuspicious-looking junks, this launch was fired upon without warning 
and sustained minor damage.25 By arming Customs vessels with better
equipment and allowing them to return fire when met with resistance, Maze
maintained that smuggling in the Kowloon area could be combated.
Furthermore, he believed such moves were a good preparation for the 
negotiations with Hong Kong, which he would soon be entering into.
In conjunction with the proposals regarding the development of a preven-
tive service that was agreed to in principle by the Chinese Government,
Maze arranged to enlist a Commissioner to investigate the areas where
smuggling was rife.26 This was with the intention of seeking possible
solutions to the problem. In his view the development of a better-equipped
preventive service did not hinge solely on the success of the Hong Kong–
CMCS negotiations. In a display of farsightedness, Maze intended it would
have a significant impact on smuggling regardless of the outcome of the
agreement. Before any investigations could take place, however, Maze
travelled to Hong Kong to initiate negotiations for a Customs agreement.
During the course of this visit in July 1929 Maze suggested that the
previously discarded Harris Agreement could be used as the basis for
renewing discussions. A Colonial Office report indicated that Maze had
intimated that there might be a tightening of a Chinese cordon around the
colony should no agreement be reached.27 The basic premise of the Harris
Agreement was that of permitting the CMCS to function freely within the
colony and surrounding waters to prevent smuggling. In return for such
concessions, however, the Hong Kong authorities wanted the right for ships
under the British flag to have permission to trade between Hong Kong and
non-treaty ports. Further to this Governor Clementi made it clear that, apart
from wanting inland water privileges for the colony’s steam vessels, he
wanted a clause inserted protecting Hong Kong’s coastwise trading priv-
ileges in all circumstances.28 From the outset Maze responded that any
such clause would render the proposal unfavourable to Chinese interests.
A conference was held at Government House on 19 July. The purpose
of this conference was the renewal of negotiations surrounding the
proposed agreement of 1918. Hong Kong was represented by Governor
Clementi; W.T. Southorn, Colonial Secretary; Sir Joseph Kemp, Attorney-
General; Commander G.F. Hole, Harbourmaster; and J.D. Lloyd, Super-
intendent of Imports and Exports.29 The Governor also requested the 
attendance of the British Consul in Guangzhou, G.S. Moss. China was
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represented by the Customs. C.F. Johnston, Commissioner of Customs 
at Kowloon district, and Stanley Wright, Commissioner, accompanied IG
Maze.30 The 1918 draft was discussed in detail and a small committee was
appointed to make the amendments suggested by the conference. The
conference met frequently for discussions throughout the following week.
A second conference was held on 29 July where further amendments were
made to the draft of the proposed agreement.31
After these amendments the Hong Kong representatives were satisfied
with the agreement. Maze then submitted it to the Chinese Government
for consideration.32 The most contentious article in the 1929 draft was
Article V, which related to inland shipping privileges for Hong Kong. This
clause had been present in a shorter form in both the 1910 and 1918
proposals, and both times the Chinese had been prepared to accept this
clause as part of agreement. By 1929, however, the political climate in
China had changed. Wright detailed:
China had undergone a re-birth, and the strong spirit of patriot-
ism, which was manifesting itself all over the country, was strongly
opposed to the granting of any privileges to foreigners which were
derogatory to the fact or feeling of national sovereignty.33
The Chinese maintained it was difficult for Hong Kong to demand privileges
that may soon be removed from Britain. Despite the conference’s initial
promise, it rapidly became apparent that negotiations had reached a deadlock,
with the GMD proposing to omit Article V and Hong Kong’s authorities not
wanting further negotiation unless the clause remained in place.
The Hong Kong authorities’ response to the proposed agreement was
predominated by self-interest. In their eyes the issue rested, as it had always
been, on the side of Chinese concerns. A simple granting of permission
to the Customs to patrol the colony’s waters held no tangible benefit for
Hong Kong. Therefore the Governor was motivated to seek some benefits
out of the agreement. The Colonial Office report notes:
Throughout all of these intermittent negotiations, the attitude of the
Hong Kong Government has invariably been that it is the Chinese who
are bent on concluding the agreement, while the colony is comparatively
indifferent to the main (i.e. Customs) issue. It is therefore up to Hong
Kong to secure the maximum advantages in return. . . . If the bargain is
not good enough, the Colony will drop the question one [sic] more.34
It was this rationale of optimizing their benefits that prompted British
demands for their shipping to be granted privilege to trade at non-treaty
ports in exchange for its concessions to the CMCS. The Hong Kong 
authorities considered they were in an advantageous position in these discus-
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Early negotiations were compounded by concerns over the possible ram-
ifications for Hong Kong should an agreement not be reached. This is
certainly a change from Hong Kong’s position when the Customs agree-
ment had been dropped rather unceremoniously by the authorities years
earlier in 1916. Hong Kong authorities, when faced with Nationalist China,
began to realize they were no longer in a position simply to discard nego-
tiations after obtaining what they wanted from the Chinese Government
without any reciprocity. Maze took great pains to explain his and the
CMCS’s position in the negotiations. Furthermore, he protested that he did
not want to be mistaken as threatening Hong Kong’s authorities but rather
urged them to be aware of the possible ramifications should Hong Kong
reject the agreement. He wrote:
it is idle to shut our eyes to the fact, and it should be clearly under-
stood that if the Agreement is definitely turned down, the Customs
will establish a very stringent – and for China a very expensive –
‘Preventive cordon’ round Hong Kong and the Leased Territory – not
with a view to crippling the Colony’s trade, but – merely in order to
protect as far as possible China’s Revenue.35
Maze’s tone in this letter is clearly threatening. He alluded to the CMCS’s
resolve to act against any attempts to thwart the negotiations. A preven-
tive cordon around Hong Kong would allow the Service to protect China’s
interests and, unfortunately, the colony would be hurt as a result.
Documentation of the negotiations is incomplete and often sketchy. The
Colonial Office provided an overview and discussion of interested parties
and their motivations in either supporting or opposing the agreement. The
Foreign Office papers reveal much of Lampson’s reaction to events.
Surprisingly, in the volumes of Customs documents, Documents Illustrative
of the Origin, Development and Activities of the Chinese Customs Service,
there is no mention of the Customs Agreement. In a further, most intriguing
twist, correspondence between Maze and the London Office’s (LO) Non-
Resident Secretary (NRS), Stephenson, discussed instructions that all
confidential correspondence pertaining to the agreement were to be perman-
ently removed from the Office. Stephenson reported to Maze:
With regard to the Confidential and Private Letters which you have
sent me since January 1929, these have always been kept entirely apart
from all other correspondence in a drawer specially reserved for the
purpose under lock and key together with the corresponding Confi-
dential and Private Letters from myself to you. I have now carefully
removed from this drawer every Confidential and Private Letter
received from you or sent to you and there is now in this Office no
record whatever of this correspondence [sic] . . . . Other Confidential
Telegrams from yourself – e.g. concerning the Hong Kong Agreement
108 Charting a new course, 1929–30
– in which references were made to your Confidential Letters and opin-
ions expressed with regard to ‘actions and attitudes’, and those from
myself communicating to you messages of a similar nature – telegrams
which had been entered in the Telegram Book – all of these have been
removed from the book without any mutilation or disfigurement.36
As a result of this secrecy the following exploration of the unsuccessful
negotiations is sometimes necessarily sketchy. But overall it is clear that,
despite the delicacy of these negotiations, Maze was actively pursuing
GMD interests.
The proposed agreement inevitably attracted a bevy of lobby groups both
within and outside China who were eager to weigh into the negotiations.
The Colonial Office and Maze, at varying stages, outlined these lobby
groups and their stance on the proposed agreement. In this regard the 
lobby groups must have been considered significantly vocal and therefore
their views given some attention. A brief listing of these groups is as
follows: the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and the Consul at Guangzhou,
the IG of Customs, the Hong Kong Government, Shanghai Chamber of
Commerce and the China Association. All of these groups were known 
to have interests in the development and outcome of any negotiations.37
What becomes apparent in the documents relating to this event is that not
only were the main players important, but there was a heightened aware-
ness of the lobby groups. These latter were increasingly vocal as regards
the negotiations, particularly those that focused on the territorial ‘reach’
of the CMCS.
In October 1929 Maze enlisted Commissioner Bell to investigate the
frontiers of China (particularly Kowloon and Lappa) with reference to
smuggling.38 In a Customs circular he urged all Commissioners to give
Bell their full support and he also requested that they examine their local
region and submit recommendations of preventive measures if they
believed smuggling had increased in the area.39 Between 25 February and
28 March 1930 Bell conducted a South-East China Coast Investigation
Commission.40 He embarked on the revenue steamer Bingjing and was
accompanied by Customs staff and Chinese delegates from Guangzhou and
Fuzhou.41 In the course of the investigation, at Bell’s instruction, 24 motor
vessels, 12 steam vessels and 24 seagoing junks were boarded and searched.
As a result six of the motor vessels were seized. Japanese nationals owned
five of the vessels found to be engaged in direct foreign trade to inland
waters.42 At Xiamen, Bell ordered a raid on the island of Wusu, which
was supported by a Chinese gunboat Zhujian and troops from Xiamen.43
This raid uncovered a smuggling ring, a Japanese vessel was held and
goods were confiscated from buildings.
Bell’s findings following his investigation were mixed. He believed the
Customs needed a closer working relationship with the native Customs
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laws regarding junks trading with foreign ports (Formosa in particular)
needed to be clarified, and also that motor vessels should be classified as
steamers and therefore they would need more detailed paperwork and to
carry a copy of their manifest. Bell recommended that all vessels within
12 miles of the Chinese coast or islands could be liable to be searched.
At the same time, though, he admitted that his own views had modified
as regards the extent of the smuggling blight. Bell recorded:
While the possibility of smuggling to a heavy extent exists, it is to be
doubted if it is availed of to the extent that might be supposed. For
from the profits gained by evasion of a high tariff there must always
be deducted much on account of risk of piracy while on the water and
banditry ashore.45
This was not a denial that smuggling was a problem. The ‘unending panorama
of rugged bays and well-concealed coves’ meant smuggling could never be
completely eradicated and Bell’s investigation had led him to scale down his
perceptions. In addition Bell commented that, while he thought preventive
measures were necessary, the proposed arming of harbour launches was
unwise. He believed this would invite attack and unless staff were all
extremely disciplined and well-trained it could lead to some ‘unpleasant inci-
dent’.46 This report was well received by Maze and the Government. It con-
firmed for Maze that smuggling was indeed a constant problem along the
southern coast but measures to counteract this were, however, unresolved.
Maze did not find British circles sympathetic to the CMCS attempts 
to address the smuggling problem. From the outset and as negotiations
stretched into 1930, Lampson was not won over by the supposed urgency
of the discussions. He was not convinced that the GMD really needed the
proposed agreement to be hurried along. The Minister, moreover, expressed
a suspicion that smuggling was not as urgent a concern as Maze would
have the Foreign Office believe.47 Lampson saw the Hong Kong–CMCS
agreement as hinging on two points: how far was it in British interests that
such an agreement should be concluded? And what disadvantages would
there be for Hong Kong should the CMCS be allowed to function?48 In
line with this advice from their man in China, the Foreign Office viewed
the need for an agreement as being more an exercise in good relations with
the Chinese Government than to really provide any benefits to Hong Kong.
There is no evidence that Bell’s report was made available to the Office.
The Foreign Office approach to the proposed agreement attempted to
take into account the wider significance of negotiations. The Foreign Office
perceived Hong Kong’s authorities as having a narrow view of the proposal
and therefore missing the fact that reaching an agreement would be bene-
ficial to all British interests and relations with Nationalist China. It would
be responsible for ‘removing a legitimate source of grievance as regards
smuggling, and strengthening the value to China of the foreign staffed
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Customs administration’.49 The Foreign Office also maintained that a
successful conclusion would bolster the foreign inspectorate of the
Customs. Significantly the potential loss of face to the Customs should
negotiations fail received no mention elsewhere. Maze’s leadership had
not heralded the demise of the foreign Inspectorate of the Customs as
feared by Lampson and the Foreign Office. Indeed the Service appeared
to have been strengthened in its relationship with the GMD. It appeared,
therefore, that the Foreign Office believed that precipitate action in
suspending discussions should be avoided in the interests of the Service.
As discussed previously the most contentious aspect of the proposed
agreement was that which granted British shipping special privileges.
Under Articles V and VI, ships and junks trading under the British flag
would be permitted to trade at all non-treaty port locations along the China
coast. As a proviso for inland trading rights, these ships had to register
with the Customs before being permitted to trade. In response to this
contentious demand, the Chinese offered a compromise that inland trading
rights would be granted to vessels that were prepared to trade under the
Chinese flag. Unprepared to run the risks of trading under a Chinese flag,
Hong Kong authorities reduced their claims to limiting British ships to the
coasts of Guangdong and Guangxi. They saw the rights of inland naviga-
tion to the Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as an essential element to
the success of the agreement.50 Furthermore they requested that privileged
factory treatment be granted to Hong Kong manufactures. Maze’s thoughts
on the contentious articles were much more pragmatic. As Hong Kong
steamers at the time had no rights to the inland waters, he then reasoned
that omitting Article V from the agreement would be no loss for the author-
ities; they could not lose a right that they never had.51
Sir Cecil Clementi, regarded as sympathetic to the CMCS, gave his
farewell address to the colony in January 1930 and was replaced as
Governor by Sir William Peel in May 1930.52 An NCDN article detailed
the ‘important problems’ that Peel was already attempting to address: the
trade slump due to a decline of the silver dollar, concerns over tax increases
and possible constitutional reform.53 There was no mention of the new
Governor turning his attention to the ongoing Hong Kong–China Trade
and Customs Agreement negotiations. In a secret telegram from Peel to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, it is apparent that Peel was not
only well aware of the ongoing negotiations but that he was inclined to
be dismissive. After reading through the files and in consultation with his
advisers, Peel declared:
I find myself entirely opposed to the suggested agreement. I consider
it to be most undesirable to allow China to operate a preventive service
in the waters of the Colony. I strongly recommend that as conditions
set out by us in draft agreement are unacceptable to Chinese Govern-
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Peel’s denunciation of the proposed agreement has been cited by Wesley-
Smith in Unequal Treaty as the main reason for the ultimate failure of the
negotiations.55 This is not, however, an accurate understanding of Peel’s
role in events. Negotiations were suspended by mid-1930 as a result of
internal unrest in China and Peel’s reluctance to leave the agreement as it
stood. This did not mark the end of discussions and by October Maze and
Peel were able to devise a much more mutually agreeable proposal. When
the Customs Agreement issue was raised again in 1935 (with a similarly
unsuccessful outcome), Maze wrote of Peel’s retirement with regret. He
believed the Governor had been an ‘invaluable support’.56 Clearly, then,
Peel was not the main stumbling block in the discussions.
Negotiations around the proposed agreement had already become
contentious by the time Peel arrived as the new Governor. Lampson
expressed his suspicion towards granting any leverage to the ‘Chinese irre-
dentists’, whom he believed would utilize such concessions in campaigning
for the return of Hong Kong to Chinese control. In a discussion with
Swire57 and Teichman,58 Lampson revealed something of the confusion
that had rapidly surrounded the agreement:
As regard the Hong Kong Customs Agreement, I told him that, like
other people who had anything to do with the wretched question, 
I had quite frankly wobbled in my opinions. . . . I might be over-
suspicious, but I felt instinctively that we should be very chary to
agreeing to anything which would give a handle to Chinese irreden-
tists in the campaign which I felt certain would increase as time went
on for the handing back to China of the Colony of Hong Kong – a
matter on which I trusted we should always firmly dig our toes in.59
For Lampson one of the overriding concerns was trying to balance inter-
ests. In doing so he thought it was preferable to create some type of
preventive service without compromising the position of Hong Kong as a
British colony. In the same entry Lampson referred to Governor Peel as
being ‘genuinely anxious’ to resolve the question.
As negotiations came to a standstill, the NCDN sought to keep the issue
in the public eye. The significance of the proposed agreement, according
to a May editorial, was that these negotiations were anything but local-
ized.60 Possibly in a bid to ascertain Peel’s stance on the Customs issue,
the NCDN presented the pending agreement as a concern for all foreign
shipping in China. The China Association61 received criticism for seeing
‘no harm’ in the agreement, this error in judgement being attributed to the
Association receiving guidance from Sir Francis Aglen. The editorial ques-
tioned Aglen’s ability as an adviser commenting, ‘without disrespect, it is
scarcely possible for him to consider this issue from any but the Customs
point of view’.62 This provocative editorial declared that the proposed
agreement would not only affect all foreign shipping at the treaty ports
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but would have moved towards ‘an eventual demand for the surrender of
Hong Kong’. The implication of such comments was that the Service was
perceived as a lever for the Nationalists to achieve their territorial ambi-
tions. The CMCS was taking on a new role as an instrument through which
the Nationalist government could battle against the foreign powers.
The negotiations surrounding the proposed agreement were immeasur-
ably complicated by internal unrest in China. The Nationalists, while
ostensibly leading a united China, were beset with internal dissension,
primarily in the form of warlords who had accepted GMD leadership in
the face of the Northern Expedition but did not intend to allow any decline
of their own power. Warlords Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan formed a
northern alliance against Jiang Jieshi and in June moved in open challenge
to the GMD. Such challenges to both the GMD and to the Customs resulted
in the suspension of further work on the agreement.
By late September, with the political and CMCS situations in the north
returned to GMD control, negotiations were once again initiated between
Hong Kong and the Customs. In a letter to NRS Stephenson, Maze detailed
that, through Lampson, he had learnt that Hong Kong was in general agree-
ment with revised proposals. After further redrafting, Maze commented
that Lampson’s ‘views on the subject now harmonise with mine’.63 Copies
of the draft were issued informally to the Foreign Office, the Colonial
Office and the Chinese Minister in London.64
In October 1930 Maze journeyed to Hong Kong to continue discussions
with the Hong Kong authorities. The NCDN reported the IG’s impending
travel and that it was understood that he would seek to create a satisfac-
tory arrangement that would bring an end to smuggling in the South. This,
in turn, would therefore mean greater revenues for Guangzhou.65 In
response to this journey Maze alerted NRS Stephenson that his services
might once again be needed in the East. Maze predicted that Stephenson
would be installed as Commissioner at Kowloon since the agreement 
had good probability of being accepted. The Kowloon post, in Maze’s
estimation, needed skilful administration as it promised to be one of
‘considerable delicacy and importance’.66 Maze’s journey ended in success,
which he celebrated in a note to Sir Newton Stabb:
Peel and I have arrived at a complete understanding concerning the
proposed Hong Kong Agreement and I understand that the Nanking
Authorities are also prepared to accept my final recommendations in
this connection. I trust, therefore that there will be no more hitches
and that this tedious and troublesome question will be settled satis-
factorily once and for all.67
This was a personal success for Maze. His guidance of the Service was
further confirmed as the right kind of leadership. Moreover, he viewed the
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By 31 October Maze and Peel had reached a satisfactory settlement over
the proposed agreement.69 The final test was its being found acceptable to
both the Nanjing and British governments. The agreement’s final form
avoided the controversial demands for an exchange of mutual concessions
and instead focused on cooperation. Lampson, who, as early as June, 
had formed the opinion that the agreement as it stood would never be
agreed upon, had predicted such a shift away from earlier versions of this 
document. He recognized that the atmosphere surrounding the discussions
had become embittered and believed that the only chance of success 
would be to drop the agreement as it had stood and to concentrate on a
preventive service alone.70 Lampson also shared Maze’s optimism for 
a successful conclusion and anticipated that the revised proposal of the
agreement would remove longstanding grievances between the Chinese
and the colony.71
The final draft of the proposed agreement (6 November 1930) was both
a compromise and reduction of the original demands of the interested
parties.72 This agreement focused primarily on preventive measures and
the contentious articles granting privileges to vessels under the British flag
were removed. Articles I through V addressed the status and conditions
for Customs staff directed to Hong Kong. Essentially Customs staff would
be treated as seconded employees and would operate under instruction
from the Hong Kong Superintendent for Imports and Exports. Articles VI
through XI dealt with the categories of vessels and their obligations to
present a manifest of cargo and to pay the relevant duties to the Customs
authorities when necessary. Article XII focused on salt, its importation,
exportation and production. A permit for salt exportation had to be obtained
from the Salt Department and then countersigned by the Commissioner of
Customs. Article XIII forbade any person in Hong Kong to have dynamite
or explosives; such substances could not be stored without a permit.
Possibly this article was an attempt to stop smuggling of arms and also 
to discourage piracy. Article XIV allowed the Customs Commissioner to
maintain an office in Victoria but no substations elsewhere (basically the
situation remained unchanged from Hart’s era).
Articles XV, XVI and XVIII are most significant in shaping the nature
of the agreement. The limitations of the draft become apparent as these
Articles set the parameters for CMCS involvement in Hong Kong. Article
XV essentially defined the limit of the Customs’ preventive service to
Chinese waters only:
Except in special cases where, after consultation between the Com-
missioner of Chinese Customs and the Superintendent of Imports 
and Exports, joint operation are decided upon, revenue vessels of 
the Chinese Maritime Customs functioning in Chinese waters and
revenue vessels of the Colony of Hong Kong functioning in Colonial
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waters shall not use each other’s water in the exercise of preventive
duties.73
This article is significant as it effectively negated one of the Nationalists’
main demands for the Customs to have access to the colony’s waters. 
By not allowing the CMCS to patrol their waters, Hong Kong was pro-
tected from any possibility of becoming another treaty port. For the
Customs this article meant they had to be prepared to work in conjunc-
tion with Hong Kong authorities to prevent smuggling. While not being
what was originally envisaged, this cooperation was at least recognition
of their concerns. Article XVI stipulated that Chinese or foreign goods
passing through Hong Kong to or from a treaty port with Customs 
documents could maintain their original status, in this way avoiding 
any additional tariffs for reimportation of goods or products to China. In 
this way the colony was gaining the benefit of treaty port trade without
actually being a treaty port or having to adhere to the obligations of 
having the CMCS present in their waters. Article XVIII further empha-
sized cooperation between the CMCS and Hong Kong authorities in each
being responsible in trying to prevent smuggling in their waters. The agree-
ment was to be ratified for a five-year period, unless re-negotiated by both
parties concerned (Article XXIV).
A dead letter: the failure of negotiations
The idea that the Chinese Maritime Customs Administration can remain in a
water-tight compartment and function independently of the Chinese Govern-
ment in these latter-days is fantastic, not to say stupid. But if we are prepared
to accept the limitations which fact places upon possibility, I believe that the
life of the quasi-foreign Inspectorate can be prolonged to the advantage of
foreign trade, shipping and finance.
Frederick Maze74
Maze believed that continued negotiations were dependent on the National-
ists’ support. Despite the promising outlook of the November draft of the
agreement, negotiations failed. The Nationalist government rejected the
draft and, in doing so, destined the Hong Kong–Customs issue to many
more years of speculation and negotiations. The failure of the agreement
stemmed from the controversy surrounding the ‘free port’ of Zhongshan.
Despite silted approaches and poor water levels, it had been opened as a
‘free port’ in July 1930. This was after intense lobbying on the part of
locals.75 There was no Customs tax on goods consumed within the port
area and smuggling was rife. The Zhongshan scheme was a huge liability
for the Chinese Government and the Customs. Song Ziwen visited
Guangzhou in October following Maze’s reports of smuggling and found
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Song instructed Maze to close the duty-free area.76 Maze noted that Song’s
irregular action had raised a storm of protest in Nanjing. The Zhongshan
Deep-Water Scheme was a project of dubious merits that anticipated this
free port would supplant Hong Kong as a leading entrepôt. Many high
Guangzhou–based officials had personal interests involved.77 They became
convinced that the closure of Zhongshan was more a contrivance of Hong
Kong interests than being revenue related and therefore directed their
displeasure towards the ongoing Hong Kong–Customs Agreement.
The closure of Zhongshan was the catalyst for the failure of the proposed
agreement. Maze wrote of the agreement as being a total loss as the
‘Guangzhou Party’ had raised objections.78 Anger at the reactive response
to Zhongshan emerged at the Fourth Plenary Session in Nanjing where 
the Guangzhou Party rejected the proposed agreement and in particular the
concession in Article XVI79 (this article granted goods passing through
Hong Kong treaty port status). This faction’s claim was that such an agree-
ment would adversely affect the trade of Guangzhou. Such a claim runs
counter to the basic premise of the agreement, which was to prevent 
smuggling and therefore benefit the south with extra revenue. What these
Guangzhou interests (including Tang Shaoyi, who was mentioned on
several occasions in the Maze Papers as being a prominent supporter of
Guangzhou-based interests80) resented was any checking of smuggling in
Zhongshan and the proposed agreement would have further restricted such
illegal trades.
The furore that erupted over Zhongshan left Song attempting to justify
his actions. On Song’s instructions Maze had closed the Zhongshan area
but Song, in a bid to extract himself from criticism, attempted to blame
the CMCS for having acted without proper instruction. Displaying clarity
of judgement, Maze had deliberately not acted until he had received written
instructions.81 In this instance he had avoided allowing the Customs Service
to be drawn into political entanglements. Although the agreement was not
concluded, in the 70-odd years during which it had been a contentious
issue, 1930 was the closest it had come to achieving success.
The failure of the Hong Kong Agreement was a resounding blow to the
good offices of Maze, who had faithfully orchestrated the negotiations. He
received commiserations from the British Foreign Office and from others
interested in the China situation. As Maze reflected:
It is disheartening, of course, to see the work of a year destroyed in
this manner, but such things happen in China (and elsewhere) and we
must bow philosophically to the fact. I did my best to get the agreement
passed, and no man can do more than his best!82
The Foreign Office gave Maze’s role in the negotiations indirect praise as
they sympathized with him when negotiations stalled. Blame for the break-
down was placed squarely on the Chinese, who were presented as irrational
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in the face of generous foreign response. Lampson shared Maze’s frustra-
tion at Song’s ill-judged actions regarding the Zhongshan Deep-Water
Scheme and maintained it was a most regrettable outcome. According to
the Foreign Office’s 1930 report, Lampson asserted that the Hong Kong
Government had gone a long way to meet the Chinese on this issue and that
he was not personally prepared to press them to make further concessions.83
The Hong Kong–China Trade and Customs Agreement entailed complex
and delicate diplomacy. Maze’s leadership of the CMCS was reaffirmed
even though the agreement was not successful. Maze had shown his skill
as a negotiator and had made it clear to both the Nationalists and the British
that he would not avoid his responsibilities as IG or as an employee of
the Chinese Government. In a letter to Sir Newton Stabb, Maze asked:
I sometimes wonder, indeed, if you, and others in London who are
interested in China, realise exactly just how difficult it is in these latter
days – not merely to maintain the quasi-foreign Inspectorate, but to
actually broaden the Customs’ influence?84
Such questions confirm Maze’s perception of his leadership as a crucial
one for the Service. Through his active participation in the agreement,
Maze was heralding a new course for the Service. By shifting away from
Aglen’s semi-independent stance and overriding foreign interest bias, Maze
was leading the Service into a more ambiguous position as he tried to
balance Chinese and foreign interests. While Maze may not have found
calmer waters for the CMCS, he had turned the Service to run with the
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6 A Service in decline
The Republican era presented numerous challenges to the security of the
CMCS but 1930 onwards marked a gradual deterioration of its position in
China. Challenges to the Service during this time were twofold: that of
internal dissension as Jiang Jieshi struggled to maintain dominance against
disaffected warlord and communist forces, and that of Japanese aggression
in the north-east. These internal and external forces afflicted the Service in
the form of the Tianjin Customs takeover in June 1930, the demands against
the Guangzhou Customs by Southern insurgents in 1931 and finally in the
takeovers of north-eastern Customs houses by the Japanese in 1932. The
Customs faced the possibility that these dangerous precedents would 
ultimately destroy its administration. During these challenges to the Service,
Maze continually drew on the assertion that the Customs needed to stay
out of politics to ensure its survival. In seeking to keep the Service separ-
ate from the stresses that were buffeting the Nanjing Government, Maze
believed he was returning to the vision of his uncle, Hart. Further-
more he believed that Hart was the only Inspector General (IG) who had
possessed ‘real power’ but he wisely had not paraded it.1 Such comments
reveal that Maze may have been not only seeking to emulate his uncle’s
leadership ideals but, in doing so, hoped to attain a measure of his legendary
influence in operating behind the scenes. The case studies of this chapter,
however, reveal that Maze’s vision was unrealistic and that his position as
IG was not as influential as he may have wished.
Despite the numerous challenges confronting the Service from 1930
onwards, the Customs Service did not collapse. It existed in name, if not
in a coherent form, until 1949. After 1937 the Service was, moreover, only
a shadow of its Imperial and early Republican forms. This chapter explores
the earliest indicators of the atrophy of the CMCS and its fragmentary
state prior to 1937.
This chapter examines case studies of incidents that had significant
impact on the functioning of the CMCS, namely the Tianjin Customs
Seizure in 1930, claims against the Guangzhou Customs in 1931 and then
the Japanese claiming of northern Customs houses from 1931 onwards.
The Tianjin Customs seizure arose primarily out of warlord (Feng Yuxiang
and Yan Xishan) opposition to the GMD and more specifically Jiang
Jieshi’s dominance thereof. This takeover of the Customs house created a
dangerous precedent for the possible dismembering of the Service.
Dormant tensions between Maze and British Minister, Lampson, appear
to have resurfaced as Maze responded to what seemed to be British inertia
to the Tianjin impasse. Again in 1931 the Service faced a direct challenge
through a southern-based faction of the GMD and their claims against the
Guangzhou Customs revenue. In this instance a compromise was effected.
The Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army’s ambitions and aggression in
north-eastern China had long been known to China and to other foreign
powers. So too the Japanese had shown themselves to be seeking larger
influence in the Customs. During the succession crisis (see Chapter 4) they
had been angling to promote their own nationals into better vantage pos-
itions in the Service. The Manzhuguo Government’s seizure of the northern
Customs houses in 1932, with the tacit approval of the Guandong author-
ities, posed a serious threat to the existence of the Customs.
The Tianjin Customs seizure: an overview
On 16 June 1930 the Commissioner of Tianjin Customs house, Bell, was
called on by a delegation of local Chinese and foreigners who presented
him with an order removing him from office. Warlords Yan Xishan and
Feng Yuxiang had allegedly enlisted Western journalist Bertram Lenox
Simpson to sequester the Customs house on their behalf, as protracted nego-
tiations with the GMD for access to these funds had proved unsuccessful.
Yan and Feng claimed they would amass the revenue surplus until their civil
war against the Nanjing Government reached some conclusion. In response
Bell retreated with his staff to the British Concession. Maze declared Tianjin
a dead port and trade was redirected. Simpson, acting on the behalf of the
northern warlords, reopened a self-styled Customs house that functioned
until September 1930. This de facto establishment was tacitly recognized
by the foreign powers, allowing their nationals to continue trading. This new
establishment was however thwarted when Zhang Xueliang, the Manchurian
warlord, moved in favour of the GMD and reclaimed the Customs house.
Simpson’s retention as Commissioner until a replacement was arranged was
disastrous as unknown assailants assassinated him. With Zhang’s mobiliza-
tion of troops in support of the GMD, Feng and Yan’s campaign against
Nanjing had been crushed. The stakes in the conflict had been high and, by
late October, Feng’s career as a warlord was finished and a chastened 
Yan was brought under Jiang’s control. The Customs emerged intact but
unsettled by the relative ease with which the warlords had been able to wrest
control from the Customs administration.
Physical attacks or threats against the Customs Service were not
unknown throughout the Republic, but what set the events in Tianjin apart
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created. The June 1930 seizure of the Customs was an unprecedented, but
not entirely unexpected, chain of events. On appraisal of the Customs docu-
ments and incidents prior to the Tianjin seizure, it is indisputable that the
threat of such an attack had been looming for many years. Ever since Sun
Yatsen’s threats against the Guangzhou Customs in 1923, there was always
the possibility of such actions being emulated with more success. In 
actuality many warlords (Zhang Zuolin and Feng Yuxiang, for example)
sought to curry favour with the treaty powers in a bid to enhance the legit-
imacy of their claims for control of China.2 With control of China came
access to the surplus revenue of the CMCS. Until 1930, however, not even
the GMD had threatened to wrest control of the Customs houses from the
Inspectorate’s control.
The takeover of the Tianjin Customs was the culmination of increasing
tensions between the Yan–Feng alliance and the GMD. The relationship
between Yan and Feng was primarily one of political expediency. The threat
that united the northern warlords was Jiang’s ensuring of GMD dominance
at the necessary expense of the warlords who collaborated with the GMD
forces during the Northern Expedition.3 Both Yan and Feng had sought
membership of the GMD and, with their forces, assisted Jiang in the final
stages of the Northern Expedition. The overarching premise for this alliance
can be found in the adage ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’: survival
instinct led the warlords to hoist the Nationalist banner. Their membership
of the GMD, however, was a necessarily tenuous alliance, as neither wanted
their power diminished. Feng’s abandoning of the GMD in May 1929 was
in response to Jiang’s push for demilitarization and his repositioning of
troops into Shandong to curb Feng’s ambitions for the region. Essentially
Feng and Yan’s alliances with Nanjing were opportunistic, guaranteeing
the maintenance of their forces. Throughout their careers both had encour-
aged the systematic indoctrination of troops making it relatively simple to
incorporate GMD ideologies of nationalism and anti-foreignism.4
On 10 October 1929 leading Guominzhun* officers addressed a public
telegram to Feng and Yan, denouncing Jiang Jieshi. They urged the war-
lords to take action (having subordinates asking their leader to do what 
he already wanted to do was a technique commonly used by Yuan Shikai
during his consolidation of power).5 In February 1930, after a short time of
neutrality in which Yan was appointed as second only to Jiang in the cam-
paign against Feng (but Yan was unwilling to fight against the warlord),6
Yan announced his alliance with Feng. For Yan the alliance was purely 
calculated for survival. Should Jiang have defeated Feng little would then
stand in the way of the Nationalist forces under Jiang attacking his own
power base. Yan’s support for Feng was initially shrouded in discussions
of the joys of travel they would share together,7 a cryptic expression of 
solidarity for Feng’s cause.
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* Feng’s National People’s Army.
The essence of Yan and Feng’s dispute with the Tianjin Customs related
to the continued remitting of surplus revenue for the Nanjing Government’s
disposal. In late April Yan challenged Commissioner Bell and demanded
that surplus should be placed in a Tianjin bank, the Bank of Communi-
cations, until the civil unrest reached a conclusion. Bell responded, after
instructions from the IG, by dismissing the Bank of Communications as
the Customs Bank on 5 May and directing that the surplus be remitted
directly to the IG’s control.8 Negotiations were initiated but, according to
Foreign Office reports, Bell’s attitude needed to be far more conciliatory
towards the northerners’ demands than it was. During May Lampson
recorded how important he believed it was for Bell to convince local author-
ities that he was indeed prepared to work towards a suitable compromise.9
It appears that despite such advice from the British Foreign Office and an
official Customs stance of non-intervention, Bell took a tough approach
and negotiations were difficult. In response to this frustration and true to
his dynamic warlord predilections, Yan ordered the takeover in June.10
From this brief account of the origins of the dispute it becomes appar-
ent that the Customs and the Consular powers were forewarned in early
May of the threat to the Tianjin Customs house. It is significant then that
Yan and Feng’s forces hesitated to put this plan into effect. In a letter
between Maze and Non-Resident Secretary (NRS) Stephenson dated 24
April 1930, there was a discussion of Yan requesting Edwardes to raise a
loan and to travel north with it.11 Maze recounted this as not being too
surprising as Lampson had encouraged Yan to support Edwardes’ claim to
the position of IG in 1928. While this claim is not mentioned in other
sources, this letter reveals that Yan was pressed for funds. Since no loan
was raised in support of this request, the situation would have deteriorated
as time passed. It is possible that, in the six weeks of negotiation that
elapsed between reports of Yan’s intention and the actual takeover, the
northern forces were assessing foreign reaction to the threat. The Customs’
own reports support the probability of the northern warlords’ watchfulness
over the Customs, as in the weeks between the threat and the takeover
representations to the Tianjin Customs were made by Chinese supporters
of Yan and Feng. These delegations included reasonably prominent local
figures, including the secretary to the Mayor of Tianjin and secretary to the
Garrison Commissioner. Bell successfully fended off these ‘diplomatic’
approaches.12 The American Consul in Tianjin, Gauss, described this watch-
fulness on the part of the warlords as Yan and Feng not having ‘gathered
sufficient courage to resort to drastic action’.13
The economic strength of the Tianjin Customs and its important contrib-
ution to Chinese Customs revenue was a significant motivation for its 
being coveted by the northern warlords. Of the 180,619,758 (Hk.Tl) 
that formed the total Customs collection for 1930, Tianjin represented 7.32
per cent of this contribution.14 While not seemingly huge revenue, Tianjin’s














































A Service in decline 121
Chinese ports. Although international trade had been faltering under the
world depression, China’s trade remained relatively strong. The Customs
Statistical Secretary, H.D. Hilliard, reflected on the arrival of unusually
large numbers of foreign trade commissions as an indication of China’s
‘importance in the eyes of the world as a potential factor to relieve the
universal trade depression’.15
Tianjin’s economic vitality was a significant factor in Yan and Feng’s
calculations. Redirecting Tianjin’s collection would have readily fulfilled
their desperate need for finances. Yan and Feng’s revenues were derived
from taxing their provinces but this would not have been as lucrative or
as regular a source as the Tianjin Customs revenue. At the least it was in
Yan and Feng’s interests to prevent the surplus revenue being directed into
Nanjing’s coffers, which could be channelled into the military campaign
against their forces. From the perspective of the northern warlords it made
little sense to allow Tianjin’s remittance to be made available to their
opposition, hence their demands to the Customs Commissioner that revenue
be held in Tianjin until the outcome of the conflict.
Following a series of threats and failed negotiations, the Service was
clearly forewarned that a takeover of the Tianjin Customs was looming.
Maze discussed the possible seizure as early as May and conceded that,
while Yan’s arguments for retaining the additional revenue may have had
certain logic, he was certain that Nanjing would not want to compromise.16
Maze also perceived great danger in the Service being drawn into a prin-
cipal role with regard to policy. He reflected: ‘I have instructed Hayley
Bell (now Commissioner in Tianjin) in this sense, and have cautioned him
to maintain friendly contact with Marshal Yan’s representatives at all costs,
and to advise non-interference . . . .’17 Despite these expressions of concern
there was little action taken aside from Bell’s appointment to this poten-
tially delicate post. In addition Lampson described the Tianjin situation 
as ‘peaceful’ and commented that not even Bell was the ‘least little bit
agitated’ with regard to the potential threat.18 Such steadiness in the face
of the looming threat is not too surprising. Bell had been sent to Guangzhou
during the boycott in 1925–6 and had taken a hard line there. The inertia
by the Customs would suggest the level of confidence the Service held in
its integrity – the belief that it would remain unaffected despite the
warlords’ threats.
To assist their takeover Yan and Feng enlisted the services of Bertram
Lenox Simpson (who enjoyed some notoriety within treaty port China
through his writing under the pseudonym of Putnam Weale). This was not
Simpson’s first dalliance into China’s political affairs. The British consuls
and the Western ‘establishment’ in China regarded him with mistrust
because of his intrigues. Lampson was visited by Simpson on 13 May and
took this opportunity to urge him to remove himself from this intrigue.
Simpson declined, responding that it would appear he had been bribed 
if he suddenly acted upon Lampson’s advice without consulting Yan.19
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Needless to say, Simpson’s later actions reveal he had no intention of
leaving the situation. The British Foreign Office reaction appeared initially
supportive of Yan and Feng’s claims. But they were disturbed by Simpson’s
involvement in this political rivalry. Lampson commented:
It is puzzling to know what the wisest course is. Moreover, on the
merits of the case, in my opinion Yen has shown more reasonable atti-
tude than Nanking over this question, nor do I think Bell has shown
any special tact. On the other hand, it is most undesirable that a British
subject should thus thrust himself or be thrust into the forefront of this
affair, especially a man of the type of Simpson.20
In this extract the impression is given that if a Briton had not been involved
then sympathies would have rested with Yan and Feng. Simpson’s involve-
ment was seen as one of the worst possible situations for the Foreign Office.
To assist him during his takeover of the Customs house, Simpson rallied
the support of a friend, L.C. Arlington, a former Postal Commissioner.
Arlington accompanied Simpson and a delegation of Chinese community
representatives that included the Mayor, the Salt Commissioner, the Chiefs
of Police and Detectives Department to claim the Customs. Goh Jingyou,
the Superintendent of Customs, informed Bell that Simpson would be
replacing him. Arlington relates:
Hardly had Mr. Simpson begun his conversation with Colonel Bell
than all of the officials withdrew, leaving only Simpson and myself to
conduct the conversation, which was not of a very pleasant kind. 
I saw at once that the Chinese officials, as usual, left the fighting –
the dirty work – to the foreigner!21
Bell had been given prior warning of the seizure. When he discovered the
phone lines were cut, Bell took a letter from his desk that he had penned
in preparation.22 From this account one must question whether Simpson
deserved the ‘two-gun adventurer’ label ascribed to him by Song Ziwen.23
In the following days Maze responded by shutting down the Tianjin
Customs and declaring Tianjin a dead port. The bulk of shipping was re-
directed to other ports. This left the consuls responsible for the clearances
of their nationals’ cargoes. Bell was removed from the tense situation 
in Tianjin and was sent on leave to the coastal resort area of Beidaihe.24
Grierson, formerly Deputy Commissioner at Tianjin, replaced Bell in
subsequent negotiations. The events in Tianjin were the focus of the NCDN
cartoonist’s wit (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).25 The paper featured two cartoons
on the incident. In the first cartoon ‘A Domestic Question’ the Beijing and
Nanjing forces, represented as a soldier and a young woman respectively,
are depicted fighting over a bucket of milk (customs revenue). In the second
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tearing the hapless CMCS goat apart. Simpson was depicted as holding
the head but not the substance.
Simpson defied the closing of the Customs house and reopened the estab-
lishment. In a desperate bid to retain staff, he reportedly threatened to
shoot any Chinese employees who did not remain to work under his new
Customs domain. When approached by Tianjin’s British consul, Simpson
claimed his comments had been wilfully misconstrued, but this did not
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Figure 6.1 Sapajou, ‘A Domestic Question – What it is no use crying over’ 
(North-China Daily News, 18 June 1930)
A D0MF.;STlC QUESTION-Whal it Is No Use.Crying Over. 
ease the consuls’ fears.26 Foreign staff were recruited from rather dubious
quarters to fill indoor positions. Maze commented that Simpson’s regime
in Tianjin was growing larger and stronger, ‘[his] staff include . . . many
ex-Customs foreign employees dismissed for dishonesty or discharged for
incompetence!’.27 Regardless of the unscrupulous appearance of the de 
facto establishment, it not only appeared to function well but also enjoyed
popularity among elements of the trading community.
The takeover of the Customs house was an indicator that Yan and Feng’s
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Figure 6.2 Sapajou, ‘Heads or Haunches? The shadow and the substance’ 
(North-China Daily News, 23 June 1930)
{ 
y, 
against the GMD. This escalation intensified the urgency for both the GMD
and Northern Coalition to force Zhang Xueliang out of his neutrality and
to take sides in the dispute. The perception shared by the warlords and the
GMD, that Zhang’s support would be crucial to their action, is borne out
in an American consular report:
It is anticipated however, that when he considers the proper moment
has arrived, the ‘Young General’ will offer to mediate, and perhaps
use the threat of employment of his military and naval forces to require
acceptance of the offer. It is generally conceded that the adherence of
the Mukden faction to either of the two contending sides would conclu-
sively determine the issue of the present civil war.28
American consular reports from Tianjin confirm that tensions between the
two contending factions had been growing steadily worse in the months
prior to the Customs seizure.29 For this reason there was speculation in the
consular ranks that there would be the outbreak of civil war.
Tianjin’s de facto Customs establishment
I realise that there may be – and probably are – political reasons against
intervention. But between active intervention against, and tacit recognition
of, Simpson’s improvised Customs there is a wide gap!
F.W. Maze, reflecting on the policy of the 
diplomatic body towards events in Tianjin30
The attack on the Tianjin Customs revealed ambivalence in the treaty
powers’ reaction to both the Nanjing Government and to the northern
warlords. This was due, in part, to the legacy of a Customs succession
crisis that had shaken the CMCS in 1928–9. The British consular percep-
tion of this turn of events is vitally significant as it directly influenced
official reaction to the seizure at Tianjin. To illustrate this point it is perti-
nent to quote at length an extract from Lampson’s diary – it exemplifies
just how the Minister was approaching the situation. Lampson dined with
Maze and others and in the course of this function:
Maze told me the latest developments from his angle at Tientsin. It is
really rather amusing. In the old days the I-G. of Customs enjoyed a
quasi independent status; he was the servant of no party, but regarded
himself as responsible solely to the Chinese people. Consequently, 
up to a point, he succeeded in keeping out of the arena of domestic
politics. All this went by the board when the Government at home
threw in their hand over Aglen’s successor, e.g. all the fuss and 
bustle about Edwardes and Maze of about two years ago. Since then
the position has radically altered, and Maze is definitely the servant –
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and nothing but the servant – of the Nanking Government. He merely
carries out their orders and has little influence on questions of policy.31
[emphasis added]
For Lampson the Customs no longer held the value it once did for British
interests in China and therefore the events in Tianjin were simply
‘amusing’. Moreover there is almost a sense of glee evident in Lampson’s
entry, particularly as Maze was encountering such difficulties. Later in this
diary entry he describes Maze’s position vis-à-vis the GMD as ‘pretty well
inevitable’ and muses that should the Service break apart there would 
be great temptation to tell the Foreign Office ‘I told you so’.32 When
confronted with the actual seizure of the Customs he commented, ‘[the]
quasi-independent status of Customs fell with Edwardes’.33 The Western
press had continually reflected this perception that the Customs was now
a Chinese-dominated institution in comments about Maze and in some
ways, then, the events at Tianjin were seen as simply fulfilling predictions
made by Lampson and others that the CMCS was doomed to collapse
under Maze.34
From initial readings it is significant that Simpson was involved in this
affair, as it appears that Yan and Feng had not desired a takeover of the
Customs by a Chinese. The possible reasoning for this is fourfold: first, at
the start of his China career, Simpson had served five years in the Customs
Service and therefore had some knowledge of Customs procedure; second,
a Westerner had the protection of extraterritoriality to cover their involve-
ment; third, Feng and Yan, while prepared to seize the Tianjin customs,
were not prepared to completely antagonize the foreign powers by
appointing a Chinese as Commissioner; and, fourth, there is the possibility
that Yan and Feng believed a Westerner would be more capable of running
this foreign-styled customs house. At the least, a foreigner would be more
difficult to remove.
The attack against the Customs in June 1930 left the British in a dilemma.
Action such as the assembling of a naval force was no longer a feasible
option for defending foreign interests.35 British and Japanese traders stood
to be most affected by any disruption of the Customs in Tianjin and, 
therefore, the British and Japanese representatives were most active in
seeking to bring about some sort of compromise between the northern
allies and Nanjing.36 After much discussion the diplomatic body agreed to
send letters of protest to both the north and south, calculated to ensure 
the foreign powers could not be seen as taking sides.37 This is significant
as it indicates that the powers were anticipating that Feng and Yan might
succeed. Therefore they wanted to have a reasonable relationship with
them. Another consideration was the actual location of the Customs 
house, which was situated within the French concession. This was a
concern as it restricted the powers from simply taking action. Regardless














































A Service in decline 127
the Customs and allowed American merchants to resume trade. For the
British, the location of the Customs house in itself posed diplomatic prob-
lems should the British have decided to defend the Tianjin Customs.38 The
French believed they should only intervene if there was a disturbance of
the peace. As Bell had left the Customs house without physical conflict
they declined to act.39
Within a short period of time, Simpson’s Customs house was accepted
by all as a de facto establishment. Trade resumed a semblance of normality.
Maze believed that such recognition of Simpson’s Customs house had
contradicted the foreign powers’ own assertion that they would not inter-
vene: ‘I fully appreciate the delicacy of the situation and the desire of the
Powers to “wait and see,” and not interfere in this domestic squabble, but
by transacting Customs business with Simpson they have in fact inter-
fered.’40 It was this tacit recognition that Maze described as ‘heartening’
for Simpson but as simultaneously creating a frustrating and ‘lonely’ atmos-
phere in which he was left campaigning for the Customs.41 From the tone
of such comments, there is a sense of Maze’s concern that no one shared
his fears for the precedents being set by events in Tianjin.
In response to the seizure The Times criticized the Foreign Office’s 
inaction when the Customs was seized, as they had ‘let this valuable and
formerly quasi-international institution become the shuttlecock of Chinese
politics’.42 This observation is significant in that it describes the Customs as
formerly an international service. Certainly the Customs Service still retained
foreign employees, and Maze wrote of the Customs as ‘an unofficial outpost
of Empire in view of the varied British interests still centred on it’.43 This
indicates a clash of perceptions of the role of the Customs Service. It is
difficult to believe, though, that only the foreign staff in the Customs con-
tinued to perceive the Service as an avenue for protecting and advancing
Western interests in China.
The actual takeover of the Customs house and creation of a de facto
establishment did not cause undue concern for the foreign powers. Indeed
all agreed that their nationals in Tianjin should deal with whatever regime
that succeeded in functioning.44 Moreover, the response to Yan’s claim
tended to be viewed in a sympathetic light. Lampson wrote of Yan as
having behaved with ‘considerable patience and restraint’45 in contrast with
the Nanjing Government, which had shown itself to be difficult in nego-
tiations.46 The involvement of Lenox Simpson continued to be a problem,
described by Lampson as giving ‘a bad impression from the outset’.47
Indeed directly after the takeover of the Customs, Nanjing lodged a protest
to the British Government calling for Simpson’s deportation.48
The fracas surrounding the Tianjin Customs and Simpson’s de facto
establishment exacerbated tensions between Maze and Lampson. Even 
at the earliest times in this crisis, Maze wrote of his frustration at being 
left to handle everything alone.49 Furthermore he referred to Lampson 
as having shown ‘comparative indifference’ to the fate of the Service.50
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He believed that Britain’s general policy in China was appropriate and
should not be altered for the sake of the CMCS but maintained that the lega-
tion had not been ‘helpful’ or encouraging.51 Maze detailed that he and
Lampson never communicated as regards the events in Tianjin,52 this in itself
an indicator of an uneasy relationship between the two. But more import-
antly this reflected a division between the Customs Service and the British
Foreign Office that had never been so pronounced in Aglen’s era. Notably,
Maze was not completely alone in his frustration at Lampson’s inaction; on
more than one occasion Maze wrote to colleagues and confidants that both
he and the Nationalists were disgruntled with Lampson’s lack of respon-
siveness.53 He recounted: ‘Dr C.T. Wang remarked to me the other day, for
example, that if Lampson had informally intervened as much to throw
Simpson out, as he actively intervened in 1928 to keep Edwardes in, he
(Simpson) would not have lasted five minutes.’54 Such reflections directly
related to Lampson’s close involvement in the succession crisis, which had
engulfed the Service just over a year earlier. It was Maze’s ascension to the
position of IG that had been the cause of much angst for Lampson, and it
appeared that neither Lampson, Maze nor the Nationalists had forgotten this.
Nanjing’s demands for the deportation of Simpson placed increasing
pressure on Lampson. Under Chinese law Simpson would have faced
severe punishment and the Nationalists wanted to see the British meting
out punishment to Simpson. The British, who remained hesitant to be seen
as taking sides and acting against the northern warlords, did not meet these
demands. Also they were concerned that Simpson’s actions might not be
interpreted by the courts in such a way that he might be convicted, and
they believed a non-conviction against him would be a much more damning
prospect.55 A non-conviction might encourage other adventurers. Instead,
discussion of revoking Simpson’s extraterritoriality was entered into but
this was considered an action of the last resort by the Foreign office.56
Reclaiming the Customs
The Tianjin Customs seizure came to an abrupt halt when Zhang Xueliang
moved into the political arena and reclaimed Hebei, Tianjin and the rest
of the province for the GMD in early October 1930. This reclaiming of
the province also included the Customs house.57 The CMCS resumed
control of the Customs house on 3 October. Grierson occupied the Customs
house and on doing so all staff appointed by Simpson, both Chinese and
foreign, were dismissed.58 This reclaiming of Tianjin and the province for
Nanjing’s control had far-reaching consequences. Not only had Yan and
Feng been crushed, Zhang had made a decisive move into Chinese political
arena in allying himself with the Nationalists. Simpson was victim to an
assassination attempt, which left him fatally wounded, and Bell’s service
in China was brought to a prompt conclusion. The CMCS emerged intact,
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Simpson fell victim to his machinations. He was shot by unknown
assailants on 1 October and died six weeks later from inoperable wounds.59
It is difficult to ascertain whether this attack was retribution by the GMD
for Simpson’s involvement in the Customs seizure or a purging from within
Yan’s ranks, but Simpson’s death appears politically motivated. His
attackers were never identified and an air of mystery surrounded the whole
incident. Maze put forward three possibilities for the attack on Simpson:
(a) that he had threatened to blackmail Zhang Xueliang; (b) that he had
offended Yan and Feng’s Shanxi party by approaching Zhang when it
appeared Manchuria was entering the conflict; and (c) that he might have
been involved in an opium combine in Tianjin. The third suggestion was,
according to Maze, not unlikely as under Simpson’s regime drug running
had increased.60 Maze regretted the attack: ‘it is deplorable that at the
eleventh hour [Simpson] has been created a sort of martyr by a handful
of Chinese miscreants’.61 Simpson was certainly a provocative figure in
China but, despite his notoriety, his death unsettled Westerners in China
and press reports reflect this unease.62 Many reports despaired that the
foreigner in China was under such threat.
The Customs seizure also affected Commissioner Bell. The events at
Tianjin marked the end of his China service. Bell was due to retire in 1931
and had wanted to extend his tenure but this was declined. Maze’s assess-
ment of Bell’s management of events underwent a dramatic shift as the
crisis developed. Initially he was applauded for good work in what was
agreed to be a very difficult situation. Maze not only considered Bell had
endured a trying situation and thanked him for this, but also depreciated
the lack of Foreign Office support for Bell’s actions.63 Such accolades
were, however, rapidly replaced with criticisms as the actual course of
events became clearer to the IG. Maze admitted that he might have given
too much credit to Bell’s own accounts of his work. He commented:
I consider that Bell proved inadequate, and handled the situation badly.
I instructed him to maintain friendly contact with all classes of Chinese
Officials, but it seems that his ‘cast iron’, Prussian-dragoon attitude
irritated all and sundry. It is clear that Simpson bamboozled him
completely, and in the end swept down upon him and mesmerized
him. In other words, he (Bell) was caught napping, and Simpson, in
Bell’s presence, actually obtained possession of our Code and of my
confidential letters and wires – a school-boy of ten could, at least, have
prevented this.64
There are other criticisms of similar nature to be found throughout Maze’s
correspondence in the wake of the Tianjin Customs debacle and it appears
that Lampson and others supported such views.65 Primarily Bell was 
seen to have misjudged the situation, and in doing so might have actually
facilitated the ensuing difficulties with Simpson. Despite Bell’s requests
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to return to Tianjin to reclaim his former post, Maze concluded that he
was ill-suited to remain in China and was therefore removed to the London
Office (LO) where he served his remaining year before retirement.
While Bell was seen as partly responsible for the development of events
in Tianjin, Maze believed that the ultimate fault rested with Nanjing. Bell’s
uncompromising position exacerbated Nanjing’s refusal to consider Yan
and Feng’s demands, the basis of which were not unreasonable. For the
Customs, its adherence to the directives of Nanjing had led it to become
embroiled in the struggle between the northern warlords and the GMD.
The ease with which Simpson had been able to secure the Customs house
and to establish his own regime must have been unnerving for the Service,
which since its inception had always promoted the indispensability of its
services to China. Even more disturbing to the CMCS was the fact that
the foreign powers, after initial confusion, were content to deal with what-
ever Customs regime was in place. This was evidence of a changing
perception of the CMCS and its role in Nationalist China.
Compromise at Guangzhou, 1931
Almost precisely a year after the Tianjin Customs impasse, the CMCS was
faced with a similar situation, this time centred in Guangzhou. Deep-seated
tensions had erupted between General Chen Jidang and Chen Mingshu, 
who were the leading political and military figures in the provinces of
Guangdong and Guangxi. At a conference Chen Jidang denounced the 
leadership of Jiang. In response to these ominous pressures, Chen Mingshu,
who was the civil Governor of Guangdong, fled to Hong Kong with his sup-
porters, leaving Chen Jidang dominant in the region. The NCDN described
the coup as ‘bloodless’.66 On 2 May Chen Jidang and his new Guangzhou
regime declared themselves against Jiang’s leadership by issuing a mani-
festo denouncing Jiang and his followers as ‘enemies of the party’.
Furthermore, a second denunciation followed, encouraging any who were
disgruntled with Jiang’s leadership to travel south. The ‘Reorganizationists’,
a left-wing branch of the GMD that resented what they saw as Jiang’s virtual
dictatorship over the GMD, supported this rival faction. Wang Jingwei, head
of the Reorganizationists’ movement, was appointed to the new govern-
ment’s committee. By the 13 May the NCDN reported that the Independent
GMD Government of Guangzhou was contemplating embarking on a
Northern Expedition but was delayed because of a lack of funds.67
By late May Maze had already discussed his concerns over the possible
implications of these political developments with Song Ziwen. He
commented:
We need not cross our bridges till we come to them, but if the ques-
tion of a pro rata division of the Canton Revenue does arise, my view
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some informal modus vivendi calculated to maintain the integrity of
the Customs rather that have a repetition of the unfortunate Tientsin
affair!68
For Maze this division and rivalry within the GMD raised the threat of
similar experiences to those that had occurred in Tianjin with the northern
warlords. He wrote to Lampson with regard to the tensions emerging at
Guangzhou and stressed that he had already discussed his concerns with
the Nanjing authorities.69 He also explained to Lampson that his advice to
Nanjing was to ‘bend rather than break’ and in doing so to avoid a repeat
of Tianjin, but there was a note of frustration in this letter as Maze ques-
tions, ‘but will they accept advice?’.
As a response to their complete break from and denouncing of Nanjing,
the Guangzhou Government began to examine the loyalties of the CMCS
and, more importantly, the potential revenue at their disposal. In early 
June the Guangzhou Government demanded that Maze should travel 
to Guangzhou as IG of Customs. Deng Shaoyin and Wu Shangying, the
Minister and Vice-Minister of Finance respectively, informed Maze that in
the place of the Nanjing Government, the GMD had established a new
national government at Guangzhou. They ordered Maze:
You are hereby instructed that henceforth you are to take orders from
this Ministry in performance of your duties as Inspector General of
the Chinese Maritime Customs. You are further instructed to imme-
diately remove to Canton the Inspectorate General of Customs and to
come to Canton at once. You are further instructed to issue orders to
all Chinese Maritime Customs Houses to have all revenues remitted
to this Ministry.70
Similar instructions to proceed to Guangzhou were also given to
Stephenson, the Commissioner of Kowloon.71 In what can only be de-
scribed as covering all possibilities, the Guangzhou authorities also offered
Stephenson a post as Southern IG. Maze was extremely confident that
Stephenson would refuse to play any part in splitting the Service.72
On 6 June the NCDN reported on the possibility of a ‘Customs 
Coup in Canton’. It revealed that a takeover similar to what had occurred 
in Tianjin a year earlier was being contemplated by the authorities in
Guangzhou. The article commented: ‘endeavours were being made to arrive
at a satisfactory arrangement under which the integrity of the Customs will
be maintained.’73 Maze presented a case to the Guangzhou authorities that
as Guangzhou, Shantou and other offices in the region represented 11.5
per cent of total revenue, these houses should not only contribute a propor-
tion of the cost of the 5 per cent for indemnities but also that they should
contribute towards the maintenance of domestic loans.74 His reasoning for
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this was that the Guangzhou Government would hardly want to damage
national interests through any precipitate actions. Maze feared such sugges-
tions may falter and therefore telegraphed Commissioner Braud in
Guangzhou and arranged for him to hand over all but 5 per cent of 
the revenues under force majeure.75 While this may seem a defeat for the
Customs, it was a manoeuvre that preserved the integrity of the Service
as Nanjing could still maintain the staffing of the Customs houses.
By 12 June the dispute had been circumvented. The relative speed in
coming to some compromise was a result of Maze’s ability to negotiate
terms satisfying to both governments. An agreement was reached that all
revenue from the Guangzhou region, with the exception of the 5 per cent
for loans and indemnities, would go to the coffers of the Independent 
GMD Government. This surplus was quoted by the NCDN as being around
two million per month.76 In an editorial on 16 June the NCDN applauded
this agreement, claiming it not only gave prestige to the Service but also
showed that both governments had the vision to put national good above
personal ambitions. The same article praised Maze for his skilful diplo-
macy in handling such a delicate situation. The editorial commented:
‘[Maze] can be assured moreover of the goodwill and gratitude of the
financial, commercial and shipping communities of all nationalities, in the
reinforcement of his labours.’77 The NCDN’s concern (shared with Maze)
had been that the Nanjing Government would choose to follow a similar
line to that of non-intervention in Tianjin; the situation in Guangzhou was
more significant as the region represented a larger proportion of the total
Customs revenue (10 per cent). The British Foreign Office also commended
the compromise, describing it in terms of the Nanjing Government having
learnt a lesson from the events in Tianjin.78
Despite this early success in acquiring Customs funds, the Guangzhou
Government’s existence was short-lived. Access to Customs revenues 
from Guangzhou was not a sufficient revenue source to adequately fund
the Guangzhou regime. The NCDN discussed the government’s impos-
ition of gambling and opium monopolies to raise revenue. A rent tax 
was also implemented.79 For reasons that remain unclear, the threatened
Northern Expedition of Independent GMD forces did not eventuate. On 
16 September southern forces had been advancing to Hunan to challenge
the Nationalists’ forces but, before hostilities broke out, they were in 
retreat. The British Foreign Office speculated that this might have been 
due to secret peace talks having been carried out. Japanese aggressions 
in Manchuria were, however, largely credited with expediting the settle-
ment between Nanjing and Guangzhou as both governments realized the
urgency for a united government in a time of crisis.80 The Service had,
through the active diplomacy employed by Maze, avoided a repeat of the
Tianjin incident. In doing so it had also benefited from a tacit agreement
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The loss of Customs houses in the north-east
Poor China! What next will happen to her. I hope that out of all the turmoil
some lasting good for her may come and that she will learn her lesson but
it is difficult to see any happy sign yet. The old Customs is still her best
friend – in fair weather or foul.
W.O. Law81
Maze’s leadership had weathered some turbulent years but there was little
respite in store for the CMCS. In 1932 the Customs faced serious challenges
to its functioning and the seizure of Customs houses in Manchuria signalled
the severing of the north-east from the Service. The lament from Law for
‘Poor China’ was quite apt. However, in retrospect, lamenting the CMCS
might have been even more appropriate, as by the middle of 1932 at the insti-
gation of the Manzhuguo authorities, the north-eastern Customs houses were
seized. In the lead up to these seizures, the ‘best friend’ of China was first
abandoned by the GMD, whose leaders showed their willingness to sacri-
fice the Service to ensure their own political survival. Second, it was betrayed
by the Japanese Guandongzhou (Kwantung) leased-territory authorities, who
gave their infant state predominance over the fate of the Service. And, third,
it was betrayed by the foreign powers, who were hesitant to go any further
than to make unofficial enquiries on the behalf of the Customs.
The aggressive actions of the Guandong Army in the north-eastern
provinces of China in 1931–2, culminating in the declaration of independ-
ence of Manzhuguo (17 February 1932), had far-reaching ramifications 
for not only Sino-Japanese ties but also international relations.82 The 
effects of these ambitions on Customs outposts in the north-east have not
received detailed research. Arguably the creation of Manzhuguo resulted in
the largest threat to the integrity of the Service in the course of its 70-odd
years of existence. Rumours of the intended takeover of the north-eastern
Customs houses by the Manzhuguo authorities appear to have been circu-
lating around the time of the creation of the new state. For Maze the tensions
that were mounting in the north were irrevocably tied to the general 
political tensions in Sino-Japanese affairs and therefore his challenge was
to balance such a delicate situation without endangering the integrity of the
Service in the process. As the Service foundered under the growing threat
of loss of Customs houses, the foreign powers endeavoured to assist the
Service, but only on an unofficial basis and in deference to the tensions
still surrounding the north-east. The Nanjing Government, after deciding
not to allow any negotiation with the new Manzhuguo authorities, similarly
tied Maze’s hands from any attempts at reaching a compromise that would
save the Service from imminent danger. The creation of Manzhuguo and
pressures to join the new regime polarized staff in the north-east, with
Japanese staff resigning and declaring their loyalty to the new Manzhuguo
authorities.
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Deep-rooted tensions between the reactionary Guandong forces and the
Chinese precipitated a crisis in 1931 following the suspicious circumstances
surrounding the death of army captain Nakamura83 and later an explo-
sion along the South Manchurian Railway Company’s (SMR) Shenyang
(Mukden) line. This event heralded the pretext for the Japanese occupa-
tion of key cities in the north-eastern provinces on 18 September 1931.
This action was clearly premeditated on the part of the Guandong forces,
and it is commonly held by researchers in this field that the military engi-
neered the actual railway explosion as a catalyst for their plans. American
journalist Abend (a China correspondent for the New York Times) recounted
being tipped off by a Japanese official in Shanghai that military action was
imminent in the Manchurian region. Abend was concerned, wondering
whether the US and Britain would stand by and ‘permit a gigantic terri-
torial theft of this kind’.84 His subsequent reports to consular officials on
the intended actions of the Guandong Army, however, fell on deaf ears.
He later reflected on Japanese actions in September 1931 and beyond to
action in 1937 with a grudging admiration:
Conquest can never be a pretty nor a clean job, but certainly the
Japanese managed the conquest of Manchuria in a much better 
fashion than they did the conquest of coastal China begun in 1937. 
In Manchuria, of course, there was slaughter, there was intimida-
tion of the civilian population, there was some ruthless confiscation of 
property, and there were economic injustices. These things seemed
inseparable from militarism in its active phases.85
Press reports at this time often betrayed a sense of empathy with the long-
suffering Japanese finally provoked into action by the unpredictable Chinese
and yet, at the same time dismay, at the course the Guandong Army opted
to take.86 World attention was, however, drawn away from this centre when
on the pretext of Chinese provocation the Japanese launched an attack on
Zhabei, the Chinese city area of Shanghai. Japanese forces were repelled
by the valiant efforts of limited Chinese forces (19th Route Army), much
to the grudging admiration of the foreign onlookers in the treaty port. In
the course of this conflict, Maze was active in his protection of Japanese
staff in the Inspectorate (located in the foreign concession). The NCDN
reported that he had received a special message of gratitude from the
Japanese Government to this effect.87
The seizure of the Customs houses in the north-east that occurred 
in mid-1932 was a great blow to the Service and also had significance in
revealing Japanese aspirations for the region. Despite Japanese protesta-
tions that Manzhuguo was a self-declared independent region, it became
apparent to all onlookers that the state was a facade for Japanese imperialist
ambition in northern China. When faced with the prospects of a takeover
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with the benefit of hindsight we may also reflect, rather naively) appealed
to the Guandongzhou authorities for assistance but found that none was
forthcoming.
Customs reports for 1931–7 are incomplete and those that are available
tend to refrain from making direct comment on the political situation
embroiling Sino-Japanese tensions. Customs documents detail the Commis-
sioners’ experiences at each of the Customs houses that were threatened
and eventually seized by the Manzhuguo authorities. These document the
deliberate intimidation of foreign and Chinese staff and persistent attempts
to bribe employees to change allegiances. Customs houses subjected to 
these pressures, and ultimately to a takeover, included Harbin, Shenyang,
Longjing (Lungchingtsun), Huichun, Niuzhuang, Andong, Aihui and Dalian.
Of these, the seizure at Dalian was the most significant, seeing that it was
created as a treaty port under Japanese treaty with China (1907) and there-
fore no interference had been anticipated. Any action against the Dalian
Customs, it was reasoned, would need to have tacit Japanese approval before
anything could take place. As Dalian became a catalyst for Manzhuguo 
to move against Customs houses throughout the north-east the following
sections include a detailed study of the Dalian Customs’ experience.
Revenue from the north-eastern provinces represented a significant
percentage of the total Customs revenue. It was a substantial portion of
funds, therefore, that was under threat should the Manzhuguo authorities
move into action. More so than just the funds, the whole basis of the
Service was facing a direct challenge. Manchurian ports represented around
12 to 18 per cent of Customs revenue.88 Of this proportion of revenue,
Dalian represented almost half of the north-eastern remittances.
In the lead up to the creation of the state of Manzhuguo, there was a
certain amount of unease on the part of Maze and those interested in the
future of the CMCS but nothing tangible to raise serious concerns. The
newly independent state of Manzhuguo (inaugurated in February 1932)
was commonly recognized by the Chinese and foreigners in China as a
puppet regime. The creation of Manzhuguo and the demands of a newly
established state for revenue provided the impetus for a significant chal-
lenge to the future of the Service. In March Maze discussed a report
received from the Harbin Commissioner, H. Prettejohn, who had heard on
‘good authority’ that the new state was in urgent need of funds and that
the Japanese were preparing to take over control of all Customs houses in
Manchuria. What Maze could not discern from this report was the esti-
mated time-frame for any such action.89 Any such occurrence was to be
avoided, if at all possible, and Maze began presenting such suggestions to
the Nanjing Government.
From 11 to 14 March the Nanjing Government, at Maze’s request to
allow Customs representatives to make contact with the new Manzhuguo
authorities, sanctioned an unofficial representation. Commissioner at Dalian
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Fukumoto, and Chinese Secretary, Ding (full name Ting Kwei-tang), were
authorized to approach the Manzhuguo authorities in the new capital of
Changchun to put forward the case of maintaining the integrity of the
Service. Fukumoto and Ding were able to speak at length on an unofficial
basis with representatives from Manzhuguo to discern the new state’s plans
for the Service. They did so with the intention of moderating these views.90
These talks, as detailed by Fukumoto, met with a degree of success in
having informally put forward the CMCS’ view for consideration. The
talks were also received with a certain degree of sympathy for the case of
maintaining the Service.
Fukumoto reported to Maze that he spoke with the Japanese Consuls
General from Longjing and Jilin.91 He also met with an ex-Customs
employee who was the Chief Secretary of a large chamber of commerce
in Japan and acting as adviser to the new government. Fukumoto com-
mented: ‘I found that the new government was busy with preparations 
for taking over all Manchurian Customs houses and for opening a new
office at Shanghaikuan, and that they would remit a certain sum for foreign
loan obligation.’92 He immediately set about attempting to convert these
and other officials to his way of thinking. A key element of Fukumoto’s
response to these intentions was to stress the detrimental effects for Japan.
He presented that it was unwise for the Japanese to become involved in
political complications and of damaging future trade agreements. Thus he
pushed for negotiations with the Chinese authorities. He was pleased to
learn that such comments had not gone unheeded; and reported to Maze
that he had met with a measure of success, but was ultimately to be dis-
appointed that his suggestions were only adopted in part.93 Ding’s report
of negotiations lacked the detail of Fukumoto’s but gave significant
reflection on the perceived attitude of the Manzhuguo authorities. Ding
commented on their attitude towards the CMCS as being ‘polite, sincere
and friendly’.94 Earlier in the same message, however, he reported the situ-
ation as ‘critical’ and expressed fears that any delay in reaching some
settlement would cause disaster. In his report Ding attributed the delaying
of the Manzhuguo threat to the Customs Service to the strenuous efforts
made by Fukumoto.95 There was recognition in the British Foreign Office
reports of Fukumoto’s outstanding efforts to defend the Service. In particu-
lar the Foreign Office praised Fukumoto’s determination in the face of
what was seen as considerable personal danger.96
Maze was not idle while Fukumoto and Ding approached the Manzhuguo
authorities. On 17 and 19 March he outlined his views on the situation in
confidential letters to the Minister of Finance.97 In these letters he proposed
that the Manzhuguo authorities should liquidate a pro rata share of the
indemnities and loans secured on the Customs and in doing so retain the
balance. This was to be done on the understanding the Inspectorate system
remained undisturbed. This compromise would be maintained pending and
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question. Maze believed that such an arrangement loosely conformed to
that which had been enacted in Guangzhou in 1931. To his frustration,
however, Song Ziwen transmitted his confidential letters to the Govern-
ment’s executive Yuan. As a result Maze was assailed by an indignant
Wang Jingwei (President of the Yuan) and others for stating that there
were similarities in the Guangzhou and Manchurian situations.98 Maze was
disappointed he had been led into this predicament and this heightened his
fear that he may be left responsible should any crisis erupt.
The Nanjing Government negated the possibility of negotiating directly
with the Manzhuguo authorities and they declared that no agreement or
understanding of any kind should be made between the Customs and 
the new territory. Maze was instructed accordingly that all his future 
actions should be carried out in the spirit of this non-recognition direc-
tive.99 The creation of Manzhuguo was an intensely political situation and
it was therefore a risk for Chinese politicians to be seen in any way
condoning negotiations with this new authority. Maze expressed frustration
at what he saw as the political protectionism of the Nanjing Government
commenting, ‘in order to save their own skins, the existing powers that be
in Nanking are quite prepared, it seems, to sacrifice the Customs integrity
in Manchuria’.100 It was in Maze’s interests to attempt to keep the Service
clear of the political side of events but obviously this was almost impos-
sible, the Service being so intricately bound to the Nationalist Government.
As events were so closely tied to the political situation in China any
foreign defence of the CMCS was carried out in unofficial communications.
Britain, in particular, was reluctant to be drawn directly into a situation
that the League of Nations Commission would soon investigate. Maze
wrote of the invaluable support Lampson had given him and recorded
Lampson offering, ‘I should be glad to do anything I could to strengthen
your hand’.101 Despite these helpful overtures, the British Minister was
reluctant to take official action. Indeed from the reading of Foreign Office
correspondence it appears Lampson was torn, not as to whether to support
the Customs or not, but as to the channels of support that would be appro-
priate. He acknowledged that the integrity of the Service had ‘long been
a cardinal point of British policy in China’,102 and while not wanting to
abandon the Customs he didn’t feel that such considerations were weighty
enough to demand protests be made to the new Manzhuguo authorities,
which Britain had not offically recognized.103 This hesitancy was echoed
throughout the British Government. The LO’s NRS, Walsham, spoke with
Sir Victor Wellesley and reported, ‘it struck me that the general attitude
of the British Government is one of marking time and that they wish to
leave China to manage her own affairs and not to move themselves unless
absolutely compelled to’.104 Even as early as March, therefore, Maze was
aware of the potential problems the Service would encounter should the
threats of takeover eventuate.
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Maze had attempted to put forth his views for possible compromises
that would relieve the situation, but once Nanjing’s policy was made known
(through meeting with Song), these overtures were never raised again. His
concern over the future of Customs houses within the new state is obvious:
We still sail in troubled waters and the Manchurian affair has created
a rather dangerous situation for us. I believe that if I were given a free
hand I could effect a settlement which would be satisfactory to both
parties, without prejudicing the major question – that is, the occupa-
tions of Manchuria – but the Nanking Government have various
political reasons for not allowing my advice and, of course, as Inspector
General it is for me to execute, and not formulate, the Government’s
policy.105
The phrase that ‘history was repeating itself’ appears in the Maze Papers
relating to the Manzhuguo threats against the Service.106 Maze clearly
perceived that the events in Tianjin in June 1930 and in Guangzhou in
1931 had certain parallels with events in the north-east.107 This is not to
say that he did not recognize the essential difference between previous
seizures of the Customs and the current threat from Manzhuguo. Rather,
Maze recognized that Manzhuguo represented an external and potentially
much more damaging challenge to the unity of the Service. A common-
ality in these affairs was, to his estimation, GMD reluctance to allow him
to enter negotiations that he believed may have saved the Service from
losing the Customs houses completely. Moreover, Maze expressed the view
that the CMCS was being sacrificed by the GMD.108
As with much of Maze’s leadership, pragmatism was a key. When
greeted with the potential threats by Manzhuguo authorities, Maze’s philos-
ophy was that of compromise. He stressed the need to give way to minor
points for the sake of saving the larger whole:
The chief consideration is to maintain the integrity of the Customs
Service in the General interest of all – including Japan. This being
understood, we ought to endeavour to avoid raising major questions;
give way, if necessary, in the case of minor questions; and try and
localise the issue as much as possible. If the Manchukuo Authorities
seize the Northern Revenue, let it be seized from the Revenue-
collecting Bank (the Bank of China) and not from Commissioners of
Customs; and should such an irregularity occur, we here, on our side,
will deal with the bank and leave it to handle the matter with those
concerned in the north: that it to say, we ought to strive to keep the
question of administrative control in the background, and it will prob-
ably be deemed convenient by everyone not to disturb the existing
Inspectorate system at present and leave us to continue to exercise
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From this passage it is apparent that Maze believed that, by removing the
focus of tension from the Service to the banks, it could remain unaffected.
This was a superficial view, however, as regardless of where the revenue
was seized it would still affect the CMCS. The key to his reasoning appears
to be the presumption that the Manzhuguo authorities would want to avoid
the inconvenience to their interests that would accompany any disruption
of the Service.
Dalian and the Fukumoto affair
In June tensions surrounding the fate of the CMCS outposts in Manchuria,
which had simmered since the creation of Manzhuguo, reached their
climax. Within the space of only a few days the new authorities moved
into action and seized the majority of Customs houses in the north-east,
starting with Dalian. Throughout June 1932 the NCDN focused on the
situation surrounding the CMCS, publishing reports of a plan to appoint
a Japanese IG.110 An editorial early in the month, entitled ‘Japan Adrift’,
discussed the gravity of the situation in Manchuria and saw the fate of the
Service as a secondary question to that of the Japanese occupation, which
the Lytton Commission would be addressing. The article stated:
The seizure of the revenue may, of itself, be comparatively unim-
portant, grave though that step obviously is. The real gravity of 
the crisis lies in the attack on the integrity of the Customs as the one
stable service in China and a most important factor in the preserva-
tion of the often precarious relations subsisting between China and 
the Foreign Powers.111
The editorial demanded that the Customs should be ‘swiftly protected’ not
merely for the revenue but because of its significance to the future of
Chinese political and economic development. The premeditated quality of
Manzhuguo’s actions by late June, however, appeared to have stunned the
foreign powers. Even more disconcerting was the overarching Japanese
support for these takeovers.
The situation escalated in Dalian when from 7 June Commissioner
Fukumoto, under significant pressure, failed to remit revenue to the Shanghai
Inspectorate. When sent a telegram by Maze questioning why this was 
the case, Fukumoto responded that he had hesitated to send any remit-
tances for fear of precipitating a crisis. In a telegram on 15 June, Maze 
made it clear that Fukumoto did not have the authority to discontinue remit-
tances. Again Fukumoto, after explaining that he had not discontinued 
but rather suspended payment of revenue, described the outcome of a
meeting with Guandong officials (not Manzhuguo officials, which reveals
the close allegiance between the two authorities in Dalian) and urged that
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compromise must be met to avoid ‘imminent rupture and taking of drastic
action by Manchukuo’.112 The Yokohama Specie Bank, which was acting
as the Customs bank in Dalian, refused to hand over remittances and
Fukumoto empathized with what he described as their fear of becoming
involved in political disputes. Events taking shape at Dalian had rapidly
spread beyond that of a Customs issue.
Fukumoto was warned by Kawai (Chief of Section for Foreign Affairs
of the Guandongzhou Government) that his determination to remit was
‘highly provocative’ and that should he proceed to do so, Japanese inter-
ests in Guandong leased territory might be affected. In addition Kawai
asserted that the Manzhuguo Government’s claims to Manchurian Customs
revenues were well founded. This was greeted with incredulity by Maze.113
In accordance with this advice Fukumoto was urged to postpone any action
and he appealed to Maze, ‘in the present situation it is practically impos-
sible for me to ignore the strong wish expressed by Leased Territory
Authorities’.114 Maze condemned this passive stance and ordered Fukumoto
to execute instructions. Fukumoto’s unwillingness to act on the instructions
became obvious as he telegraphed:
A passive attitude is the only one possible for me at the present moment.
I am myself convinced and also have been warned by responsible
Japanese Authorities that an open rupture between Dairen Customs 
and Manchukuo would be destructive to Japanese interests. That I, 
a Japanese, should be the instrument to bring about such a rupture is
intolerable and against my conscience.115
Despite such blatant insubordination Maze was hesitant to take any drastic
action until he had consulted with Song on the matter. The opportunity to
discuss this impasse was delayed as Song was travelling from Beiping
(Beijing) at the time. On 23 June Fukumoto was instructed to stand aside,
to place the Deputy Commissioner Hakamura in charge and to proceed to
Shanghai.116
Fukumoto’s actions had administrative and political significance. When
asked by Song for his opinion, Maze responded that dismissal was the
only punishment for Fukumoto’s insubordination but that he realized 
the consequences of this would extend further than simply removing him
from the Service. He reflected, ‘from a political standpoint it might be
desirable to go slow; that he [Song] must consider that dismissal would
make Fukumoto a martyr, a patriot and a hero, etc.’.117 Despite these reser-
vations Fukumoto was dismissed on 24 June. The NCDN devoted its
editorial to this dramatic turn of events and expressed sympathy for
Fukumoto. The paper acknowledged that he had served the Service loyally
in the past and had no doubt endured great personal pressures in the lead
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was fully justified in taking action against this unprecedented behaviour.118
The editorial examined these events as further evidence of Japanese
complicity in the Manzhuguo state:
For days past Tokyo had refused to admit that the assault on the Dairen
Customs was contemplated. The technique has been the regular stock-
in-trade of Japanese diplomacy ever since September last. It has lost
for Japan incalculable sympathy the world over.119
This action in Dalian had been largely unforeseen owing to its status as a
leased territory, but this takeover had created a precedent. As Maze outlined
in his report on these events, seeing that Dalian was within Guandongzhou
leased territory it had been assumed that interference with the Customs
there would not be tolerated.120 The impasse with Fukumoto proved the
folly of this view.
Ingram of the British Foreign Office regarded Fukumoto’s dismissal 
as ‘deplorable’.121 Under the Dalian Customs Agreement any replacement
was required to be a Japanese national and, therefore, little real change
could be effectively made. Furthermore such action was regarded as having
‘afforded the Japanese a suitable pretext for bringing to an end once and
for all the Chinese customs regime in Dairen’.122 As events transpired
CMCS and GMD reaction to the impasse in Dalian did become a catalyst
for seizures throughout the north-east. In response to Fukumoto’s dismissal,
Deputy Commissioner Hakamura resigned his post and by 27 June all
Japanese staff at Dalian had severed their ties with the Service. It is
arguable that Fukumoto’s dismissal prompted the Manzhuguo authorities
into action and by 8 July all Customs houses had been seized. The north-
east was effectively torn away from the Service.
Moves against the Customs Service (March–June 1932)
the Japanese have now started developments which may (in fact will, unless
there be a rapid restoration of the position) undermine the Chinese Maritime
Service and all for which that Service stands. . . . The whole affair is 
equivalent to robbery under arms.
North-China Daily News123
The NCDN was not alone in its indignation over the actions of the
Manzhuguo authorities in the north-east. Such outrage did not, however,
translate into concerted action against forcible takeovers, rather the foreign
powers looked on as the Customs suffered a crushing blow to its exist-
ence. As outlined previously, the Customs houses affected by Manzhuguo’s
ambitions for the region were in Aihui, Andong, Dalian, Harbin, Huichun,
Longjing, Niuzhuang and Shenyang. Reports from the Commissioners at
these posts afford a review of events leading up to their forcible removal
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from the Customs houses at the instigation of the new authorities.124 The
affected areas experienced a general pattern of threats against the Customs
house and intimidation of staff. In most cases by March the Customs houses
encountered their banks’ refusal to remit funds from the Customs account
to the Shanghai Inspectorate. By the end of March, therefore, the Customs
houses were in a deadlock. Regardless of their desire not to be drawn into
the demands of the Manzhuguo authorities, they were thwarted by the
banks’ refusal to remit revenue at the requests of the Commissioners. Maze
had anticipated that such action would then allow the Customs to continue
to function, as the issue was then not with the Service but the banks. This,
however, was not to be the case. In most instances any substantial remit-
tances to the Inspectorate had ceased by late April to early May.
Following the dismissal of Fukumoto, Manzhuguo forces, bolstered 
by Japanese police and in some cases military personnel, proceeded phys-
ically to take over the Customs houses. Commissioners arrived at work to
find the Customs houses under armed guard. In Harbin the Manzhuguo
authorities attempted a takeover at night but were bluffed from doing 
so by Commissioner Prettejohn and a number of Customs employees. 
This thwarting of the Manzhuguo forces was short-lived as staff arrived
the following morning to find the Customs house was barred shut.125 In all
instances the Commissioners were placed under considerable pressure 
and personal danger; they were often compelled at gunpoint to relin-
quish files, keys to safes and official documents. At Andong and Harbin
the Commissioners’ residences were similarly violated, subjected to 
‘raids’ as documents were hidden and staff sheltering there were sought
out. Even as early as March Prettejohn had been approached to join the
new regime and his Deputy Commissioner was also entreated with 
cash incentives. Staff at all other houses, including Longjing, Huichun,
Niuzhuang and Shenyang, were subject to threats and often imprisonment
to induce them to join the new regime. As Prettejohn commented on his
staff’s experiences at Harbin, ‘[w]hen “Manchukuo” want a man to work
for them and he refuses, the usual method is to put him in prison and 
treat him so badly that he eventually consents to anything’.126 Despite such
pressures and personal dangers, the majority of Customs staff remained
loyal to the CMCS.
Armed men, accompanied by a Japanese intelligence officer, forcibly
ejected Commissioner Wallas and his staff from the Longjing Customs
house on 29 June. In response to this affront Maze lodged a protest with
the Japanese chargé d’affaires.127 In particular he questioned the grounds
for Japanese involvement in such actions. This protest was largely
discounted by the chargé d’affaires, who maintained that an investigation
had confirmed that Japanese military authorities had not taken part in any
such actions and that furthermore Wallas was satisfied with the protection
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involvement in Manzhuguo’s actions against the CMCS was a common
device but had lost much of its plausibility by this stage.
In the lead up to, and during the takeovers, a number of CMCS staff
were imprisoned. Those unfortunate enough to be incarcerated were report-
edly mistreated in a bid to coerce their support for the new regime. Few
staff succumbed to these pressures. In Harbin Prettejohn took to harbouring
staff that he considered in a position of danger and then assisting them in
smuggling out of the town.128 Similarly in Niuzhuang Acting Commissioner
Shaw had given instructions for any staff that could do so to try their best
to escape from the port.129 In Aihui Commissioner Joly proceeded to evacu-
ate all staff and their families that he considered to be in danger.130 Their
journey by rail and vessel to Shanghai was indicative of the dangers they
had faced in the north-east.
After Fukumoto’s dismissal all Japanese staff severed their ties with 
the Customs and entreated others to do the same. After the takeovers 
new employees were required to work for the regime and some Chinese
CMCS staff were forced to remain in the interim to keep the houses 
operational. At Niuzhuang they were forced to keep filling their duties
while under armed guard, until replacements could be procured for the
new regime. Shaw reported that these staff used passive resistance to 
the new regime. He detailed:
[they] performed their duties in the most perfunctionary manner
possible, with the result that the staff of the ‘New Customs’ learned
their duties in a very poor manner, and that the office work was carried
out in a very confused way resulting in a large falling off of revenue
and the commission by merchants of many offences which could not
be detected by the ignorant and uninformed ‘new staff’.131
Clearly, the new authorities encountered a stronger resistance to their new
regime than they had envisaged. There were relatively few defections to
the new Customs apart from those of the Japanese staff. Threats and/or
cash incentives were necessary but not entirely successful in attracting staff
to the new regime.
The two most prominent defections to the Manzhuguo regime were
Fukumoto, the Commissioner of Dalian, and former Acting IG Edwardes.
Fukumoto became the Commissioner at Dalian for the Manzhuguo author-
ities and was responsible for removing the existing staff from office. While
the Customs houses were being seized there were approaches to Maze
regarding the possibility of having Fukumoto reinstated. It was suggested
to Maze that this might relieve some of the pressures being placed on the
Service in the north-east. Japanese authorities were keen to draw parallels
between Fukumoto and former IG Aglen. Maze, however, failed to agree
with these ‘similarities’, seeing that Aglen was insubordinate in refusing
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to follow government orders in the interests of the Service; whereas
Fukumoto’s insubordination was at the ‘bidding of an alien state’.132
Needless to comment Fukumoto was not reinstated.
Edwardes’ defection came in 1933 but still sent shockwaves through the
Service. Although Edwardes was no longer an active member of the
Customs, his acceptance of an appointment as an adviser to the Manzhuguo
authorities was an affront to not only the Chinese but also the entire 
Service (Edwardes was Aglen’s appointed successor in 1927 but had
become embroiled in the succession crisis that had ultimately brought Maze
into the Inspector Generalship). The shifting of allegiance by someone who
had been an employee of the CMCS was seen as particularly reprehen-
sible. The Chinese Government responded to the news of the March 
1933 appointment with the release of a circular condemning Edwardes’
‘despicable’ act:
[Edwardes’] action therefore in accepting post of adviser to the so-
called Manchukuo is not only manifestly one of base ingratitude which
has aroused the deep resentment of his former comrades in the Chinese
Customs Service and cast a slur upon the hitherto high reputation and
loyalty of the Service as a whole but is also in glaring contrast to the
behaviour of the foreign staff of the Customs until recently serving 
in Manchuria who, though offered bribes, subjected to the greatest
possible intimidation and even imprisonment, resolutely refused to give
to the so-called Manchukuo the benefit of their services and remained
staunchly loyal to the Chinese Government.133
In retribution for this traitorous act, the Nanjing Government cancelled all
honours that had been conferred on Edwardes.134 Whether Edwardes
retained his pension is somewhat unclear. Edwardes was rumoured to have
received £5,000 a year from Manzhuguo while still being pensioned by the
Chinese Government. Despite his ‘shady’ dealings, Edwardes became a
confidant to Sir Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury.135
Edwardes was listed in the Manzhuguo Handbook of Information for 1933
as a Counsellor to the Department of Foreign Affairs.136 According to 
Maze, moreover, Edwardes’ appointment as an adviser to Manzhuguo was
regarded as nothing more than a joke but that naturally the Chinese author-
ities were angry over this betrayal.137 Edwardes’ actions also brought the
foreign basis of the CMCS into disrepute.
By late 1932 some of Maze’s greatest fears for the Customs Service had
been realized. There was no longer any question of maintaining the integrity
of the Customs in Manchuria as it had been completely severed from
China’s Customs administration.138 The Inspectorate had once again had
its hands tied by the reluctance of the GMD to enter into negotiations with














































A Service in decline 145
anything more than unofficial overtures to the Japanese on this issue.
Despite recognition that foreign interests in China were endangered by the
actions of the new authorities in seizing the Customs houses, the powers
failed to respond. For the CMCS an era had passed – that of a unified
Service enjoying the support of the foreign powers in China, and in its
place dawned one that would be marked by a bitter struggle for continued
survival.
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7 ‘Steadfast and fearlessly
persistent’
The CMCS in the face of war,
1937–45
Though much which the institution represent belongs to the buried past, it
will deserve to be remembered as a model of disinterested efficiency and of
practical international service.
The Times, on the CMCS, 1 June 1943
As traced in preceding chapters, the influence and coherence of British
interests in the Service had been already been significantly challenged by
the early 1930s. A much more direct threat came with the culmination of
Japanese ambitions in China and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
in 1937. This chapter examines the fate of the Service in these later years
leading up to its removal from the mainland. For the CMCS the outbreak
of war initiated a struggle for survival in the face of substantial challenges.
Through compromise and determination, the Service was able to remain
intact, albeit operating under adverse conditions. Moreover the difficulties
for the CMCS ran deeper as the Nationalists sought to reduce the inde-
pendence of the foreign inspectorate, much as it had done to the Salt
Inspectorate. Consequently, in 1943 Maze submitted his resignation, thus
ending the era of British leadership of the Service. The Service continued
to function, in spite of great difficulties, until its removal to Formosa
(Taiwan) in 1949. Some Customs staff opted to remain in China to work
under the Communist party. The end of the Republic marked the end of
the CMCS as a Chinese institution and its role within treaty port China.
This chapter provides an overview of key events and themes relating to
the final decades of the CMCS. The year 1937 will be examined in some
detail as a way of highlighting the primary features of the wartime experi-
ences of the CMCS. Difficulty in remaining a national Service, operating
in occupied China and countering smuggling and other aggressions were
some of the key challenges faced by the Service. This period was marked
by disorder and disintegration. Japanese entry into the Pacific War marked
a new stage of relations for foreigners in China and so, too, for the CMCS.
And the immediate post-war period did not see an end to the challenges














































will also reflect on how tightly bound the Customs Service was to the
position and British interests in the Far East.
Japanese ambitions and the Customs
Japanese interests in the CMCS remained unabated from the early 1930s
onwards. It may be argued that Japanese occupation of Manchuria and
control of the Customs houses there gave Japan an even bigger economic
interest in China.1 Following from the Japanese occupation of Customs
houses in the north-eastern provinces, considerable pressure was brought
to bear to ensure a Japanese staff member remained in a position of influ-
ence within the Service. Maze wrote on this matter to Sir John Simon,
Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in June 1935.2 In this letter
Maze outlined that the ascendancy of Japanese influence in the politics of
the Far East had made the position of the CMCS and the role of the
Inspector General (IG) increasingly delicate. According to Maze, the
Japanese insisted that one of their nationals must hold a position close to
the IG, in this case that of the Chief Secretary. Subsequently, Commissioner
Kishimoto was appointed to the post.3 There was also the understanding
that if the post of Deputy IG was revived then it was expected that a
Japanese national should be appointed – this position was a significant one
as it usually denoted the successor for the IG’s position. Maze was confi-
dent, however, that no Japanese would ever be appointed IG owing to
Chinese opposition.
As the creation of a Japanese-led, autonomous region in north China
became more apparent, Maze began to formulate plans to keep the CMCS
intact.4 Maze proposed to follow the basic line of compromise that he 
had devised in 1932. This would see the Customs remaining intact and
staff holding their posts undisturbed. After deducting the cost of adminis-
tering the northern ports and share of the contribution towards interest 
of the foreign and domestic loans, the balance would remain with the
northern authorities. Internal division within the Chinese political scene
also compounded the difficulties the service faced. In this issue, Maze
showed the pragmatism that had become something of a trademark of his
administrative style. Not only did Maze see compromise as the best solu-
tion in relation to the Japanese, he also intended that the Guangzhou faction
and other independent factions in China should be encouraged to preserve
the Service. Compromise was the key to this solution; Maze believed he
could concede non-essentials while standing firm on the essentials when
necessary.5 The preservation of British influence in the Inspectorate was
a priority.
In early 1937 the North-China Herald (NCH) published an editorial on
the strength of the Service as an asset to China. This article praised the
ability of the CMCS to service foreign loans in spite of the loss of revenue
from Manchuria and Dalian. One passage reads:
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Amid the succession of upheavals, disappointments, disasters and
uncertainties, it seems to stand as the sure rock against which the waves
of misfortune dash helplessly if noisily. On it foreigners and Chinese
depend for the preservation of the fabric of commerce against the ills
of political and economic misfortune.6
The role of the CMCS in facilitating trade is depicted here as the key to
all commerce in China. Moreover it was being equated with stability for
China and China traders. This article gave unreserved support for the
Service and Maze’s leadership, praising their resolute stance despite ‘an
orgy of smuggling’ in the north. The Japanese were criticized in this article
as ‘patrons of an ad hoc smugglers paradise’. Clearly the foreign com-
munity in Shanghai (and no doubt elsewhere) were uneasy with events
unfolding in the north, particularly as smuggling undermined their inter-
ests and trading concerns. This article framed these concerns in terms of
being expressions from ‘friends of Japan’, reflecting the tensions emerging
between the desire to remain on cordial terms with the Japanese in spite
of their actions in China. This article was indicative of the concerns facing
the Service as it encountered increasing turbulence from 1937 onwards.
When confronted with the advancing Japanese military in China, the
predominant concern for Britain was the preservation of its economic 
interests. While there was growing sympathy for China in the face of
successive Japanese aggressions, British foreign policy remained concilia-
tory towards the Japanese.7 This attitude remained even after the outbreak
of the Sino-Japanese War. In part, this was a realization that Britain was
no longer in a position where it was capable of defending itself against
European aggressions as well as deploying its forces in the Far East.8 In
both 1937 and 1938 discussions took place between the British and the
Japanese, focusing on creating a better understanding between the powers
and also on the protection of British interests in Japanese-held areas.9 Even
after this time, when British-owned properties were attacked, the British
took a passive stance in relation to events. This would not have been lost
on the Chinese Government, fuelling anti-British sentiment that the GMD
already harboured.
British foreign policy was reflected to some extent through British 
businesses in China. The preference for conciliation can be evidenced
through the actions of the British merchants and enterprises in China who
were determined to continue their businesses despite Japanese invasion.
Christopher Briggs (Captain of the Customs launch Huashang, stationed
in Zhifu) recalled that as the Japanese military advanced and reconnais-
sance planes began to appear over Zhifu British businesses painted Union
Jacks on the roofs of their premises with the belief that this would spare
them from attack.10 He also recounted that the Customs had a flagstaff and
flew the British flag at this time (it is not clear if this was sanctioned by
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ambiguous position of the CMCS as a foreign-staffed but Chinese insti-
tution. This ambiguity became an ongoing problem for the Service and its
position in relation to British interests in China.
Tensions between the Chinese and Japanese forces reached boiling point
following the 7 July Marco Polo Bridge Incident and erupted into armed
clashes. The subsequent advance of Japanese troops into north China had
an immediate impact on the functioning of the Service. Zhifu provides a
good example of this. By the time Japanese warships arrived in Zhifu
harbour CMCS vessels had already been confined to the harbour for some
time. This was due to concerns for safety, considering there were many 
warships operating in the water. Briggs was notified that his ship was not
to go to sea without permission and a Japanese sentry on board. While this
practice did not continue for long (Briggs recounts the Japanese sentry’s
sea-sickness while facing a rough sea), it gives an indication of the attempts
to monitor and control the daily functioning of the CMCS. Later, the
Customs Commissioner was replaced by a Japanese Commissioner. Briggs
reflected on the feeling among the staff of the Customs:
We were, naturally I suppose, very anti-Japanese. They had started a
war against a China that employed us and treated us well. . . . A feeling
of insecurity and fear interrupted our peaceful and relaxed attitude to
life and our prospects for the future were beginning to look uncertain.
We were prepared to do anything which would embarrass the unwanted
invaders, without getting ourselves or even the Customs into trouble.11
For the foreign staff of the Customs, as with other larger foreign com-
munity, there was an uneasiness and fear of the ‘unpredictable’ Japanese
military, despite the belief that this conflict would remain between China
and Japan. For the foreign Customs staff, the risks were greater as they
were working for a Chinese institution.
By 1937 smuggling was rampant in the north-eastern provinces but 
also in other parts of China. The preventive department of the CMCS could
not cope with the scale of smuggling and the accompanying aggression it
encountered. In the NCH for 1937 rarely a week passed without reports 
on smuggling, clashes with smugglers, or complaints by the Japanese
against Customs officers for infringements, real or imagined. Smuggling
was particularly bad in Tianjin and it was reported that in a two-week period
in January a total of 60 trucks had forced their way through the customs
barrier, escorted by Japanese and Koreans.12 Many more trucks used 
other roads to travel inland with their goods. Thus Customs officers’ obser-
vation on this matter would only have represented a small proportion of
the actual amounts smuggled. Four categories of contraband were com-
monly smuggled: artificial silk yarn, cigarette paper, sugar and kerosene.13
Smugglers in Tianjin seized the CMCS station at Small West Gate at 
night and used this as a base for escorting convoys of their contraband.
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Moreover, in Tianjin in 1936 an estimated $50,000,000 duty was lost through
smuggling.14 Xiamen and Fuzhou were featured in articles detailing the chal-
lenges the CMCS faced with smugglers.15 This in itself provided an indi-
cation that smuggling was not solely the bane of the northern ports but rather
was afflicting all of the coastal regions to some extent. To thwart smugglers
the preventive service devised three lines of defence: the first being larger
patrol boats at sea, the second consisting of fast motor launches along the
coast, and the third being land stations.16 These measures were insuff-
icient to effectively stem the flow of smuggling. This was a disheartening 
situation for the Service and one that was fraught with danger for staff.
Smuggling not only affected revenues and trade but brought an element
of danger to the work of Customs officers. A number of officers were injured
by smugglers or in encounters with suspected smugglers. In one instance
near the Guangxi border a Customs party was ambushed while attempting 
to seize smuggled goods that had been hidden in an omnibus station. 
The Customs men retaliated with gunfire and withdrew but a Briton, Boat
Officer Paget, was killed and a Chinese guard was injured.17 Customs offi-
cers were constantly at risk, with land patrols coming under fire, and, in the
north, fierce resistance from Japanese and Korean smugglers.18 Customs
cruisers often had to fire warning shots across the bow of suspicious ves-
sels that refused to stop for inspection.19 And then boarding such vessels
was dangerous as often the crew were armed and prepared for a clash.
Sea- and river-going vessels in the Service were affected by Japanese
aggressions both in terms of control of the vessels and carrying out their
duties. A number of CMCS cruisers were seized or sunk while trying to
elude capture by Japanese destroyers. These included the Shungjing and
the Kwanwei. A report by Maze to the Chinese Government raised the
issue of Japanese victimization of CMCS vessels. This detailed two vessels,
not operating but docked in Ningbo, which were bombed and machine–
gunned by Japanese aircraft.20 Subsequently, the Customs Cruisers in
Shanghai were taken over by the Japanese army, CMCS crews were led
ashore and replaced by Japanese and the ‘rising sun’ flag was hoisted.
While the Japanese took over all vessels in Shanghai, including the dredg-
ing vessels, they did not engage in harbour maintenance. The resultant
silting of the Huangpu raised serious problems for all vessels seeking to
dock or depart from Shanghai’s deteriorating harbour.21
From the outbreak of war, Customs vessels were under threat of capture
by the Japanese and some were anchored in Hong Kong for safety. The
issue had arisen, however, of the possible sale of these preventive cutters
to the British Naval authorities.22 Maze expressed grave reservations at
this possibility, fearing it would provoke trouble from the Japanese author-
ities should they learn of it (this was later blamed for provoking the
Japanese move against the Customs in Shanghai). In addition, the ability
of the Customs to carry out their duties with regard to preventive works
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regions and inspections on land were increasingly difficult. Protection was
not always afforded by Hong Kong waters. In the case of the Zhaxing, the
cruiser was shelled by a Japanese destroyer and the Captain tried to make
a break by heading into Hong Kong waters but ended up beaching the
vessel.23 The crew then made safe their escape. The Japanese destroyer
then towed the cruiser back into Chinese waters. This vessel then became
a spoil of war.
The fate of the CMCS roused British concerns. The British Foreign Office
was keen to safeguard the Customs as the repayment of foreign loans was
directly linked to this Service. So when Japanese threats came to Tianjin
in August 1937, there was trepidation that the Service would be lost.
Certainly, there had been other challenges to the integrity of the CMCS but
these had come from factions within China or within the Service (the succes-
sion struggle), but this was altogether different. At the crux of this was 
the Japanese concern that revenues would be used to fund the Chinese
resistance or war effort. Therefore allowing the Chinese any access to funds
from occupied territories made no sense. The British feared the Japanese
might take drastic action and so they encouraged compromise. Ideally,
revenue could be placed in the Yokohama Specie Bank but foreign loans
would be repaid. However, in negotiations Commissioner Myers in Tianjin
(under significant pressure from the Japanese) overreached this mark, as all
revenues were placed in the Yokohama Specie Bank, including remittances
for foreign loans.24 This was a much larger concession than had been
predicted or desired by the British Foreign Office, or the Service.
In November the Japanese made it clear they wanted half of Shanghai’s
revenues. The British Foreign Office attempted to negotiate so that all
revenues would be placed in a neutral bank but, in the end, an agreement
was struck whereby all revenues (including those already held in the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank) would be transferred to the Yokohama Specie
Bank. From this, foreign loan obligations would be filled. By December
a Japanese Commissioner was appointed to the Shanghai post. In addition
the duties of appraisal and examination were taken over by Japanese staff.
These Japanese officials were, however, operating under the nominal
control of Maze, as the IG.25 The actions of the Japanese in Shanghai were
not as cautious or slow as they had been with the takeover of the Customs
houses in the north-east, where these takeovers had been preceded by warn-
ings, representations and the like. In this instance, the Japanese took
advantage of the momentum gained through their military offensive. And
by December 1937 they had asserted their control in Shanghai.
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Government refused to capitulate to this
British effort at appeasement. For the Nationalists, challenges came from
Japanese aggressions but were also present in the tenuous United Front
formed with the Communists. This united stance against the common 
foe had unraveled by 1939 so the GMD then faced challenges that were
both external and internal in nature. The challenges to the CMCS were 
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symptomatic of an external threat; however they did not allow Maze to
transfer the funds from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. For Maze, this
was a difficult situation as he was torn between British agreements and 
priorities and the wishes of the Chinese Government. He was also under
constant pressure from Japanese interests in the Service. No matter how
skilled his diplomacy, it was obvious that Maze could not devise a plan to
satisfy all of these interests while maintaining the integrity of the Service.
The Customs Agreement of May 1938 focused particularly on the
Japanese controlled treaty ports. In essence this saw the British recognition
of the right of the Japanese-controlled autonomous regional governments
in China to take over the Customs service. It also saw the British giving
up their claim to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation’s
custody of Customs funds.26 This raised protest from the Chinese Minister
of Finance, Kong Xiangxi (better known as Dr H.H. Kung), and from
within the Service. All future revenues were, however, placed in the
Yokohama Specie Bank, and, from this time, the Japanese were more
restrained towards the CMCS.27 China continued to service foreign loans
until January 1939. In contrast, the issue of the repayment of domestic
loans had long been overlooked. To some extent these negotiations reveal
the source of Maze’s frustration. Despite British assurances that the CMCS
was a priority, they were prepared to sacrifice its integrity as a Chinese
institution for the sake of appeasing Japanese interests and ensuring the
Japanese did not take over the Service. Safeguarding their own economic
interests was a priority and as long as foreign loans were being repaid then
they would be satisfied. This policy of appeasement was pronounced after
the war in Europe commenced.
Japanese administration of the Customs within the Japanese-controlled
territories left much to be desired. The system was described as ‘breaking
apart’.28 A revision of the tariff scheme led to the favouring of Japanese
goods but reportedly many commodities were brought duty-free into 
China under the guise of supplies for troops. Accompanying this was the
perfunctory searching of Japanese vessels. Japanese soldiers were reported
as levying internal transport charges through threat of force rather than
any authorization.29 All of these factors combined to undermine trade and
revenue. For the Chinese Government, Customs revenues were dimin-
ished and yet war costs kept rising. Deficit spending was already a problem
for the GMD and issuing of new currency led to inflation rather than
alleviating the situation.
The Pacific War and implications for the CMCS
With the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 the United States
entered the World War. China then fell under the ‘American sphere of
influence’ for the Pacific War and aligned itself against the axis powers.30














































The CMCS in the face of war, 1937–45 153
Japan’s rapid victories against the allies led to a renewed interest in the
China theatre as the Chinese forces had been fighting the Japanese for
many years). With the outbreak of the Pacific War, internment and the fear
of persecution loomed large for Customs staff. The Customs establish-
ments still operating under Maze’s nominal control in occupied China 
were seized in December and American and British staff interned. Despite
assurances by the Japanese authorities that he would remain unmolested,
Maze was seized on 5 March 1942 by the Japanese Gendarmerie. He was
detained and interned in Shanghai’s notorious Bridge House for ques-
tioning. Maze wrote of this experience and the deprivations he suffered.
He recorded that he was:
Thrown into the noisome felon’s prison known as the ‘Bridge House’.
It is divided into six so-called ‘old cells’ about 20 feet by 10 feet 
and six ‘new cells,’ somewhat larger. I was domiciled in one of the
latter. . . . My prison associates, in addition to a few foreigners, in-
cluded Chinese thieves, murders and bandits, etc . . . most of the lower
class Chinese occupants were suffering from various loathsome skin
diseases and their clothes were alive with vermin.31
Maze was detained for four weeks. Following this internment, he was re-
patriated to Durban. It was after this that he decided to return to China
and to the wartime capital to resume his duties.
In December 1942 Maze arrived in Chongqing and described the Customs
situation as both ‘confused and difficult’.32 He firmly believed that his
internment had allowed the Chinese to curtail the influence of the IG, taking
away the prestige and authority of this post. The Service too had been
affected. He commented:
I think they [the Chinese government] propose to make the Service a
purely Chinese subordinate Department of the Ministry, as it has been
in theory but not in practice – witness the present predicament of the
Postal and Salt Departments.33
Maze was not wholly surprised by what he perceived as an inevitable
reduction in the role of the Service, most particularly as he believed 
China had come to political maturity. With China now at the ‘forefront 
of world events’ he sympathized with their desire to cast aside foreign
interference. What he did not agree with was the methods undertaken to
reduce the standing of the Service. He reflected that his own actions 
in preventing the appointment of further foreign staff from 1930 was part
of this preparation for Chinese staff to take over control of the Service.
And when in Spring 1943 Maze was requested to submit plans for the
post-war rehabilitation of the Service he suggested recalling retired foreign
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CMCS men but only on a contract basis.34 This again reflected Maze’s
sympathies with the Service becoming a truly Chinese institution.
While returning to China, Maze did not intend to not remain in Chong-
qing for the long term to administer the Service.35 In May 1943 Maze
announced his resignation from the CMCS and his intention to depart from
China. He cited ill-health as a major factor in his decision. By this 
stage he had served in the CMCS for just over 50 years and his internment
experiences coupled with the tensions and hardships during wartime would
no doubt have taken their toll. In correspondence, however, ill-health
receives little attention and rather Maze identified the decline of British
status in the Far East (following the fall of Hong Kong and Singapore) and
the shifting of Chinese public opinion towards the Americans (following
American loans to China) as the factors that had made his position unten-
able.36 In his estimation then, it was larger political forces that had brought
Maze’s leadership to an end.
Events leading up to Maze’s resignation revealed tensions surrounding
the leadership of the Service. Apparently much of the resentment on the
part of the Chinese Government was that Maze had been instructed by
Generalissimo Jiang to remove the Inspectorate to the wartime capital as
early as 1940. Maze claimed that he had never received these instructions
and therefore had not relocated the Inspectorate. Countering these claims
was Kong’s assertion that Maze had been issued these instructions but
refused to comply. Rather than embarrassing Kong and disputing such com-
ments, Maze had allowed Kong to ‘save face’ and to restore the good stand-
ing of the Customs.37 This took some time but Maze believed this decision
was important for maintaining the goodwill of supporters of the CMCS.
In London The Times carried an editorial titled ‘Foreigners in China’,
reporting Maze’s resignation and reflecting on his career. This article
lamented Maze’s ill-health stemming from his imprisonment as the factor
that had led Maze to relinquish leadership of the Service. The editor-
ial praised Maze as a capable administrator with ‘a warm sympathy for
progressive movements in China, and a sure political instinct’.38 And
furthermore it reflected that Maze’s resignation marked the end of a third
stage for the Customs (the first being its inception, the second the leader-
ship of Aglen). Of note is the reference to the CMCS as an institution of
a bygone era: ‘Though much which the institution represented belongs to
a now buried past, it will deserve to be remembered as a model of dis-
interested efficiency and of practical international service.’39 Certainly the
glory days of the CMCS were long past, and so too its era of wielding
great influence in China’s affairs. This was what Maze himself had greeted
as an inevitable progression. The idea of the Service as providing ‘disin-
terested efficiency’ is a curious one; this institution had long balanced
between foreign and Chinese interests and often had a partisan role in
events. The cessation of British leadership effectively brought to an end
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Maze’s resignation was tinged with disappointment. He reflected: ‘I must
confess that after 50 years’ service I expected better treatment than I have
received at the hands of the Government.’40 Although Maze resigned from
the Customs he remained in an advisory role to the Chinese Government.41
He also responded to requests from various Chinese communities by broad-
casting appeals for medical supplies for China.42 In this way he could draw
on his standing as a long-time advocate for China in the international arena.
Maze’s position as Adviser to the Ministry of Finance was limited by the
fact that he remained overseas and in his correspondence there is no indi-
cation that he intended to return to China. Moreover, once the war had
ended, the need to reorganize the CMCS was paramount, and this led to
an examination of its administrative funds, which in turn provided the
rationale for abolishing this advisory post in November 1945.43 It is
arguable that this would have happened as a matter of course and Maze
did not express any surprise in his correspondence that his services were
dispensed with.
The decline of British influence and interest in the CMCS reflected the
general decline of Britain in the Far East. The British were in a dilemma
as they had substantial interests in the Far East but lacked the financial
means to actively defend them.44 In addition there was strong anti-British
sentiment among the Chinese leadership (something that Maze himself
reflected upon), which further heightened British fears. In contrast, Ameri-
can actions in China had often been linked with philanthropic works and
education, creating a positive impression. American support of China’s
war effort also further enhanced this goodwill.45 British intentions were
indeed to remain in China but their promises of economic development
and assistance came with a caveat that Britain could only afford to do so
after a three- to four-year period.
In an expression of goodwill on the part of the British, 1943 saw the
signing of an Anglo-Chinese Agreement. This agreement surrendered
British rights and concessions and was intended to herald a new era of
equality between the two powers.46 This was intended to boost Chinese
morale in their fights against the Japanese, but at the same time would
also help to preserve British commercial interests in China. In reality
however, this agreement was not such a great sacrifice on the part of the
British, as the concessions they held (Tianjin for example) had become
more of a liability, owing to anti-British sentiment, than a benefit. It also
raised more issues than it resolved, as it brought into focus Kowloon terri-
tories and their retrocession. And British merchants soon found themselves
helpless against discriminatory laws.
In Maze’s view anti-British feeling among the Chinese leadership was
the key to the decline of the Service. Jiang, in particular, in his view,
harboured such sentiments. Maze provided various reasons for what he
saw as anti-British sentiment, including Jiang feeling snubbed in respect
to international negotiations, the poor treatment of Chinese troops while
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fighting alongside the British in Burma, and also ‘an inferiority complex’.47
This was purely speculative but for Maze this provided some rationale for
the way in which the foreign Inspectorate of the CMCS was treated. Maze
saw this as compounding the way British interests were ‘left in the cold’
as now the Americans were dominant in China’s affairs. The appointment
of an American as the new IG was a reflection on the rising influence of
America in the Far East. This appointment was designed to snub the British
(according to Maze). Maze had submitted a list of possible successors and,
from this, the American citizen Little was selected. This appointment thus
ended British leadership of the CMCS and reinforced the demise of British
influence in the Inspectorate.
Maze appeared to have something of a tense relationship with his
successor, Little, evidenced through a terse exchange of letters relating 
to the custodial rights of Hart’s correspondence. The tensions surrounding
these papers may have been an outlet for asserting authority with regard
to the CMCS and Maze’s reluctance to relinquish his control. Maze’s 
decision to withhold some confidential and private documents from his
successor illustrates this tension.48 There is also no evidence of Maze cor-
responding at great length with his successor; this is surprising as Maze’s
correspondence reflects ongoing contact with many members of his staff.
The general impression is that Maze remained aloof from this new leader-
ship of the CMCS but did maintain contact with senior Chinese staff.
New leadership was not the only change for the Service. Foreign CMCS
staff could no longer look with certainty to the Service for their liveli-
hood. What had been a relatively assured career in the Service was thrown
into disarray by the 1940s. Life in the Service and, indeed, in treaty 
port China had effectively changed forever. Customs staff had encoun-
tered serious challenges during the war years including intimidation, attack
and, finally, internment. Furthermore, many had not received salaries 
since December 1941.49 Compounding the issue was the fact that the issue
of emoluments for interned foreign staff was slow to be addressed.
Employment opportunities were available in the Abyssinian and Iraqi
Customs and, in light of the difficulties faced by staff wishing to remain
in China, Maze expressed the view that staff should consider such pos-
itions.50 Many staff also looked to the British Commonwealth for their
livelihoods.
During the War, the Japanese had seized property belonging to internees.
After the War, Chinese authorities took over these properties. According
to the principles of the 1943 Anglo-Chinese Agreement these properties
should have been returned to their British owners; however, this was rarely
observed as the Central Government could not effect observance from its
subordinates.51 Numerous representations on this matter were made by the
British before property was returned. Even by 1949 there were still diffi-
culties in this regard.52 British shipping was also affected by tough new
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In the case of Customs staff, personal belongings were lost. In Shanghai,
staff had locked their belongings into the Customs godown for safekeep-
ing. All personal effects were, however, handed over by the Japanese to
the ‘Enemy Property Control Commission’ in February 1944 and were
considered lost.53 It was later realized that these items had been auctioned.
Similarly, after the war, when efforts were under way to recover and
account for belongings, opportunism abounded and Chinese staff enlisted
to created invoices were often suspected of theft (considering the post-war
economy it may not be too surprising that some staff would give in to the
temptation to avail themselves of goods that could be sold or traded). Even
items sent outside China were not safe. Maze had sent cases of papers
(both personal and semi-official in nature) and other valuables to Singapore
(Britain’s fortress in the south-east) for safekeeping, but with the fall of
Singapore in 1942, these belongings were scattered and jewellery stolen.54
This loss of personal property in addition to internment was a blow to
Customs staff, many of whom were left with little after building collections
during lengthy careers in China.
In the post-war period, Little had to reorganize and rebuild the Service.
The CMCS needed to reorganize and re-staff but there was official resist-
ance against the return of foreign staff, although in some instances (for
instance the Marine Department) their expertise was needed. All technical
staff, including marine officer and examiners, were called back to China.
Some indoor staff were also asked to return but the return of many foreign
Commissioners was contentious.55 Moreover, the prospects for ex-CMCS
staff were not good enough to induce them to return to their former posts.
Many ex-Customs men were dealing with post-war legacies of dislocated
families and this may account for some reluctance on their part to venture
to China again. Little’s attempts to lure these men back to the service had
mixed results. Severe inflation and domestic turmoil were disincentives;
an additional deterrent was that wives were not permitted to return with
their husbands. This no doubt decided the question for many of these
former Customs men.56 There was mention, however, of some 40 to 50
men who would be returning to China between May and September 1946.
Despite efforts to rebuild the CMCS it was difficult to operate in an
environment of domestic turmoil. The Service faced its most serious 
challenges as inflation and civil war took hold of China. The CMCS had
ceased to function as a strong national institution, and its foreign inspec-
torate was a mere shadow of its pre-1937 form. The late 1930s to 1945
marked the demise of British interests in the Customs Service. It is fair to
say that by this time the CMCS had ceased to exist as a British concern
and had become more of a liability for British interests in China. The
appointment of an American IG confirmed this new focus of Chinese inter-
ests and so too signalled the end of British dominance in this once powerful
but now demoralized institution.
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In the final analysis
To conclude then, this work has traced the gradual decline of the CMCS
as an imperial institution. Contrary to Hart’s predictions and Aglen’s
misgivings that the CMCS could not survive in the Republic, this work
has shown that the Service responded dynamically to numerous forces of
resistance and change that confronted and challenged its existence. This
resistance manifested itself in both Chinese and British/Western responses
to the Service. What the CMCS could not resist was the upheaval wrought
by war and then the demise of the treaty port system. With the end of the
treaty port system much of the rationale of the Service had vanished.
This work has explored particular junctures where the existence and
nature of the Customs was challenged, including the Guangzhou Customs
crisis, the Guangzhou–Hong Kong boycott, the Customs succession
struggle, the negotiations over a Hong Kong Customs agreement and the
seizure of the Tianjin Customs followed by Japanese aggression in the
north-east. By examining these threats against the Service and responses
to them, this work serves to highlight the shifting significance of the
Customs as a foreign institution, while at the same time providing insight
into perceptions of identity within the Service.
In many ways the psyche of the Service remained constant, despite many
challenges. From its inception right through to its decline, there was an
overwhelming sense of mission in maintaining the CMCS for the good of
China, but this was always tempered with a consciousness of the British
and other foreign interests that the Service protected. The present work has
recorded an account of Britain’s shifting perceptions of the Service and has
shown how the Customs can often be seen as indicative of larger forces at
play in Sino-Western relations. In 1923 the Service had been seen as a
foreign concern, to the extent that gunboat diplomacy was employed to
dissuade Sun from interfering with foreign interests, but by 1932 the British
were hesitant even to protest unofficially the seizure of the north-eastern
Customs houses by the Manzhuguo authorities. The fate of the CMCS
reflected the decline of Britain and the West in China and the general demise
of the privileged life enjoyed by the foreigner in the treaty ports.
From the 1920s it is possible to trace a decline in the status and cohe-
siveness of the CMCS as an institution with national scope. This accelerates
in the 1930s with a de-evolution of the Service occurring during the war
years. Threats against the Service, whether successful or not, all served to
emphasize the tenuous base that this institution functioned from. The
attacks against the Customs in the 1930s signalled the demise of the service.
And this was further accelerated through the Sino-Japanese War and the
subsequent World War.
A frustrated and isolated Maze clung to the belief that he was defending
British interests in China through the Customs service, but the British
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integrity of Service had been breached, however, there was little that could
be done by Maze or the British to lessen the damage. The Service had
relied on its image as being able to function largely separate from the
Chinese political situation, a belief that was a dangerous illusion. Under
Little’s leadership the CMCS did not fare any better as by this stage the
influence of this institution had been eroded.
The CMCS, the best friend of China, had been dealt a heavy blow with
the loss of the Customs establishments in the north-east. But the decline
of the Service did not end here. The forces of change and resistance
continued to play themselves out and by the mid-1930s the Service strug-
gled to maintain the semblance of its former cohesive structures. The
Service was very much a product of its era, growing out of the treaty port
system, and reliant to a large extent on the continued goodwill of not only
the Chinese authorities but also the interested foreign powers. And until
the Sino-Japanese War, foreign interests in loan repayments and the con-
tinuation of existing trade won out over any other concerns for the bitter
struggle that was engulfing China.
Thus, over 40 years after Hart had prophesied that the Service, would
collapse, the foreign inspectorate ceased to operate in treaty port China.
The CMCS had survived for the duration of the treaty port system and
beyond but was no match for the new wave of patriotism that was sweeping
China in the form of the Communist Party. There was no place for this
remnant of foreign imperialism with its ties to the Nationalist era in the
new People’s Republic of China. Vestiges of this international service
remain, however, in the voluminous archives documenting trade, in service
reports, in the lighthouses and charting of rivers, in photographs, through
reminiscences of careers on the China coast, and in architectural legacies
such as the Customs Inspectorate building with its imposing clock tower,
which still graces Shanghai’s Bund.
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